

## EDITORIAL SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS

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### THE ‘EVENT’ IS SAID IN MANY WAYS: EDITORIAL SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS\*

The present volume comprises twenty-three studies devoted to the theme of the ‘event’ and its mediation. While predominantly philosophical in orientation, it also includes contributions from theology, literary studies, and cultural theory.

Given not only the disciplinary, but also the thematic diversity of the contributions — even within the same field of study — as well as the multifaceted implications and overlaps of the topics discussed, it was not possible to group the studies according to any clear thematic order. Classifying them according to the chronological order of the authors they discuss also proved possible only to a limited extent. Nevertheless, a few basic distinctions or possible criteria for grouping have clearly emerged. The most fundamental of these is between studies that are explicitly philosophical in nature and those that belong to other disciplines. The concept of the ‘event’ is ubiquitous, and different academic disciplines approach events within their respective fields, examining them at varying levels of abstraction. They also describe and interpret phenomena related to the ‘mediation’ of events through their own disciplinary frameworks, thereby offering a wide range of perspectives on the topic. *The ‘event’ is said in many ways* — and this diversity is also reflected through different disciplinary approaches.

This could have justified classifying the studies into a philosophical chapter and a chapter devoted to other disciplines. We followed this approach only

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partially, however. Five papers in the fields of literary studies and cultural theory have been included in the concluding third chapter, but those studies that address some aspect of the ‘divine event’ — whether approached from the perspective of continental philosophy or Christian theology — have been placed in a separate chapter. The reason for this is primarily that the Christian tradition has proven to be a source of inspiration in many respects for the continental philosophies of the ‘event’: There are numerous aspects of classical Christian theology which — although they were not previously described using the concept of ‘event’ due to the millennia-long dominance of Greek metaphysical frameworks — are today characterized as ‘event-like’ in light of such philosophies. Examples, which obviously predate the recent boom of event philosophies, include revelation, the ‘Christ-event’, the Holy Trinity, grace, salvation, the Eucharist, liturgy, the Church, etc. Thus, we have placed two studies on religious topics, as well as an additional study on Schelling’s philosophy — as an important precursor to event philosophy — at the beginning of the volume, in the first chapter.

Of the fifteen studies representing the philosophical approach, the majority belong to the field of continental philosophy; one additional study discusses Wittgenstein, while another represents the analytic approach. Among the former, some are linked to one another through the authors discussed, others by exploring similar topics — e.g., that of responsibility and moral identity, which are also central themes in the present context — still others by focusing on authors who either offer an alternative to event philosophy or specifically critique it. The placement of one study was motivated by its comprehensive treatment of French philosophies of the event, while the study on artificial intelligence — which also draws on continental philosophies of language — was placed at the end of the chapter on philosophy, mainly because of its applied philosophical character. Nevertheless, even when all these factors are taken into account, the classification of the studies cannot be considered unambiguous.

In the following, I briefly summarize the individual studies included in the volume, reconstructing their main lines of argument as they appear from my reading of the contributions.

## **I. Divine Event: Philosophical and Theological Approaches**

*Robert Grzywacz*’s study compares Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of discourse and Richir’s transcendental phenomenology in their distinct interpretations of biblical prehistory, treated not as historical reports, but as a privileged narrative medium where the event of revelation occurs. Revelation thus appears not as a supernatural message but as a symbolic disclosure of the origins and fundamental truths about the human condition, a disclosure that emerges through the reading of these primordial narratives about pre-historical times. As the author shows,

