European Integration Studies

Kickstarting the Hungarian defence industry in the 2020s – Synergies, opportunities, and obstacles for smaller member states within EDTIB

Tamás Csiki Varga — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

Since 2016, Hungary has embarked upon developing its national defence industrial capacities as part of a comprehensive homeland defence and armed forces modernisation programme. Once underfinanced and degraded, with minimal capacity remaining, the national defence technology and industrial base have been reorganised and developed over the past decade as an integral part of the defence modernisation programme. Meaningful production, research, and development capacities have been developed in close cooperation with Tier-1 European (particularly German) defence industry firms, with a focus on regionalisation; cooperation with Turkish, Austrian, and Czech firms; and various joint ventures. Relying on the opportunities offered by European cooperation initiatives (both within the EU and NATO), these projects aim to tie Hungarian and joint ventures to the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, as well as to make use of joint technology development and available resources for multinational cooperation. Based on the thorough assessment of primary sources (strategic documents, expenditure data) and secondary literature (expert analyses and media reports) this paper provides an overview of these processes. The goal of the paper is to assess the synergies, opportunities, and obstacles for developing the Hungarian defence industry in the 2020s, presenting the lessons learned to its European allies. The conclusions of the research show that kick-starting a rapid, large-scale industrialisation and modernisation programme with an innovation edge by the early 2030s is a ‘high risk – high reward’ strategy. This ambitious goal is supported by sizeable midterm procurement programmes driven forward by a record-breaking defence budget; redesigned institutional, legal, and innovation frameworks; and an integrated long-term national industry development programme. Still, sustaining high-level investment, providing skilled and qualified workforce, and developing innovative capacities remain the most crucial pillars of developing the Hungarian defence industry.

Constitutional and European legal rules for armaments’ quality and presentation of alternative procurement: Contribution to the possibilities of contractual optimisation in armament procurement (the contract as a force multiplier)

Karl-Heinz Gimmler — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

War is a legally relevant hazardous situation with potentially incalculable human casualties in terms of life and limb, especially of the soldiers in action. This dangerous situation is comparable to a nuclear power plant meltdown.
Many European states have a constitutional obligation (not examined in detail). For example, the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria must qualitatively optimise armament for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of soldiers who may be fighting.
This obligation exists throughout the EU based on the CFR and the jurisdiction of ECHR, in the rank of ordinary statutory law.
Armament procurement is also a legal subject for multidimensional optimisation under numerous legal aspects, in particular the choice of contract type, price optimisation, and tax optimisation. Therefore, it should (finally) be considered multidimensionally for the benefit of the defence of freedom in EU-Europe and NATO as a whole.
The procurement of defence equipment must contractually enable the core objectives of the state, namely secure availability, sustainable defence equipment, and cost-effective procurement. To this end, hundreds of individual contractual clauses and regulations must be used.
Rental and leasing contract procurement is generally more cost-effective and otherwise offers no disadvantages compared to traditional purchase procurement. All conceivable disadvantages can be contractually prevented and avoided. Specific unavoidable disadvantages are practically not recognisable. It is a suitable “force multiplier and defence enabler.”
Optimised contractual arrangements, particularly other contract types and VAT optimisation, can save at least tens of billions of euros per year in the whole EU-Europe.
Due to the lower impact on the annual budget, more and/or better quality of armaments can be procured.

Social engineering warfare as a tactic of information warfare

Stjepan Groš — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

Information warfare encompasses a set of tactics and techniques used to spread disinformation. Adversaries use these strategies to run information operations to manipulate individuals, groups, and society. Owing to the current widespread information warfare, studying the phenomenon to identify effective and efficient means of combating information operations is very important. One prerequisite for the efficient and effective suppression of information operations is an awareness of the tactics and techniques of information warfare. Identifying these tactics and techniques will take some time because of the large number of options at the disposal of those who spread disinformation. This study contributes to this endeavour by analysing social engineering as a technique of information operations. Treating social engineering as a technique of information warfare is a novel approach because social engineering is usually associated with cyber security and is rarely discussed in conjunction with information warfare. We show that social engineering can be used in information operations without requiring significant adaptations. We also argue that social engineering should be treated as a distinct domain and activity, separate from both cyber security and information warfare. While both cyber security and information warfare can use social engineering in their operations, they remain distinct activities that require unique knowledge and skillsets.

