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INDIFFERENCE AND EVENT. HEIDEGGER, BADIOU, AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICAL TIME*

Abstract: How can we think the link between Heidegger's *Ereignis* and Badiou's *événement*, i.e., the link between event as *à-venir* and event as *er-äugen*? This paper suggests tracing this link back to a diagnosis of modernity shared by Heidegger and Badiou, namely, the *indifference* which is to be thought as the result of an all-encompassing equivalence of anything with anything else. Consequently, the event is revealed as a figure of 'rupture with indifference'. This conception has crucial temporal implications. An event as a break with indifference implies that in the mere presence of the 'now' that equates any moment to any other, there is no 'present'. A present can only be created in a withdrawal from mere presence, and as such the present in modernity is absent. This idea seems to be challenged by François Hartog's term 'presentism'. According to Hartog, the present, far from being absent, is today omnipresent and it fabricates its own past and future. This omnipresence of the present suspends historical time altogether. Considering that the event as a rupture with indifference departs from a lack of present rather than an omnipresent present, the following question arises: How does the event as a rupture with indifference relate to presentism?

Keywords: Badiou, Heidegger, Hartog, indifference, presentism

[...] geworfen im Wurf ist der Mensch ein *Übergang*,
Übergang als Grundwesen des Geschehens.
Der Mensch ist Geschichte, oder besser, die Geschichte ist der Mensch.
[...] Im Übergang *entrückt* und daher wesentlich *abwesend*.
Abwesend im grundsätzlichen Sinne — nicht und nie vorhanden, sondern abwesend, indem

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er weg-west
in die *Gewesenheit* und in die *Zukunft*, ab-wesend und nie vorhanden, aber
in der Ab-wesenheit *existent*. *Versetzt* ins Mögliche,
muß er ständig *versehensein* des Wirklichen.¹

1. INTRODUCTION. THE LACKING PRESENT IN THE OMNIPRESENCE OF THE PRESENT

How can we proclaim ourselves as our own contemporaries? This seemingly simple yet strange question contains a complexity. For, as Badiou remarks in the seminar *Images of the Present Times*, in order to be our own contemporary, we must “first determine, whether there is a present”.² For only a present into which we could incorporate could split the otherwise immediate correlation between our sensuous-certainty of being *this* ‘I’ that always finds itself in *this* now, which nevertheless remains the same in every moment.³

Our question is then the following: is there a present today that can break with the immediacy of this strange eternity, with ‘*this* now’? Given that the entire circulation of commodities, trends, and innovations promises today nothing but to put the world at our constant disposal and to be absorbed in exclusive, never-before-seen lived-experiences, it seems, indeed, that *this* now, in which we are absorbed, is never ending.

Regarding this feature of ‘never ending now’, the French historian François Hartog confronts us with a striking claim. According to Hartog, the trouble of our day is not that the present is absent but rather that it is ‘omnipresent’. Events are constantly produced and consumed to the point that, “the present, in the very moment of its occurrence, seeks to view itself as already history, already past”.⁴

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 29/30, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 531. The English translation of the passage is as follows: “Thus thrown in this throw, man is a *transition*, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. [...] Man is *enraptured* in this transition and therefore essentially ‘*absent*’. Absent in a fundamental sense — never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his *essentially being away*, removed into *essential having been* and *future* — essentially absencing and never at hand, yet *existent* in his essential absence. *Transposed* into the possible, he must constantly *be mistaken* concerning what is actual.” Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (Bloomington / Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 365–366.

² Alain Badiou, *Images of the Present Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2024), 141.

³ For this correlation in the sensuous-certainty between ‘I’ and ‘now’, see G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York / Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 62–64.

⁴ François Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity. Presentism and Experiences of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 114.

Indeed, since the rise of the social media as the main determiner of the global agenda, are we not one-upping almost every day a ‘historical moment’ that is supposed to be considered a breaking point by future generations, but which we forget the next moment? Precisely this strange phenomenon brings us to the confusing spontaneity of opposites today. On the one hand, we feel that we cannot keep up with the accelerating pace of technological progress, as well as the rapid shift in the ‘world’s’ agenda and its trends. At the same time, however, this speed is accompanied by the strange feeling that nothing is actually happening in our present.

Precisely this is implied in Hartog’s claim: On the one hand, the distance between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation “has been stretched to a breaking point” resulting in a “crisis of historical time”,⁵ on the other hand, however, there is a strange sense of an “immobile present”⁶ that “daily ‘fabricates’ the past and the future it requires”.⁷ The metaphor Hartog uses to describe these ardent oppositions is remarkable: “an immense stretch of water restlessly rippling”.⁸ Does this restless rippling not come to the fore emblematically on treadmills in fitness studios today, where we keep ourselves in constant movement without moving in any direction? Overall, this contradictory experience of time today, that is “looking both backwards and forwards, but without ever *leaving* this present that we have made into the limits of our world” is what Hartog designates as “presentism”.⁹

For Hartog, presentism results from the longing for the future, which “decrees that the viewpoint of the future shall prevail”.¹⁰ Therefore, presentism must be seen as a waste product of a worn-out futurism and an exhausted idea of progress. Presentism involves both the longing for the future and the inability to leave the present, or to put it more drastically: it is constantly leaving the present and finding again nothing but the present itself.

Applying Hartog’s claim to Badiou’s remark, we are confronted with the following puzzle: We cannot become our own contemporaries today since we cannot leave ‘this’ present. In other words, there is no present today because of the omnipresence of the present. Does there not seem to be a contradiction here? We can simply accept that we are committing a simple ‘logical’ error and violate the law of non-contradiction, or we can realize that two opposites interweave here and explore a speculative situation.

⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁷ Ibid., 113.

⁸ Ibid., 18.

⁹ Ibid., 18, 203.

¹⁰ Ibid., 107.

This paper pleads for the latter and invites its reader to delve into a speculative investigation on the question of ‘the present’ in all its three senses: ‘Present’ as that which *objectively* exists in front of us (*Vorhandenheit*), present as the ek-static experience of being there (*Anwesenheit*), and lastly present as a category of historical time which withdraws from any ‘presence’ understood in both former senses (*Gegenwart*). The objective is to explore how the concomitant accuracy of both propositions, namely, ‘there is no present’, and ‘the present is omnipresent’, is not a logical fallacy, but rather, a dialectics *par excellence* of a relation relating to itself. I suggest that Badiou’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of event can unfold the speculative concomitancy of the absence and presence of the present, which lies hidden in Hartog’s diagnosis of presentism. Such a conception of event can shed a quite different light on the crisis of historical time, in which we find ourselves according to Hartog.