however, the significance of these narratives will differ according to Ricoeur's and Richir's distinct approaches to the very act of reading. Namely, in Ricoeur's view, revelation may lead — due to the polyphonic, multiple literary forms of biblical texts that name God in diverse ways, without reducing it to a single concept — to the purification of the reader's self from narcissistic tendencies, reshaping it in the form of a 'shattered' identity with its center always to be newly regained. This process is accompanied in Ricoeur's case by a cosmically realist understanding of biblical prehistory, distinct from datable history yet foundational for it, framed along the temporally layered nodal points — borrowed from Rosenzweig — of creation (as a contingent and fragile order functioning as a continually renewed beginning of an immemorial past), revelation (as an ever-repeated address to the individual in the present), and redemption (as the advent of a new historical reality). In Richir's view, however — for whom the most archaic phenomenization takes place in schematism that operates within the domain of non-intentional *phantasia* (in the primordial and unrepresentable *chôra*) driven by blind and anonymous affectivity — revelation occurs not primarily through symbolic-linguistic structures but through immediate affective-empathic experience awakened by reading the emotional life of characters. Accordingly, his interpretation of biblical motifs — primarily through Melville's *Moby-Dick* and *Billy Budd* — portrays tyranny and self-hatred as distortions of primordial innocent affectivity (the 'lost paradise'), distortions that underlie the symbolic institution of culture and the socio-political order of humanity. The study concludes that, although for both thinkers 'revelation' essentially promises a possible liberation from the narcissistic illusions of the human self, Ricoeur takes a more positive stance, while Richir is far more skeptical regarding the possibility of renewal in the face of the internal conflicts within the human being.

Lorenzo Pompeo's essay draws attention to the central role of the concept of the 'event' in the recent rediscovery of Paul of Tarsus' thought (e. g., in the works of Heidegger, Badiou, Bultmann, and Tillich) and examines the theologian Erik Peterson's eschatological interpretation of St. Paul's *Letters* primarily because it is distinctive in explicitly connecting the notions of 'event' and 'sacrament'. Central to Peterson's sacramental understanding of the event is the Pauline inspired notion of the 'new aeon' — a radical temporal rupture, inaugurated by Christ's resurrection and enthronement, which ends the old cosmos and establishes a qualitatively new cosmic order — a notion that is closely linked to both the act of baptism and a new understanding of the relation between history and eternity. Namely, baptism is not to be understood merely as a ritual of symbolic significance, but rather, as the decisive event of an effective sacramental participation in the Christ-event, i. e., a real incorporation into Christ's death and

resurrection that is both present and incomplete, being the condition of the intermediate stage of an ‘eschatological reservation’ anticipating future resurrection. Baptism thus inaugurates entry into the new creation and thereby transfers believers from the old to the new aeon, giving them a new sacramental status in which their entire being merge into the sacramental union between the individual, the communal essence of the Church, and God. As the author emphasizes, this rupture between the old life (in the flesh) and the new life (in Christ) does not take place in the believer’s sovereign experience, but in the sacramental event that God makes happen and therefore cannot be appropriated. History is divided accordingly: The old passage of time is overcome by a new aeon brought about by the eschatological event of the enthronement of Christ, which is the event of the emergence of a new, eschatological quality of time, as opposed to mere historical time. The paper also points out Peterson’s critique of Lutheran interpretations of the Gospel, which reduce it to forgiveness of individual sins, although Paul announces Christ’s cosmic victory over Adamic original sin. It criticizes modern philosophical trends, too, that spiritualize or dematerialize the meaning of the sacraments, even though they involve real material substances that affect real bodies. The essay concludes by emphasizing that as a definitive experience of the true event of Christ’s self-giving, the sacramental event is a concrete irruption of the new aeon into history, which brings about a change of being, yet, it is also paradoxical: Christ is revealed and concealed, historically present yet eschatologically awaited.

*Huimin Wu*’s study fulfills two main objectives. It argues for the inherent unity of Schelling’s philosophy by demonstrating a unified ontological ‘logic’ at work in it, and shows how this logic supplements contemporary event philosophies. The essay challenges the traditional ‘myth of rupture’ that portrays Schelling’s philosophy as fragmented across disconnected periods, proposing instead that a unified ontological dynamics underpins the philosopher’s early and late thought, forming a coherent system. The dynamics in question is that of the ‘Latency-Contraction-Ekstasis’ triad rooted in the ‘*Ungrund*’ — which is not chaos, but a primordial source of two complementary latent potencies, namely, an inwardly contracting ‘rooting impulse’ of a ‘dark drive’ and an outwardly ekstastic ‘luminous force’ that guides toward self-manifestation, the undifferentiated unity of which transcends the opposition between being and non-being — a concept that Schelling posits in order to reject traditional metaphysics’ various notions of a static ‘ground of being’. The author shows that the ‘Latency’ of the unmanifested potency tension in the *Ungrund* compels a ‘decision’ that transforms latency into actuality by divine contraction. Namely, ‘Contraction’ is potency’s self-limitation that generates the ontological difference between *Grund*