New Types of Higher Airspace Flight Operations and Their Legal Challenges

Attila Horváth — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

The absence of an internationally recognised legal boundary between airspace and outer space has long been acknowledged but has seldom resulted in practical operational issues. This was largely due to the clear technological distinctions between air and space activities. However, advancement in materials, propulsion and manufacturing technologies now enable operations in the transition zone between conventional aerial flight and spaceflight. It is only a matter of time before activities in this specific region around our Earth will be facing legal challenges. The lack of clear legal delimitation between outer space and airspace does not stem from an absence of natural phenomena that could define such a boundary but rather the existence of multiple valid criteria, each of which has counterarguments. To address this issue, it is proposed that an intermediate or transition zone be codified to establish a secure legal framework for these emerging higher airspace operations. Such a framework would provide legal security for investors, while fostering research, development and innovation. Although this measure would not resolve all legal ambiguities concerning spaceflight, it could alleviate challenges faced by developers and operators of stratospheric, mesospheric, and lower thermospheric flight technologies. This article explores practical examples and the technological contexts of these operations to inform developers about regulatory developments.

Legal regulation on the use of artificial intelligence for national security purposes in Europe

Marko Jurić — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

This paper analyses the regulation of the use of AI for national security purposes in Europe. After a brief mapping of most relevant uses of AI for national security purposes, applicable legal framework is analysed. Both the EU AI Act and the Council of Europe's AI Convention provide for broad exceptions regarding the use of AI for national security purposes. This covers activities of both public and private entities acting in the national security domain. In such circumstances, personal data protection law is seen as possessing the most direct impact on the use of AI for national security purposes. In this context, the notion of personal data is explained, emphasizing that any information relating to an identified or identifiable person qualifies as personal data under both the GDPR and Convention 108. The processing of this data, which is broadly defined, can be subject to data protection laws even in national security contexts, provided it meets certain criteria.

The research shows that while there is a lot of uncertainty when it comes to the application of personal data rules to national security situations, existing case-law indicates that application of those rules is not fully excluded. On the contrary, it is to be expected that at least when private entities are involved in data processing operations, personal data protection law might prove to be very effective. Also, it is to be anticipated that the ECHR will play a major role in ensuring that uses of AI for national security purposes remain in line with requirements of democratic society.

Cybersecurity from a systemic perspective

Barbara Kaczmarczyk — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

Cyberspace has become a place of aggressive attacks aimed at various areas of human life. Statistics indicate a dynamic increase in cyberattacks in European Union (EU) member states and NATO countries, where technologies are developing at a rapid pace; on the one hand, this contributes to economic growth and, on the other hand, to the creation of increasingly complex cyberattack algorithms. They are aggressive and can cause significant losses.

The following research methods were used to develop the article: analysis and synthesis of literature on the subject in the field of security, the state security system, cybersecurity, statistical data and legal acts. interviews were also conducted with experts in the field of security and cybersecurity systems.

A systemic approach can be considered in the context of two subsystems: management and executive. The management subsystem includes the decision-making bodies of NATO and EU structures that develop a cybersecurity policy for all members of their structures, while the executive subsystem includes the armed forces and other security entities of individual EU and NATO members, as well as society on an individual (citizens) and collective (private institutions, enterprises) basis.

Due to the nature of cyber threats, cyber security should be considered systemically, i.e. in a way that covers all its aspects; we should also improve cybersecurity strategies to counter threats, secure infrastructure and the green energy sector, develop technological and production resources, and enable the creation of cyber defense that is applicable both in one country and around the world.