Essentially, I contend that Heidegger and Badiou share a common diagnosis on modernity. I call this diagnosis ‘indifference’, which we can regard as the culmination of the principle of substitutability in modernity. Substitutability grounds simply in the equal validity of any difference. The idea of culmination can be understood preliminarily as follows: If, increasingly, anything equals anything else in modernity, then the very notion of difference becomes ‘indifferent’. This diagnosis has a solid temporal dimension that can explain the strange experience of our oxymoronic ‘accelerated immobility’. No matter how dizzyingly fast each moment passes over to the next, providing something new and never-before-seen in the ever-changing presence of images, today each moment is somehow equal to every other moment.¹¹ In fact, indifference points to the constant repetition of ‘now’ in each *different* moment as a raw: ‘Now’, ‘now’, ‘now’. I propose to think the event, in the cases of both thinkers, against the backdrop of the ‘indifference’ of the immediate moment that is closed upon itself.

In doing so, we reveal that, for both Heidegger and Badiou, the event signifies a rupture with indifference. In ontological terms, the event is a rupture with beings as equally valid representations of count-as-one. In political and economic terms, it is a rupture with the circulation of equivalent languages, bodies, and opinions. In temporal terms, it is with the repetition of the indifferent series of ‘now’.

Finally, this conception of the event can reveal a speculative element in Hartog’s ‘presentism’, which we can define as the consummation of the present by itself. This can be achieved if we understand that the present is not merely presence (neither *Vorhandenheit*, nor *Anwesenheit*), but rather, withdrawal from presence.¹² If the omnipresence of the present concerns circulating images, then the present can be revealed as an eventful exception: a dis-imaging and de-presencing withdrawal from

¹¹ On the indifference of equal ‘moments’ see Badiou, *Images of the Present Times*, 75.

¹² *Ibid.*, 142.

the circulation of present things-at-hand. In doing so, we can grasp not only how the omnipresence of the present can abolish the present but also find a stronghold of Hartog's *presentism*. Hartog pushes us to engage with the critical question of the conception of the event as a rupture with indifference. Given that the *future* plays a decisive role in both Badiou's and Heidegger's conceptions of event, and that every prevailing future ends up in the deadlock of the present closed upon itself according to Hartog, it is important to discuss whether there is an implicit 'presentist' tendency in the conception of the event as a rupture with indifference.

To achieve our objective, we must delve into the ontological and temporal relationship between indifference and event. Let us begin with Heidegger.

2. HEIDEGGER'S *EREIGNIS*: THE EVENT OF APPROPRIATION AS THE TRUTH OF BEING

In Heidegger, *Ereignis* is a "being-historical" concept.¹³ Regarding that for Heidegger the history of Being¹⁴ is a history of its forgetting, *Ereignis* constitutes a strange turning point in this history. Strange, as it signifies the farthest point of abandonment by Being and Being's total withdrawal from beings. *Ereignis* refers to the hint (*Wink*) that this extreme form of forgetfulness of Being gives to disclose the appropriation of man and Being.¹⁵ In fact the 'hint' relates to the original meaning of the German word *Ereignis*, which can be traced back to the verb *er-äugen*. This verb contains the 'eye' (*Auge*). In this sense, *er-äugen* points to a different kind of seeing, a catching sight of something that appropriates what is caught sight of.¹⁶ *Ereignis* is a *singulare tantum*,¹⁷ which means that it does not denote just any happening or any event, but rather, *the* unique event of the appropriation of man and Being.¹⁸

Insofar as Heidegger's event is about the retreat from the metaphysical ground of beings and the experience of the clearing concealment of Being, it should also be conceived as the event of the truth of Being. Being regarded historically, we have a

¹³ On the role of *Ereignis* in the "history of being" see Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy. (Of the Event)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 179–180.

¹⁴ Throughout the paper, I write Being (*Sein*) with a capital 'B' to distinguish it from 'beings' (*Seiende*). I also dispense with Heidegger's terminological shifts from *Being and Time* to *Contributions to Philosophy* such as the spelling of 'being' (*Sein*) as 'beyng' (*Seyn*): a term that Heidegger explicitly uses to distinguish his new attempt from the metaphysical thinking of Being as 'beingness'. On this point, see Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 344.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 245.

¹⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 11, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann), 41.

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference* (New York / Evanston / London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 36.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

circularity here: *Being*, *Event*, and *Truth* all denote the same, namely, the event of the appropriation of man and Being such that we cannot anymore think of man without taking Being into account; nor can we think of Being without taking man into account. However, we must note that behind Heidegger's Being-historical account on *Ereignis*, there is a metaphysical diagnosis of modernity that is at the heart of our objective. I will thus briefly discuss this diagnosis to prepare for the later demonstration of the fundamental relationship between Heidegger's *Ereignis* and Badiou's *événement*.

3. EQUAL VALIDITY AND INDIFFERENCE

The implicit diagnosis underlying Heidegger's concept of *Ereignis* can be simply called *Gleich-Gültigkeit*. The reason I use this German word here, and even hyphenate it, has to do with the peculiarity of this word, which is that it is a speculative word in the Hegelian sense.¹⁹ *Gleich-Gültigkeit* has a double meaning. Taken literally, it denotes what is of equal value, or more precisely: *equal validity*. In its everyday use, however, *Gleichgültigkeit* simply means *indifference*. The important point here is to understand how according to Heidegger these two meanings of the same word relate to each other, that is, how equal validity belongs together with indifference.