and *Existenz* as embodiments of the two potencies, standing in a dialectical relation, but necessarily leaving an unintegrated ‘ontological remainder’ (the overly solidified ‘dark drive’ during contraction) that is the ontological origin of ‘the possibility of evil’. In turn, ‘Ekstasis’ refers to the domain-specific unfolding of this ontological difference, followed by a return to the original unity of potencies, completing the cycle. The study demonstrates how this Latency-Contraction-Ekstasis dynamic is at work unconsciously in nature (via physical, chemical, and biological phenomena) and consciously in history (via conflict, freedom, and evil), reenacting the *Ungrund*’s tension. The essay concludes by arguing that Schelling’s notion of the perpetual generative ‘meta-event’ of divine decision, reenacted across domains, is able to resolve tensions in current event philosophy. Namely, Deleuze’s principle of the ‘priority of difference’ (events unfold inherently ‘disjunctive’ potencies into actuality, generating difference) neglects a prior unifying field, and Badiou’s principle of the ‘priority of rupture’ (events are ‘irruptions of the infinite into the finite’) neglects the continuity of becoming, whereas Schelling’s model bridges these gaps by affirming disruptive difference (Contraction) while preserving integrative unity (Latency/Ekstasis), and framing rupture — not as an anomaly but — as part of being’s perpetual cycle of generation.

## II. The Event: Philosophical Approaches

Marlene Prosdocimo’s study interprets the intricate relations between Heidegger’s concepts of the ‘mediatedness’ of beings and the ‘immediateness’ of nature, the ‘holy’ as the latter’s essence, its ‘eventfulness’, and finally the ‘poetic word’ as the “event of the holy” (Heidegger), drawing on Heidegger’s *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry* (more precisely, of *As when on a holiday...*). The author shows why the immediate cannot be some determinate being, why it is called ‘nature’ and in what sense it is omnipresent; what Heidegger might mean by saying that the holy is the essence of nature, without being its posited first origin in a foundational order; what meaning may be ascribed to Heidegger’s claims that nature, as simultaneously the oldest and the youngest, “is ‘begotten out of holy chaos’”, yet the holy is “present as what is coming (*Kommendes*)”; and how the temporality of such a generative dynamic should (and shouldn’t) be conceived. The study further argues that the mode of subsistence of the holy — which is one of the ‘names’ for the Heideggerian ‘other beginning of thinking’ — can only have an ‘evenemential’ nature; that Heidegger’s notion of originary ‘enowning’ (*Ereignis*) cannot be thought of as a form of monism, but rather incorporates a correlation (between be-ing and man); and that the originary opening of holy chaos that begets nature has an analogous structure of ‘correlation’ and therefore itself proves to be an event, namely, the event of

‘beginning’ (in the sense of ἀρχή) that always ‘reigns’ and ‘begins’, without a punctual beginning. In the concluding part of her essay the author suggests that the poetic word, which is the ‘event (*Ereignis*) of the holy’ according to Heidegger, not only corresponds to the event of the essencing of nature, but in such a word — due to the enowning correspondence between language and poet — ‘what is coming’ has begotten and continues to beget the omnipresent immediate (nature) in its difference from beings.