Screening for Security: The Defence Sector as a Gateway to Broader Economic Control

Bálint Kovács — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

This paper explores certain aspects of defence industrial protectionism, and draws parallels with investment screening, as one of the major tools used to maintain economic security. Investment screening has been used quite often in the case of takeovers in the defence sector. Investments in this area, coming from either strategic partners or adversaries, have previously been blocked in several jurisdictions. While this was viewed as normal, the expansion of this treatment to other areas of the economy is a more recent development. Economic security, as a dimension of national security often takes precedence over liberal market principles. Several economic activities are now subject to screening, resulting in further state involvement in the economy, under the guise of the protection of economic security.

Human oversight and risk-based approach to artificial intelligence: What does the Artificial Intelligence Act have in common with discussions about lethal autonomous weapon systems?

Kaja Kowalczewska — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

The regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) is a pressing global concern, with various regulatory bodies aiming to foster innovation while safeguarding humanity’s interests. This article synthesises perspectives on AI regulation in civilian and military domains, highlighting common ethical foundations and legal proposals. Emphasising the European Union’s ethical community as delineated by fundamental rights, it explores the Artificial Intelligence Act and debates on lethal autonomous weapon systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. By analysing the overlap between civilian and military ethics, the article argues for a shared objective: promoting innovation while upholding human dignity through robust regulations that ensure human oversight and a risk-based approach. The article contends that the consensus on substantive issues regarding military AI regulation is imminent, but its formalisation through legal means may lag behind.

Space defence legal regime in the service of sustainable development

Katarzyna Malinowska — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

This article examines the challenges and opportunities of military space activities in the context of the sustainable development of space exploration. It investigates the legal frameworks governing military use, focusing on the need for regulations to address risks such as space debris caused by anti-satellite testing, as well as space governance issues. It analyses the role of international, regional (EU), and national laws and policies in achieving a sustainable and responsible exploration of outer space. The role of international and regional bodies such as the UN and EU in achieving sustainability goals is analysed in terms of the synergy between civil and military uses of space.

Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights from the perspective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Krzysztof Masło — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

According to Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European Union (EU) is obliged to access the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Accession to the ECHR is particularly important in the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The work carried out on the basis of which the EU will accede to the ECHR should aim to shape the future accession agreement so that it not only resolves the problem of judicial control over the CFSP and the compatibility of the law created with the standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) but also, above all, addresses the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR in the context of the deficit of judicial control of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) over the law created under the CFSP and the practice of the functioning of this policy. This article thus focuses on previous works concerning EU accession to the ECHR, possible solutions to problematic questions, and the importance of the ECHR to the CFSP. The process of accession to the ECHR has shown that the introduction of an explicit legal basis in the treaties authorising the EU to do so has proven insufficient and created new problems which have in turn proved difficult to solve in practice.

Defence capability development optimisation

Jan Mazal — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

This article outlines comprehensive research methodologies and practical outcomes aimed at enhancing strategic decision-making processes in defense capability development. It introduces a structured and applicable methodological framework that integrates theoretical principles, advanced technological approaches, and practical experiences. Central to this framework are advanced modeling and simulation techniques, specifically constructive wargaming and operations research methods. These techniques systematically integrate a set of capability optimization tasks exploiting detailed mathematical modeling and simulation, supported by specialized software tools. The article outlines thirteen conceptual steps for optimizing military force structures and capability configurations by evaluating a vast array of combat scenarios by operational effectiveness criteria within established financial and strategic constraints. The proposed framework is the subject of serious research activities and a defense project development aimed at enhancing the practical applicability of the described methods and approaches to computer-aided capability development processes, effectively supporting strategic planning and substantially improving overall military preparedness.