According to Heidegger's well-known extravagance, we could trace this relation of belonging back as far as Plato. However, let us limit ourselves to the outbreak of modernity and focus on a turning point that Heidegger considers an 'original sin': Descartes' cogito.²⁰ Simply put, Heidegger's point is that the forgetfulness of Being manifests itself in a very specific way in Descartes. With him an era of the 'being-history' begins culminating in the determinateness of being as beingness *qua* objecthood in Hegel's absolute idealism.²¹ The subject *qua* 'I' becomes with Descartes the locus of presentation and beings become objects of the unifying subject.²² What we must see in this move is that Being is reduced to beingness, where the I, itself an object, decides the objecthood of its objects as beings and represents itself in its representation of objects.²³ Already here, we can anticipate the movement toward the principle of *equal validity*: in becoming objects of the representing subject *qua* I, beings become commensurable and gradually substitutable. Metaphysically speaking, the objectification of the world by the representing subject signifies the principle of equal validity, insofar as the validity

¹⁹ On "speculative words" see G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic* (Cambridge / New York: Cambridge University, 2010), 12.

²⁰ See Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 134.

²¹ See *ibid.*, 166, 297.

²² See *ibid.*, 155.

²³ See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, Gesamtausgabe, 6.2., ed. Brigitte Schilbach (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), 123.

(*Gültigkeit*) itself is the principle of objectivity. In short, (equal) validity is the triumphant principle of modern subjectivity.

Heidegger regards the conception of reason in German Idealism, which produces its own concepts, as the culmination of the forgetfulness of Being in modernity.

Once beings become equally valid productions of reason *qua* the absolute subject, the concept of truth culminates in “correctness (*Richtigkeit*) of absolute certainty”.²⁴ From that moment forward, the entire course of modernity is marked by nothing but what Heidegger calls ‘machination’ (*Machenschaft*), that is “constant presence; ποίησις [‘making’] – τέχων [‘know-how’]”, which grounds the modern faith that “everything ‘can be made’ if only the ‘will’ to it is summoned up”.²⁵

The culmination of objectification of beings is achieved in ‘the constant replaceability of the equivalent by the equivalent’. This underlies the shift from the equal validity of everything to indifference of the *thing* in the age of positionality (*Ge-Stell*), which Heidegger subsumes under the equivocality of the word *das Gleich-Giltige*.²⁶

The hint of event occurs in the moment when the ‘subjectivity’ behind the production of ‘objects’ is extinguished, i.e., when the subjectivity becomes indifferent in the face of equally valid positionality of things. What the event hints at is a double indifference. On the one hand, beings are all equally valid and thus indifferent, on the other hand, Being itself is indifferent in that it abandons beings.

²⁴ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 159.

²⁵ Ibid., 85–86. This ‘maxim’ appears almost 50 years after Heidegger’s *Beiträge* (1936) in one of the most famous movies of the 20th century, in *Back to the Future* (1985). This is, indeed, what the time traveler Marty ‘gives as advice’ to his insecure and shy father in 1955, namely that ‘you can accomplish anything, if you put your mind to it’. A somewhat more derogatory form of it is probably Nike’s advertisement slogan: ‘Just do it!’

²⁶ In order to manifest the speculative spirit in the belonging together of indifference and equal validity, a passage from the original lecture *Ge-Stell* seems to me crucial. This passage pushes the possibilities of the German language to its extremes. Thus, even the great translation of Andrew Mitchell remains helpless here as it is impossible to reflect the play between ‘equal validity’ and ‘indifference’ in English. Therefore, I share first the original for the reader who can read in German and then Andrew Mitchell’s translation: “Das ständig auswechselbare Gleiche gilt in allem Beständigen gleich. Das Gleich-Giltige in allem Beständigen sichert diesem die Beständigkeit durch die auf der Stelle bestellbare Ersetzbarkeit. Der Bestand besteht aus dem Bestellen des Ge-Stells. Im Bestand steht alles im Gleich-Giltigen.” Martin Heidegger, *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 79. ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), 44. And here is Mitchell’s translation: “A constantly exchangeable equivalence holds equally in everything constant. The equivalence of value in everything constant secures for this its constancy through a replaceability that is orderable and in place. The standing reserve consists of the requisitioning of positionality. In the standing reserve everything stands in equal value.” Martin Heidegger, *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures* (Bloomington / Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 44.

Heidegger's *Ereignis* can only be understood against the backdrop of this double indifference in modernity. It is the culmination of the principle of equal validity of beings, which results in the utmost indifference and senselessness. This culmination, however, is at the same time a hint to Being in its complete retreat. This is how we can understand Heidegger, when he, relying on Nietzsche, declares "the plight of the lack of a sense of plight" to be the highest plight.²⁷ This is the strange ecstatic effect of the indifference, which through an oxymoronic 'abundant void' silently points to that which is different from itself — that is, to the "radical experience of the essential occurrence of [...] *beyng* as *the event* [...] in its self-concealing".²⁸

The remarkable point about the absolute equal validity of beings and the indifference of Being is the following: What is not indifferent cannot be regarded as a being. If indifference is the epochal appearance of the equal validity of all beings without any exception, then the exception to indifference cannot reside in beings no matter how different they are represented, but in the indifference of *beyng*. In other words, the evental dimension of the indifference of beings lies in the silent hint to *beyng* (*Seyn*)²⁹ that this indifference points us to. Forgetfulness is an evental appearance of Being to which modern man in the age of machination is the most 'indifferent'. Only this indifference, however, reveals that Being itself is indifferent to the principle of equal validity. In other words, the event of appropriation is the only difference that can withdraw from indifference, insofar as the evental indifference discloses that Being lacks any form of validity, i.e., objectivity. We should now delve into a strange split in Heidegger's talk of 'withdrawal' that will bring us to the temporal core of *Ereignis*.

4. THE TEMPORALITY OF THE EVENT: THE LEAP INTO THE ABYSS AND THE WITHDRAWAL FROM BEINGS

The double meaning of indifference relates very much to two different ways of thinking withdrawal. On the one hand, Being is withdrawn from beings; in other words, Being is indifferent and beings are abandoned. This is the factual, or passive withdrawal, that is, withdrawal of Being to which the 'future ones' (*die Künftigen*) are exposed to. However, on the other hand, we can regard this withdrawal as the abyss of the ground of beings which is the resonating (*Anklang*) of the event of appropriation. Therefore, leaping into this abyss can reveal the active sense of

²⁷ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 85.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁹ As explicated above, 'beyng', in a reference to Heidegger's decision to use the old German spelling 'Seyn' in *Contributions to Philosophy*, is the new manner of writing 'Being' to "indicate that being is here no longer thought metaphysically". See *ibid.*, 344.