*Anton Sverdlikov*’s study attempts to outline the contours of a ‘metaphysics of events’ that is simultaneously realistic and phenomenological, drawing on ideas from the late Heidegger’s treatises on the history of being and their radicalization in Fink’s cosmological account of the event. The author argues that in Heidegger’s works, the ‘unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) of beings’ can be considered the primary meaning of the ‘event’, and further shows that — in contrast to the early Heidegger, for whom such an event is closely tied (in a ‘correlationist’ way) to the accessibility of beings to the human being — Heidegger’s thinking from the 1930s onwards represents a de-anthropocentrization of his earlier existential conception, claiming that the event of unconcealment is an inherent, ‘quasi-realist’ (though not entirely human-independent) feature of beings as beings. In the next step, the author reconstructs Fink’s explicitly ‘realist’ project, which aims to de-subjectivize the concepts of phenomenality, event, and the ‘openness of beings’ (in which humans continue to participate, but are no longer constituent elements). He shows that both sides of Fink’s cosmological distinction between ‘intraworldly beings’ and the ‘world’ retain a radically eventful yet utterly human-independent character, namely, intraworldly beings are essentially phenomena that manifest themselves (not to a subject, but) in the world; while the world is the ‘real’, cosmological site of the subject-independent totality of the coming-to-appearance of beings. On that ground, the study further argues that 1) a systematic generalization of these results can lead to an explicitly metaphysical conception of the event as the ultimate form of reality (distinguished from both the classical metaphysics of the presence of beings, and its ‘correlationist’, transcendental-phenomenological critique), and that 2) such a metaphysics of the event can be developed in both speculative and empiricist directions, namely, as a speculative metaphysics of the one singular event (analogous to the One or the Absolute of speculative philosophies), conceived as radically distinct from, and the truth of, the multiplicity of non-autonomous beings; and also as a more moderate, empiricist perspective on the event, leading to a phenomenological metaphysics of finite, multiple things appearing as events.

*Pietro Prunotto's* article aims to establish the concept of 'technical event' through investigating the relation between event, technics, and the human, as it appears in the work of Heidegger, Aristotle, and Stiegler. First, the author summarizes the significance of the concept of 'event' in Heidegger's endeavor to break away from onto-theology, as well as the ontological importance of the question of technology within the framework of this project. As the study points out, the issue of technology turns out to be liminal and amphibious for the later Heidegger. While he captures the connection between the destiny of Being and modern technology through his concepts of *Machenschaft* and *Gestell* — within the domain of which every being is reduced to a calculable and controllable *positum* — he also regards the rethinking of technology as a potential 'threshold' for non-metaphysical thinking — namely, a leap into a thinking of the event — which, according to the study, can be conceived of by grasping the unified co-belonging or mutual interdependence of the event, technology, and humanity. The author shows, however, that Heidegger's approach remains indebted to a metaphysical framework insofar as he (in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* B, 1) attempts to think *phýsis* — whose cause lies within itself — as the very site of the event and therefore ontologically superior over *téchne*, within whose realm the other causes are bound to exteriority and accidentality. The study therefore revisits Aristotle's discussion of the accidental causes (namely, fortune and chance, in B, 4–6) that refers to a constitutively non-objectifiable space within *phýsis* — a space of contingency that, as the author argues with the help of Stiegler's notion of the 'invention of the human', is the space of a 'technical event'. By the notion in question, Stiegler points to an event that, without reference to any substance or foundation, opens an internal difference within *phýsis* and — as some 'technical' middle voice — institutes the correlated processes of anthropo- and technogenesis, namely, the circular co-emergence of subject and object, interior and exterior, the human and the technical. The study concludes that — by avoiding both instrumentalism and naturalism, as well as any metaphysical opposition between *phýsis* and *téchne* — Stiegler's theory not only fulfills Heidegger's endeavor to rethink Being as event, but also extends and completes it by articulating a genuine technical ontology of the event.

*Simon Vincken* starts from the work of Gary Gutting (*Thinking the Impossible*, 2011) who gives an overall characterization of post-war French philosophy, and also introduces a division between its two branches. Gutting claims, first, that — as a response to the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics (according to which Being withdraws from full comprehension, and the Event signals the end of metaphysics), and also in utter difference to the approach of the analytic tradition (which mostly works within established logical and linguistic constraints) —

post-war French philosophy is characterized by a profound fascination with what appears to be beyond the limits of thought. Gutting also introduces a distinction between two camps of such a ‘thinking the impossible’ — corresponding to two distinct ways of addressing Hegelian thought —, namely, the ‘absolute skeptics’ who hold that there are insurmountable conceptual impossibilities (particularly in relation to ethics, alterity, and the divine; e. g., Levinas, Derrida, and Marion) and therefore reject the Hegelian model of dialectical resolution; and in turn, the ‘relative skeptics’ who — acknowledging the limits of thought only within given sets of concepts — believe in strategies to bypass such impossibilities (through ontology, mathematics, or power structures; e. g., Deleuze, Badiou, and Foucault) and that way they align with a reinterpretation of Hegel’s dialectical process. By concisely summarizing the pertaining thoughts of the mentioned thinkers, Vincken shows that Gutting’s distinction between relative and absolute ‘skepticism’ is indeed valid, yet, it is not exhaustive, primarily because it does not pertain to the pre-conceptual dimension of lived transformation brought about by the Event (as highlighted in particular in the work of Romano), a transformation that reconfigures the very structure through which we engage with the world.