The growing role of the European Commission in defence capability development

Anna Molnár — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

The aim of this research is to present and analyse the growing role of the European Commission in defence capability development. In the first section, I review the literature on the theoretical background of the Commission’s role in the European defence policy. In the second section, I briefly present the decision-making processes in the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. Following the discussion of the external factors that underpin these developments, I elaborate on the past role of the European Commission and how it has changed after the recent Russian aggression in the Ukraine. I then use SWOT analysis to highlight the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the role of the Commission in European defence. Although several EU member states and institutions supported the further integration of defence policy following the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy in early 2000, the defence-related activities of the EU remained weak and limited. Similar to the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine in recent years has spurred further development and “Europeanisation” of this policy area. During the last decade, the EU has set the defence agenda in motion and has launched new military-related initiatives due to the deteriorating security environment in the EU’s neighbourhood. This has sometimes even involved breaking the taboos on defence and strengthening the role of the Commission significantly in the defence industry and space sectors. Following the creation of the European Defence Fund, the most important development in this area concerned the possibility of using EU budget money for defence purposes. Although the defence industry and market of the EU is still fragmented and underfinanced, the European Commission has launched important initiatives to overcome these challenges.

The Internal Security Agency and Poland’s Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Solutions

Grzegorz Ocieczek — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

This article is devoted to critical infrastructure protection issues, with a focus on national regulations. It does not omit issues concerning the authorities which, according to the regulations, are responsible for critical infrastructure protection, including: relevant ministers, the Government Security Centre as well as the Internal Security Agency. The publication also presents issues related to ensuring information and communication technology security and countering terrorist threats, espionage and cyber-attacks. The empirical aspect of citing an excerpt from a research on terrorism, which was conducted in 2022 by ABW officers among representatives of academia as well as representatives of services and institutions belonging to the anti-terrorism community involved in terrorism studies, has not been disregarded either. The research points to a growing threat to the European Union from terrorist attacks. The article concludes with postulates on the need to increase the protection of critical infrastructure, in particular through proper risk assessment, as well as the need to develop an IT model for threat knowledge management.

The EU’s defence ambitions in the field of defence technological and industrial development

Andrzej Pawlikowski — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

The European Union (EU) has long aspired to bolster its defence capabilities, particularly in the realm of defence technological and industrial development. This study scrutinises the EU’s evolving defence ambitions against the backdrop of a rapidly changing global security landscape. Faced with multifaceted security challenges and growing geopolitical uncertainties, the EU has embarked on a journey to enhance its strategic autonomy and bolster its defence industry’s competitiveness. Through a comprehensive analysis of EU policy documents, defence strategies, and industrial initiatives, this study delineates the EU’s efforts to foster innovation, collaboration, and interoperability within its defence ecosystem. Moreover, it explores the mechanisms employed by the EU to leverage synergies between civilian and military research, harness emerging technologies, and fortify its defence industrial base. By delving into the complexities of EU defence initiatives and their implications for transatlantic relations, regional security dynamics, and industrial cooperation, this study contributes to a nuanced understanding of the EU’s quest for strategic sovereignty and technological prowess in an increasingly contested world.

Challenges in the Use of Artificial Intelligence-enabled Systems in Modern Armed Forces

Iztok Prezelj — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

The application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the armed forces brings about a number of new possibilities and also new risks. In this paper, we have identified and analysed a wide range of risks associated with uncontrolled and unstoppable development of general AI, as well as several ethical and legal, operational and strategic risks. We have shown how and why these risks are dangerous and some even pose a threat to human security, values, norms, democracy, human rights, etc. These risks need to be carefully examined in order to improve the military use of AI and regulation in this area. The wide range of risks identified and their extremely diverse nature show that regulating the military use of AI will be difficult and complex, requiring all disciplines of law, and that regulatory rules need to be applied at national, regional and global level. The rapid development of military AI suggests that some risks are likely to be considered and regulated before any malicious military use of AI occurs, while unfortunately some others will only be regulated after the first instances of its malicious and illegal use by some armed forces.