withdrawal: Leaping into the abyss of the withdrawal of Being means ‘withdrawing’ from the absorbedness of beings to the “domain of stillness”,³⁰ i.e., to the truth of Being. For Heidegger, this is an evental withdrawal into the truth of Being: The decision,³¹ without which there is nothing but indifference.³² Precisely this decision is the breaking point with indifference. In radical distinction from all calculated, machinational and thus indifferent lived-experiences to which, according to Heidegger, all experiences are reduced in modernity, this abysmal leap is a true experience “that could [...] set humans beyond themselves into an untrodden domain”.³³ Thus, we can sum up the epochal dimension of Heidegger’s event with the following passage from *Contributions*:

Event always means event as ap-propriation, de-cision, en-counter, un-settling, withdrawal, simplicity, uniqueness, solitude. The unity of this essential occurrence is non-objective and can be known only in that thinking which must venture the unusual — not as the peculiarity of something odd, but as the necessity of that which is most inconspicuous and in which are opened up the abyssal ground of the ground-lessness of the gods and the grounding condition of humans and in which, furthermore, something is assigned to beyng that metaphysics could never know, namely, *Da-sein*.³⁴

The leap into the abyss has a clear temporal reference that remains implicit but is crucial to the understanding the event as a break with indifference in Heidegger. We should render this temporal reference explicit.

From *Being and Time* onwards, Heidegger never ceases to assert that Being is time. Thus, the forgetfulness of Being, or Being’s withdrawal refers in fact to an original forgetfulness of time. Here, time surely does not denote the mechanical representation of measured time-space. Rather, it denotes human finitude, which is necessarily forgotten in average everydayness. In this state, time is experienced as a mere continuum of measured time-space; all moments are divided into quantitatively equal time-spaces. It is important to note that the shift of the equal validity of beings to the indifference of Being is a phenomenon related to the loss of the sense of time, and thus, of finitude. Only timelessness — that is, unrestrictedness, detachedness or in

³⁰ Ibid., 18.

³¹ With *de-cision*, Heidegger does not mean here the “judgement and choice of human beings”, but rather, “a division [*Scheidung*] in the aforementioned togetherness of Being, unconcealment [...]” Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 2000), 116.

³² Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 80.

³³ Ibid., 43.

³⁴ Ibid., 371.

short: the *absoluteness* of Being — can render beings equally valid and substitutable. Thus, Heidegger relates the forgetfulness of time to Hegel's absolute reason, which brings about a regime of indifferent infinity. Therefore, a dislocating leap into the abyss means for him nothing but the disclosure of finitude.³⁵ In other words, for Heidegger, a rupture with indifference can only mean a disclosure of the 'meaning' of being, which lies in nothing but in the 'sense' of time, which is rooted in finitude.

If modern times are marked by a timeless infinity of eternal 'now', then the present must be thought of as an exceptional experience of the ek-stasis of being-there, that is a disclosure (*Erschließen*) of the finitude in the "site of the moment".³⁶ In the openness of beings in which we are absorbed, time appears as an endless succession of 'now' between beings that we have *not yet* taken care of and beings that we *no longer* take care of.³⁷

The emergence of the present marks a change in our attitude toward time, whereby "Da-sein as temporality temporalizes a mode of behavior that is related in *such* a way to time that it takes account of it".³⁸ When we take time into account, we notice something paradoxical that explains why temporality is, for Heidegger "the *ekstatikon* par excellence".³⁹ Time is ecstatic, because it is in itself outside of itself. Thus, timeliness is the closest yet precisely because of this immediate proximity, the farthest from us to disclose. Therefore, taking time into account requires interrupting our absorption in beings, that is, withdrawing from them. This interruption is the abysmal ground of true temporalization. As such, it is the condition of any inceptive thinking and true historical deeds are carried out only by the 'few' as 'founders' in poetry, architecture, arts, and politics.⁴⁰

This temporalization occurs through a break with the indifferent 'now' and underlies Heidegger's distinction between history (*Geschichte*) and historiography (*Historie*). History is evental, as the word *Geschichte* — deriving from the word happening (*das Geschehen*) — already designates. History is a "revelatory process that puts us at risk".⁴¹ Therefore, only the history, or the historical deed, can be regarded as inceptive, insofar as it bridges the beginning to the future. Historiography, on the other hand, is merely an exploration of the past from the present perspective.

³⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Seminare (Übungen) 1937/1938 und 1941/42*. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 88, ed. Alfred Denker (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2008), 35.

³⁶ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 323.

³⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), 345–346.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 372.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 302.

⁴⁰ See Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic"* (Bloomington / Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 128, 181.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

Here, we can relate Heidegger's striking remark about historiography to Hartog's 'presentism'. The problem with the 'present perspective' in historiography is that "it could also be that a present is as frozen as the past, and that the standards of a present are merely bad residues of a past no longer understood".⁴² Thus, we can conclude that the arbitrary substitutability of 'present perspectives' marks historiography, whereas history is the realm of beginnings that breaks with any given perspective. If so, cannot we also say that history is about 'creating a new present'? It seems that we are in the optimal moment to pass over to Badiou's conception of the event.

5. BADIOU AND THE SPECULATIVE CAPACITY OF *INDIFFÉRENCE*

The link between Badiou's conception of the event and Heidegger's diagnosis of indifference dates back to Badiou's 1986–1987 Heidegger seminar. This link plays a decisive role in the formation of his speculative thought strategy in *Being and Event*. In the systematic unity of this major work, however, the speculative role of breaking with indifference remains in the background. It is only after 2015, following the publication of the mentioned seminar, that we can retrospectively recognize Badiou's hint at this confrontation in the foreword to the English edition of *Being and Event* in 2006. There, Badiou concedes that "situations are nothing more [...] than pure indifferent multiplicities" but he also adds that "truths are certainly indifferent to differences" if they exist.⁴⁴ The two 'indifferences' do not denote the same here. In the following, I open up this subtle difference between these two forms of indifference by referring back to Badiou's confrontation with Heidegger, which begins in his Heidegger Seminar in 1986 and culminates in a quite peculiar way in *Images of the Present Times* in 2001.