*Michalis Tegos’* article examines the concept of the event focusing on Heidegger and Badiou. It claims that Heidegger’s notion of *Ereignis* is fundamentally ambiguous: The event names the primordial co-belonging of Being and Time, intertwining ontology and history, but their fusion creates a persistent tension between the ontological and historical dimensions of the event. Namely, it signifies the event of an ontological appropriation (the coming into its own of Being and *Dasein*) as the disclosure of the truth of Being, yet the event is also to be thought as a historical rupture within the History of Being, producing an ambiguity between the Event of primordial disclosure and historical events. Therefore the study argues that while the late Heidegger attempts to overcome not only Western metaphysics’ ‘first beginning’ (grounded in *arche*, sufficient reason, and metaphysical presence) but also his own notion of ‘ontological difference’ (between Being and beings), his thinking of the event as a new beginning for thought is nevertheless entangled in the remnants of the ontological difference. The central claim of the article is, however, that Badiou’s philosophy responds directly to this Heideggerian tension between the ontological and the historical. As the author shows, Badiou develops a mathematical ontology, based on set theory, that treats Being as pure multiplicity structured by the ‘count-as-one’, and thinks of any situation in terms of its laws of presentation, in the conjuncture of the void and the infinite. In this context, ontology can account only for ‘normal’ multiplicities, not for anomalies. The event is such an anomaly: It is

an exception or abnormal multiple constituted by the disequilibrium between its presentation and representation, introducing an ‘evental site’ that is unforeseeable and unrepresentable within the laws of a situation. The event is trans-ontological: “Of the event, ontology can say nothing” (Badiou). Furthermore, Badiou also subtracts the event from history: It does not belong to any linear or teleological narrative of history, it is not a destinal sending, nor is it theological or messianic, and it is not reducible to empirical happenings either. The event for Badiou is a contingent and hazardous supplement to any situation, which inaugurates a truth-procedure: Through subjective fidelity to it, a subject emerges and produces a finite fragment of an infinite-valid truth. Ultimately, the author argues that Heidegger opens the path, but Badiou radicalizes it: He succeeds in offering a conception of the event as a new beginning for thought — neither ontological nor historical, but an exceptional rupture enabling truths.

Zanan Akin’s paper examines the relationship between Heidegger’s concept of *Ereignis* and Badiou’s concept of *événement* as two philosophical attempts to rethink historical time. It argues that both thinkers respond to a shared — although differently interpreted — diagnosis of modernity: The rise of indifference, where everything becomes equivalent to everything else, eroding meaningful distinctions and historical depth by reducing time to an endless sequence of interchangeable ‘nows’. The author contrasts this with the historian François Hartog’s theory of ‘presentism’, which interprets this ‘never ending now’ not as the absence of a genuine ‘present’, but rather, as the omnipresence of the ‘present’ — where ‘events’ are constantly produced and consumed so that nothing actually happens in the present — suspending historical time altogether. As the author points out, according to Heidegger, the spread of indifference in modernity began with Descartes, in whose view beings became equally valid objects of the representing subject; this reached its peak in Hegel’s absolute idealism where the equally valid objects were said to be the products of a rational absolute subject, resulting in the indifference of the ‘thing’ as such, the loss of the sense of time, and that of finitude. This leads to pervasive ‘machination’, for which not only beings are indifferent, but Being itself also becomes indifferent in its abandoning of beings, which humans are passively exposed to. The only exception to this dual indifference is a ‘hint’ of the event silently pointing to Being in its complete retreat, which can be seized by a de-cision to actively withdraw from immersion in beings and enter into the truth of Being, the latter being the abysmal condition of any inceptive thinking and true historical deeds carried out only by the ‘few’ as ‘founders’ in poetry or politics, bridging the beginning to the future. For Badiou, in contrast, what underlies the structural indifference in modernity is not ‘machination’ or ‘technology’, but rather, the indifferentiative capacity of