Combatting Cyberwarfare Crimes in the European Union

Miha Šepec, Maša Kočivnik — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

Cyberwarfare crimes constitute a major threat to the security of the European countries. The effects of such attacks could be devastating for the European economy, stability and national security. The question therefore remains, whether the European Union (EU) has effective security measures and strategies against cyberwarfare attacks, and whether it has appropriate legal definitions of such phenomena. Furthermore, does the EU have cooperation measures and institutions for combatting such crimes? In this article we will first present the practical and legal definition of cyberwarfare and its impact on the security of the EU Member States. Then we will analyse the main security measures and strategies of the EU for preventing cyberwarfare attacks, the primary among which are the EU Cybersecurity Act, Directive on the security of network and information systems (NIS) and its second revised version (NIS 2 Directive), and the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).We will continue with substantive legal documents, where the main role is still played by the Directive EU 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems, which is now almost 11 years old and dated in some aspects. On the procedural level we will analyse the EU cooperation in combatting cyberwarfare attacks through two perspectives (cooperation measures and EU institutions). In the first perspective, we will exam the European Arrest Warrant, the European Evidence Warrant, the European Freezing and Confiscation Order, the European Investigation Order, the European Judicial Network (EJN), and the Schengen Information System (SIS). And in the second, we will present Europol and its European Cyber Crime Centre, Eurojust, and the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). Although the EU has mechanisms in place to combat and prevent cyberwarfare crimes, the legal situation is still far from ideal. The main problem remains the lack of clear legal definition of cyberwarfare crimes and no focused legislation in regard to criminal prosecution of such crimes.

Export Restrictions in the Field of Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Computing: Justification and Risks – The United States–China Rivalry from a European Union Perspective

János Székely — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

The study aims to elicit the problems posed under international law and, to a lesser extent, under European Union (EU) law by export controls imposed on foundational transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum information technology in the relations between United States and People’s Republic of China. It examines the notion of export controls and its evaluation under international law, finding that such an evaluation of the legal nature of these measures remains unclear on not only whether these measures may constitute economic coercion but also whether such coercion is prohibited. Further uncertainty persists regarding whether other legal foundations may be identified, which would permit such measures when they affect critical technologies for future development. The study finds that, currently, export controls affecting artificial intelligence and quantum information technology are limited but expanding, thereby creating some urgency in finding legal solutions to counteract their effects. Updating of the EU legal infrastructure, which is not ready to counteract the unintended effects of export controls on the EU, is also found as necessary.

Artificial Intelligence and Human-out-of-the-Loop: Is It Time for Autonomous Military Systems?

Zvonko Trzun — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100

This paper systematically presents the disruptive technologies that have emerged on the battlefields in recent decades, as well as those that are yet to come. Special attention is given to current technical capabilities: the status of unmanned vehicle development is briefly outlined, focusing primarily on the most prevalent type, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Additionally, the paper discusses the most common and effective adversarial attack techniques specifically targeting unmanned vehicle technology. The concepts of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, deep learning, and convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are introduced. The paper illustrates how CNNs aim to tackle tasks that previously required human intelligence, as well as how the enemy attempts to disrupt the development of CNNs during the crucial training and pattern recognition phase, which is essential for later generalisation. The paper demonstrates the advantages of manned-unmanned teaming as a model that effectively utilises disruptive technologies while simultaneously counteracting the effects of the enemy’s measures. Moreover, it analyses the introduction of fully autonomous, AI-driven military systems on the battlefield, outlining the advantages and disadvantages inherent to such a fundamental change. From the evident lack of interest among young people in joining the armed forces to the autonomous systems’ potential to save the lives of soldiers and civilians, there are numerous reasons suggesting that this technology could alleviate the burden on human soldiers. However, concerns remain that autonomous systems may malfunction, potentially reducing rather than increasing the safety of militaries. The paper concludes with recommendations for future steps in the introduction of new technologies, based on their current state of development and the robustness of the AI models they use.