6. *COUNT-AS-ONE* AS THE VANISHING TERM BETWEEN EQUIVALENCE AND INDIFFERENCE

The systemic trace of Badiou's link to Heidegger's diagnosis of *Gleich-Gültigkeit* in its double meaning (equal validity turning into indifference) can be found in the structure of what Badiou calls *count-as-one*.⁴⁵ Counting-as-one sheerly denotes that any difference which is sealed by a structure gains, as a term, an equal validity of being a clearly defined 'legal' entity. This means that the term is recognized but only at the cost of a de-singularization. In other words, any element counted as one in a situation, no matter how diverse and unique its inner properties may be, cannot

⁴² Ibid., 33.

⁴⁴ Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (London / New York: Continuum, 2006), XII.

⁴⁵ See *ibid.*, 23–30.

‘count’ more or less than any other term in the situation, as the term ‘count-as-one’ itself indicates.

In Badiou’s ontological terminology, an event is related to the interruption of this ‘counting’, that is, the exception to the structure of the count-as-one. In order to understand the exception, we must first roughly grasp the ‘rule’. In any consistent situation there are two instances of counting: The structure that seals the belonging of an element to situation, and the metastructure that secures its inclusion.⁴⁶ Without going into detail, let us apply this concept to a social situation, such as of a nation state, to better understand it. If it were about me as an individual, the first counting would recognize that I exist in the social situation of Germany, that I am registered under a certain name and reside somewhere, and so on. The second counting would ensure that all my properties with which I interact in society can be traced back to my registered identity. If both apply, then I can speak of being a “normal term”⁴⁷ of this social situation. All normal terms carry the double seal of legality, which secures their equal validity. This legal seal renders the infinite inner differentiation of every normal term compatible with the necessity of maintaining the consistency of the ‘social bond’, i.e., the prevention of its “un-bounding”.⁴⁸ In other words, this way all normal terms can enjoy being uniquely different, without constituting any danger to the consistency of the situation.

Through the role of the singleton ‘{ }’ in Badiou’s ontology, we can perfectly understand the dialectic of equal validity and indifference in recognized differences that are counted as one. A singleton, which signifies a subset in set theory, gives a multiplicity “the seal of the one in the structuring immediacy of the situation”.⁴⁹ As individuals, we are in fact subsets of *ourselves* in social situations. This means that we do not count in the situation as “the proper name of an infinite multiple” that we *are* but as “an indifferent figure of unicity” as what we *count*.⁵⁰ Strikingly, this simply means that in a social situation ‘the state’ is not concerned with proper names, that is, with individuals but with names put in a singleton, i.e., with {individuals}. This means that only as subsets of ourselves can we have a validity in the situation. However, this also implies that every infinite multiple becomes commensurable, when put in a singleton and counted-as-one. Consider two erratic proper names, such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump. Even these two figures of ‘hubris’ in our present can be tamed and become commensurable, if put in a singleton. As multiples in

⁴⁶ See *ibid.*, 84; 96.

⁴⁷ A normal term in Badiou’s ontological language means simply a term which is both presented and represented in the situation. In basic mathematical expression, it denotes that a term is both included by the situation and an element of it. See *ibid.*, 99.

⁴⁸ For the relation between the state, the social bond, and “un-bounding” see *ibid.*, 107–108.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

themselves they are infinitely different; however, as {Elon Musk} and {Donald Trump} they are equally valid legal persons, just like any other legal person in the United States. This implies that their differences in age, wealth, and their political position, are indifferent.

Put together, this means that no matter how different multiplicities may be, as ‘normal terms’ they all carry the seal of the structure.⁵¹ As such, they cannot constitute any exception to the structure. In this precise structural sense, we must conclude that all equally valid terms are indifferent.

7. AN INDIFFERENCE WHICH IS INDIFFERENT TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENCE AND INDIFFERENCE

As this brief review of Badiou’s ontological terminology already reveals, his system resonates with Heidegger’s diagnosis of indifference.

In his Heidegger seminar, Badiou articulates this resonance as a confrontation oscillating between a fundamental agreement and a fundamental disagreement. He explicitly agrees with Heidegger’s emphasis on singularity, which places the category of event at the center of philosophy.⁵² However, he notes that, for Heidegger, indifference always refers to a ‘lack’ of difference, with which he disagrees.⁵³ If indifference is conceived as a lack of difference, as Heidegger does according to Badiou, it always remains in the interiority of (a racial, national, or whatever kind of) difference, which is implicitly longed for.⁵⁴ Badiou claims, however, that there is another way of thinking indifference: as a diagonal to the opposition between difference and indifference.⁵⁵ This is the strong, or active sense of the indifference that we should unfold.

According to his dialectical maxim “one divides into two”,⁵⁶ Badiou dialecticizes hierarchical and indifferent *difference* and introduces an eventual indifference into this

⁵¹ What I call here a bit metaphorically the ‘seal of a metastructure’ is in fact developed by Badiou in *The Immanence of Truths*. There he determines this ‘seal’ as “a principal ultra filter”, which “as though [it] had a sort of permanent root system enabling its flowering, however extensive it might be, to remain attached to the One underlying it”. This is another beautiful analogy explaining the metastructure that ‘roots’ every difference in the seal of count-as-one which in-differentiates the internal diversity of any term that belongs to the situation. See Alain Badiou, *The Immanence of Truths* (London / New York: Bloomsbury, 2022), 298.

⁵² Alain Badiou, *Le Séminaire Heidegger. L’être 3 – Figure du retrait 1986–1987* (Paris: Fayard, 2015), 17.

⁵³ Ibid., 80.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 49.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 80.

⁵⁶ “One divides into two” is the ‘true’ law of dialectics that should be preferred to “two fuses into one”. This is a maxim that Badiou traces back to Lacan, in Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject* (London / New York: Continuum, 2009), 14, 113.

relationship of opposition. Badiou's *indifférence* is basically indifferent to the very distinction between difference and indifference. This implies that the loss of indifference must not necessarily lead to a repressive difference with a claim to superiority over all other differences. It rather implies a loss of validity. Only a term with clearly determined differential features can be valid in a situation. A *term* that loses its hitherto differential features is, strictly speaking, no longer a term. Being unbounded from the structure it can be regarded, somewhat paradoxically, as a powerless power that a truth procedure can generate. A post-evental multiple that withdraws from its hitherto representation is powerless, as it lacks validity. However, the power of indifference can potentially produce a universal effect equivalent to the 'global situation' and force the situation to be altered as a whole.⁵⁷