capitalist ‘circulation’ as a repetitive process of homogenizing diversification. For him, any normal situation is a purely indifferent multiplicity structured by the ‘count-as-one’, sealing differences as a term that gains an equal validity of a ‘legal’ entity by recognizing it via de-singularization. The exception to such an overall structure of indifferent differences can only be a genuine event that breaks with the circulation of commensurable differences, opening a gap in the repetitive structure of time that at the same time bridges the gap between the past and the future. The study concludes that while both philosophers conceive the event as a rupture in the regime of indifference that generates a genuine present, restores historical time, and thus seems to break with the presentist condition, the inherent futurism of such notion of the event may turn out to be a sublime instrument of the presentist present.

*Joshua Royles’s* study aims to demonstrate that Badiou’s critique of Deleuze — according to which the latter’s metaphysical framework ‘suppresses difference’, that is, subsumes the multiple into the oppressive totality of the One at the expense of the radical singularity of the event — is incorrect. First, it explains how Deleuze’s univocal being implies a constant, real, and tumultuously dynamic tension between being and the event. It points out that events, for Deleuze, are radically singular manifestations of the repetition of the same and the different, as exemplified by the ‘festival’: It repeats the same in a cyclical and predictable manner, yet at the same time repeats it with an unpredictable, unique difference; thus, it is precisely the original event that commemorates its own repetitions, and not the other way around. Thus, for Deleuze, contrary to Badiou, events cannot simply spring up out of the void, and they are not rooted in a pure present either, since they are not entirely disconnected from their past and future, but rather, all events are co-implicated: The actualization of any one event expresses them all by virtue of a ‘counter-actualization’, which is a virtual link between all the previous events and those to come. The study further explores this issue by emphasizing that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the ‘Body without Organs’ must be regarded as a whole that resists the totalizing pressure of the organism, which compels all its parts to function solely for the sake of the whole’s operation. Namely, it is one substance whose foundations are cracked by its two sides or attributes: The plane of consistency, which is submersed in the possibilities of virtual infinity (where all separate substances freely collide through flows in all direction), and the plane of stratification, which is encased in the actuality of form (preventing such flowing together, strata being the source of individual beings). Insofar as these two, formally distinct planes stand in an irresolvable tension with one another, and as such, constantly generate the One as a unitary, fusional multiplicity in and because of their difference, Deleuze and Guattari’s re-

conception of substance falls outside the usual dyad of the one and the many. The study also points out that the objections raised by both Žižek and Badiou against Deleuze's project stem from their proximity to Lacanian psychoanalysis; and it is precisely on this basis that Badiou makes no mention of the collaboration between Deleuze and Guattari, while Žižek downplays its significance, even though Guattari's contribution was essential to Deleuze's overarching project. The author concludes by noting that Deleuze's response to the 'irreconcilable relationship' between being and event, as posited by Badiou, offers hope that, in our contemporary world splintered by recent events, connection and relationships can always be re-established.