It is important to understand the quality of this withdrawal. Similar to Heidegger's active withdrawal, Badiou's withdrawal must be thought of as a leap into an unknown, which creates an indiscernible split between the hitherto representation of a term and the immanent change that it undergoes. This immanent change marks the beginning of a procedure of fidelity. A procedure of fidelity means joining to an indiscernible new composition of a multiple, without being able to derive any direct meaning from it — except from a call, which is "keep going! [*continuer!*]"⁵⁸ Thus, for Badiou, the loss of indifference contains a paradox: if a term in a situation breaks with indifference, it does not do so in a way that causes it to lose its validity willingly and knowingly. This loss of validity is not discernable. The alteration to which a term is subjected in the event of an encounter is an immanent one. In other words, the term is still counted but *as what* it is counted no longer corresponds to the newly emerging composition of the multiple. We can call such a term indifferent in the strong sense, as it immanently withdraws from its representation and becomes anonymous. The immanence must be underlined here: only from the perspective of the intervention, is there a break.⁵⁹ Seen from the site of the situation, there is no break.⁶⁰ This means that the loss of validity, i.e., the loss of indifference can only be 'decided' from the site of the event, that is, from the fidelity procedure itself. However, what we stated above applies also here: the state (of the situation) is not concerned with the infinite potentiality of the multiples — or to speak with Nietzsche, with the question who someone can *become*, but with what they *are*, that is, with the counted term in a

⁵⁷ Three terms are central here, "forcing" and "Generic Extension" in *Being and Event*, and wandering "non-principal ultra filters" in *The Immanence of Truths*. For "Forcing", see Badiou, *Being and Event*, 401; Generic extension: 378–381; for the "power of a divergence of heterogeneous multiplicities" that can become equivalent to the global situation, see Badiou, *The Immanence of the Truths*, 302.

⁵⁸ Alain Badiou, *Ethics. An Essay on the Understanding of Evil* (London / New York: Verso, 2001), 54.

⁵⁹ Badiou, *Being and Event*, 207.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 205.

singleton. This means in other words that counting does not concern what something or someone *will have been*, but only its representation as what it *is considered to be*.⁶¹

We can infer that Badiou's event follows a path which we must call subtractive. Why subtraction? Because Badiou is convinced that every *difference* as *difference* in a given situation falls under the law of count-as-one, that is, it remains subordinate to the principle of equal validity. This is why Badiou asserts that pure difference falls under the norm of indifference, for the law of counting is nothing but indifference.⁶²

This means that no 'addition' of difference to the situation can form a heterogeneity or constitute an exception to the structure. To better understand the centrality of subtraction, consider the structure of indifference *par excellence*, the circulation of the *general equivalent*, i.e., money. According to Badiou, it is the indifferentiative capacity of capitalist circulation, and not 'technology', that underlies the structural indifference of substitutability in the development of modernity.⁶³ Through the mediation of the general equivalent, the equal and the non-equal circulate as equals *qua* exchange values differing only in quantity. Circulation is then a repetitive process of homogenization. Thus, any heterogenous quality, included in the circulation, becomes a commensurable 'difference' and cannot constitute an exception to the 'law' of the structure, which is indifference. Therefore, the only possible exception to the overall structure of indifferent differences is subtraction, or withdrawal from circulation. Seen from this perspective, indifferent in the strong sense of the word is a term which cannot be counted or integrated into circulation and thus cannot attain any validity or 'value'.

8. THE LOSS OF INDIFFERENCE AND THE QUESTION OF REPETITION

Even though there is a disagreement about the underlying cause of 'indifference', Badiou affirms Heidegger's assertion that all thinking is conditioned by a break away from or loss⁶⁴ of indifference. In Badiou's view, too, philosophy can only be put back into the open space of its conditions⁶⁵ if it is preceded by a rupture with indifference in one of its conditions, that is, if there is either an 'encounter' in science, politics,

⁶¹ Badiou, *Le Séminaire Heidegger*, 234–235.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 80.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 62; Badiou, *Images of the Present Times*, 286.

⁶⁴ At this point, Badiou speaks specifically of the 'loss' of indifference because his entire interpretation is based on a single passage in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where Heidegger says the following: "In the poetry of the poet and in the thinking of the thinker, there is always so much world space to spare that each and everything — a tree, a mountain, a house, the call of a bird — completely loses its indifference and familiarity." Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* 28.

⁶⁵ Badiou, *Images of the Present Times*, 280.

art, or love⁶⁶ that can break with the repetition of the structure. One can only break with the repetition, i.e., with a certain representation of something (i.e., that which is counted as one by a structure), when an encounter occurs.⁶⁷ However, such an encounter cannot restore or bring back anything that has been ‘lost’. Thus, unlike for Heidegger, this means for Badiou that a break with the repetitive, i.e., with the previous representation of something, cannot retrieve or take back (*wieder-holen*) a difference.⁶⁸ Here, we arrive at the heart of our considerations on Badiou’s conception of event as a rupture with indifference: The temporal dimension of the event that will finally lead us to the question of the ‘present’.

9. THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENT IN THE BREAK WITH INDIFFERENCE

In the previous section, we saw that for Heidegger the temporal regime of indifference is the eternal ‘now’ and the present is an exception to this timeless now as a site of decision. Similarly, for Badiou, the temporal effect of indifference is the dissolution of the present. This is why, for example, in *Logics of Worlds* the adjective ‘evental’ always precedes ‘present’, since a present is the “set of consequences of the evental trace”.⁶⁹ This means first that a (true) present is not given in the “transcendental of a world”.⁷⁰ Second, we can grasp a present only as a result of an evental rupture with indifference. In *Images of the Present Times*, this rupture is explained in terms of what Badiou calls ‘fivefold indifference’ in the active sense of the word, whereby something breaks free from the given structure of the immobile ‘now’ and makes a present possible. This includes the indifference to numbers as a criterion; indifference to the established regime of the possible; indifference to

⁶⁶ Badiou, *Le Seminaire Heidegger*, 235.

⁶⁷ One would have to say: Yes, representation is repetitive. We can trace this ontologically back to the fact that, in order to reduce the ‘gap’ between presentation and representation to a minimum, the constitution of the situation must count all terms repetitively. To understand this in a non-ontological way, it would suffice to think that as ‘{individuals}’ we repeat the representation of our person through each and every everyday action in which we interact with institutions that are guaranteed by the state; every time we vote, get married, open a bank account, sign a contract, and so on and so forth.

⁶⁸ The German verb *wieder-holen* means both to repeat and to retrieve. In a passage in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where Heidegger speaks of *wieder-holen* in the context of the “inception of our historical-spiritual Dasein, in order to transform it into the other inception”, he plays with both meanings. So, *wieder-holen* is about a repetition to retrieve greatness by generating a difference: the other inception. In fact, it is striking here that this is not far off from Deleuze’s repetition of the difference. See Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 41.

⁶⁹ See Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds* (London / New York: Continuum, 2009), 52.

⁷⁰ “Transcendental of a world” refers to a term in *Logics of Worlds* that sets “the degree or intensity of the differences (or identities) of what comes to appear in a world”. See *ibid.*, 234.

particularities; indifference to the antinomy between tolerant vs. authoritarian, and finally, indifference to anything that separates repetition and projection.⁷¹

10. THE STRENGTH OF A STRUCTURE: THE COUNTEREFFECT OF ALLOWING EXCEPTIONS

In this fivefold indifference, the last one needs the most explanation. For in its utmost complexity, it touches on the heart of the temporal dimension of an ‘evental’ present. Let us thus shortly elaborate on what Badiou means by the indifference to any separation between ‘repetition’ and ‘projection’.

Let us begin by opening up what projection and repetition denote in this specific framework. Taken in themselves, both repetition and projection are figures of alienation of the present. As Badiou notes, the present “can be devoured by the past, but it may also be devoured by the future”.⁷² The figure corresponding to the former is a repetition, and the latter is a projection. Accordingly, “the alienation of the present by the past is the figure of repetition; the alienation of the present by the future is projection”.⁷³ Here, we should delve deeper into Badiou’s refined dialectical determinations on repetition to be well prepared to understand the evental ‘torsion’⁷⁴ of repetition by a projection which only can create a true present.

Badiou remarks that what we often attribute “as strength to the structure [is] its insistence, its capacity for repetition”.⁷⁵ However, he notes that we overlook the fact that a structure demonstrates its strength in the face of exceptions and not “just with respect to its continuity, or preservation”.⁷⁶ How are we to understand this? The strength of the structure is revealed in its ability to maintain itself by allowing exceptions.⁷⁷ In other words, its strength does not lie in avoiding deviations, but in

⁷¹ Badiou, *Images of the Present Times*, 150.

⁷² Ibid., 139.

⁷³ Ibid., 140.

⁷⁴ Torsion is in fact a concept belonging to the context of the *Theory of the Subject*. Although Badiou’s thought strategy remains somewhat intact, namely, to think the exception creating intervention which alters given laws without being discerned as such. Torsion interrupts the repetition of a given structure — see Badiou, *Theory of Subject*, 150. However, quite Deleuzian in effect, torsion itself is nothing but repetition, namely, the “repetition of difference”, which alters the initial rule — ibid., 122.

⁷⁵ Badiou, *Images of the Present Times*, 26.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ With regard to the occurrence of novelty, Badiou distinguishes between *natural* and *historical* ontological situations. The ‘new’ occurs only in historical situations. This means that there is nothing new in nature. In natural situations presentation and representation always coincide, so that a multiplicity that belongs to the situation is also included. However, it gets more complicated, when it comes to historical situations. For if we can say that there is the *new* in history, it is because in historical situations presentation and representation never overlap. Insofar as what distinguishes the

reintegrating any possible exception to itself. Thus, “what is important in an order [...], is the countereffect, not the effect”.⁷⁸ By this, Badiou means that the secret to an order’s strength lies in its ability to absorb the exception, or to put it vulgar: The point is to repeat the structure by a trivializing inclusion of the exception and not merely prohibit its possible emergence. This trivialization means actually an ‘indifferentiation’, just as our technological ‘innovations’ repeat the structure in the guise of a constant *never-seen-before*. A structure proves itself to be successful if it can repeat itself in its exception by homogenizing any possible point of heterogeneity. The constant circulation of things, information, and bodies fulfills exactly the duty of this corrective inclusion, or the homogenizing diversification. The true present, however, is evental in that its character consists of a “break with what is merely circulation or communication”, which for Badiou are in fact the same thing.⁷⁹

11. THE PRESENT AS A TORSION OF REPETITION BY PROJECTION

We are now ready to interpret Badiou’s following statement as the crucial component of a break with indifference: “The present is the torsion of repetition by projection, the creative incorporation of the past into the projection of the future.”⁸⁰

Here, I propose that we think of the ‘torsion of repetition’ as the creation of a paradoxical *ek-static* gap that bridges a historical gap. As paradox as it may seem, what I am talking about is precisely a gap filling gap: it is a gap opened in the repetitive structure of time that fills the gap between the past and the future.

The constant circulation of equally valid differences conceals the repetition of the indifferent row of now, like ‘now, now, now’ in the guise of constant change. The torsion of the repetition by the projection first creates an immanent gap in this row that interrupts the continuum of the endless production of ‘now’. A present is created through the trace of an indiscernible difference that brings the possibility of a new world into existence. In other words, the same gap that is opened within the temporal structure is the one that potentially can fill the historical gap between the past and the future by bridging them. This is then what the torsion of repetition by a future

historical situation from the natural situation is the non-correspondence between presentation and representation, history can be thought of as an ‘omnipresence of singularity’. One could therefore say that the abnormal in a historical situation is, in a strict sense, the normal. The function of ‘the state of situation’ in the ontological sense can be then understood as follows: Repeating the counting operation in order to correct the constantly occurring abnormal and de-singularize any term. See Badiou, *Being and Event*, 173–174.

⁷⁸ Badiou, *Images of the Present Times*, 26.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 149, 288.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 171.

projection implies: The creation of “the possibility of a new world, like the possibility that the world might be a different world from that of the false present”.⁸¹

12. THE EVENT AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INSIGHT AND WHAT IT CATCHES SIGHT OF

Here, Badiou’s reference to Heidegger’s event can help us to delve deeper into his idea of the torsion of repetition. In *Images of the Present Times*, Badiou discusses the relationship between the present and the event in Heidegger. He notes that, for Heidegger, the present depends on a ‘new way of seeing things’ that is capable of dislocating our relation to the world as it *is*. Badiou appreciates the metaphor when Heidegger speaks of a possibility “of a [different] insight into that which is”.⁸² Affirmatively, he notes that “when something happens there is a new sort of blurring between the insight and what is caught sight of”.⁸³ For Badiou, this means that when our vision is altered, “not only insight is new but also what this new insight catches sight of”.⁸⁴ This insight lies in fact at the core of the idea of the torsion of the repetition by the projection. Indeed, when something happens and we see things ‘differently’ — as in an amorous encounter or at the beginning of a strike, etc. — it is because “there is this ‘differently’” that makes us see differently.⁸⁵ To put it in another way, evental here is that the newness of our vision and the difference in what we see become indistinguishable. Is this not precisely how Heidegger thinks the appropriation [*er-eignen*] in the event, or a consigning appropriation in that the new consignment of the seeing and what is seen makes it impossible to treat the seeing and what is seen separately? Indeed, at this point Badiou comes closer than ever before to Heidegger’s understanding of the event as it becomes clearly manifest in the following passage:

In innovation, there is an interplay between insight and what is caught sight of. Basically, what can be called an ‘event’ is broadly this phenomenon. An event is also the fact that, in innovation, an indiscernibility develops between insight and what is caught sight of. Except that Heidegger claims that this indiscernibility between insight and what is caught sight of was previously lost — i.e., the clearing of the open — and hasn’t yet returned. It’s no longer here, and it’s not yet here.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Ibid., 161.

⁸² Ibid., 292.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

As we finally approach the end of our considerations, it remains to ask how all this relates to presentism: How does the ‘event’ as a break with indifference relate to the crisis of historical time?

13. CONCLUSION: IS THE EVENT AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESENTIST PRESENT?

According to Hartog, the crisis of historical time relates to the gap that is “the distance between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation [that] has been stretched to its limit, to a breaking point”.⁸⁷ The speculative point of the crisis of historical time lies in this gap. Taking the metaphor of stretching seriously, we must ask: What is the result of an over-stretching if it is about a bond between the past and future that renders them intelligible? Hartog sounds clear at first: The suspension of historical time. However, as we have shown, historical time is also suspended where we cannot create any temporal gap — any ‘abyss’ to leap into, to speak with Heidegger.

This shows us that a non-presentist present — that is, a present that can be thought as the torsion of the past by the future — creates a gap in the presentist structure of time, which can only bridge the gap between the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’. In other words, presentism, as much as it seems to emerge in the case of a gap, must in fact be seen at the same time as the symptom of a dissolution of any possibility of a gap in the repetitive immobility of the present, that is, in the “unending now”.⁸⁸ This becomes manifest also in Hartog’s assertion that the present today fabricates both its past and future. Precisely in these terms, we can regard Badiou’s and Heidegger’s conception of the event as a break with this indifferent fabrication as a withdrawal from the omnipresent presence of the present. This withdrawal from omnipresence can create a gap and generate a present, which is not *prae-sent* in the Latin meaning of the word, namely, before us, or a present-at-hand.

It remains only to speculate that Hartog would probably disagree with this reading. It seems to me very likely that he would point out the emphasis of the ‘future’ both in Heidegger and Badiou. Indeed, Heidegger’s *Contributions*, which we can regard as his second *magnum opus*, is devoted to nothing but the preparation of the other inception. Thus, the whole work is addressed to the ‘Future ones’ (*die Künftigen*). As for Badiou, in one of his recent publications, he notes that “poetry is the possibility

⁸⁷ Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity*, 119. Note that the terms “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation” as well as the concept of “historical time” all refer to Reinhart Koselleck’s “conceptual history”. See Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past. On the Semantic of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 263–268.

⁸⁸ Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity*, XV.

of thinking what will come”.⁸⁹ In other words, for Badiou, the event is poetizing the future. What it ‘poetizes’ is *a* truth.⁹⁰ Overall, it is, indeed, a trait shared by many post-Heideggerian French thinkers — Badiou included — to give a precedence to ‘that which will have been’, i.e., to the *future anterior*, or to *à-venir*, that is, ‘what is to-come’ from which the French word *événement* derives.

Regarding the future in general and the future anterior in particular, Hartog has a striking point, though. He talks about a drive, namely “the drive to make of every future a future anterior”.⁹¹ Hartog describes this drive as the tendency of the present to turn “back on itself in order to anticipate how it will be regarded when it is completely past, as though it wanted to ‘foresee’ the past, to turn itself into a past before it has even fully emerged as present”.⁹² However, he adds that “this retrospective vision never steps outside the closed circle of its own domain, the present”.⁹³ In short, Hartog sees the *future anterior* as a presentist instrument. This is the reason why an overemphasis on the future in the conception of the event as a break with the indifference, both in Heidegger and Badiou, would probably displease Hartog. Seen from Hartog’s perspective, in the conception of event, a somewhat futurist residue remains, even if it is sublime. It is a remnant of a phase namely the 20th century which according to Hartog has begun futurist and ended presentist.

However, if presentism should be understood as being stuck in an in-between, where the future is inaccessible and the past no longer applies, we must reject the underlying premise behind this idea. Perhaps the trouble of our present does not lie in the fact that we are in an odd in-between period determined by things that are no longer and things that are not yet. Perhaps, the trouble lies rather in our assumptions about this ‘in-between’, as if being ‘in-between’ itself were not the basic trait of being historical, in the sense of not being natural. Is the mode of our thrownness not, just as Hegel’s absolute, with us all along? Can the assumption of being in a temporary ‘in-between’ be itself a projection that posits as if in within the immanence of certain phases of the modern history, there were a clear vision of the past and a foreseeable future? Is this narration not possible only in retrospect, in *après coup*? What we thus need today is first and foremost to open a gap in this narrative of the gap. This could perhaps truly be what can interrupt, that is, create a gap in the present’s fabrication of its own past and future that can paradoxically fill the historical gap in pure indifference to this gap.

⁸⁹ Alain Badiou, *Alain Badiou par Alain Badiou* (Paris: PUF, 2021), 92.

⁹⁰ According to Badiou’s ‘ontology of multiplicities’, every multiplicity of multiplicities is without one. Therefore, one cannot speak of truth, but only of truths in the plural, which nevertheless have no less of a universal effect.

⁹¹ Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity*, 114.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

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