*Andrea Sipos'* article — drawing primarily on the ideas of Romano, Tengelyi, and Maldiney — explores the temporality of personal, life-changing events and, in light of this, rethinks the the issue of time-consciousness. The study first examines the types of events that these authors discuss in their respectively hermeneutic, phenomenological, and psychoanalytic approaches; it then reviews their cumbersome and often paradoxical descriptions of the peculiar temporality of these events. The study argues that the difficulties associated with describing the temporality of the event stem from the legacy of the Husserlian phenomenological tradition, according to which temporality permeates every modality of consciousness and is a fundamental 'given' in both the so-called 'natural attitude' and the 'phenomenological attitude'. In contrast, the author puts forward the following two central theses: 1) Time is a 'symbolically instituted' phenomenon that in itself may pose an obstacle to a purely phenomenological approach — and must therefore be bracketed within it — especially when it comes to examining the affective aspects of our experiences without objectifying them in any reflective way. 2) Consciousness has two fundamental functions: One is the primary, first-person singular affective perception of constantly flowing, more or less intense, yet a-temporal impressions; the other is its reflective-thinking-interpreting mode, which, adopting a third-person perspective, maintains a distance from the immediate affective experience, mobilizes language, and is involved in concept formation, including the concept of time, thereby projecting temporality onto the originally 'timeless' affective experience. Thus, according to the author, even the adoption of the phenomenological approach (the execution of reductions) remains within the framework of reflective-objectifying conscious activity, and therefore seeks to conceptually capture the pre-reflective, non-intentional, non-objectifying modality of consciousness through the model of reflective acts. The study further argues that the event is primarily perceived in a direct and spontaneous manner — through non-intentional, pre-reflective, a-temporal affective perception — and only subsequently through reflective-

linguistic interpretation; that the apparent temporal paradox of the event stems from this two-stage structure of comprehension; and that the concepts of event and selfhood (*ipséité*) mutually presuppose one another — contrary to the views of Romano and Tengelyi, who argue that the singularity of the event determines the singularity of its addressee — insofar as the event marks a rupture in the ever-changing, pre-reflectively formed, and densely structured meaning of an always already unique self, which the author calls *singularity*. Consequently, the study concludes that a personal event is nothing other than the experience of a profound, radical metamorphosis occurring within the structure of its addressee's singularity.

*Ákos Attila Tóth's* article focuses on the significance of the concept of event in the context of ethics. It does so by examining the extent to which Levinas's and Waldenfels's conceptions of the moral subject — and, more broadly, the origin and status of ethics — represent a radical departure from classical ethical theories. First, the author briefly outlines the moral philosophies of Aristotle and Kant, pointing out that their shared conviction is that moral identity lies in calming the storms of life and achieving moral stability, whether through the habituation of virtue and the constant discipline of reason over desires, or through the legislation of reason and the alignment of freedom with universal law. As the study emphasizes, however, this classical view is fraught with difficulties in three main respects: The image of the stable moral subject is based on the abstract concept of a rational agent, it favors universality over singularity — a tendency that is particularly evident in Kantian ethics — and it denies vulnerability, even though in ethically significant situations we often encounter complexities that cannot be rationally explained, and we mostly experience ourselves as vulnerable, exposed subjects. The study then summarizes the relevant views of Levinas and Waldenfels as two approaches that break with this classical ethical paradigm. It shows that for none of these thinkers does the self form the basis of moral identity; rather, it emerges due to ethical events, which constitute the self from the outside. For Levinas, such an ethical event is the encounter with the face of the Other, while for Waldenfels, it is the unsettling intrusion of anything that is alien. In their view, ethics is not something a person does, but rather something that happens to a person and calls for a sense of responsibility. Although, accordingly, the starting point of ethics for them is the encounter with alterity, this does not render classical ethical theories false, the author argues, but merely highlights their incompleteness: The cultivation of character, the discipline of habits, the pursuit of rational consistency are not the sources of ethics, but rather help sustain it as sediments of earlier ethical events. The study concludes by noting that the views of Levinas and Waldenfels converge on a crucial reorientation, according

to which responsibility precedes freedom; subjectivity is not the foundation of ethics but its consequence; and the true origin of ethics lies in vulnerability and exposure, in openness to events that one cannot control.

*Péter Makai's* study develops an event-ontological framework that links events and responsibility, and argues that events are not so much ruptures as they are transformative processes woven into the fabric of existence. The author begins by noting that — although much of contemporary philosophy is moving away from traditional approaches based on clearly distinguishable substances and subjects, and instead regards as primary the specific dynamism that characterizes the mutual interpenetration of the contingent and context-dependent elements of existence — contemporary interpretations of the 'event' often draw a sharp distinction between structures and events, and thus overlook their perichoretic aspect. The study presents an illustrative example of the latter, from the intersection of moral philosophy and philosophical anthropology. It argues that events — especially actions performed by others — profoundly influence personal existence and create a 'transformative medium' that is governed by a specific moral responsiveness — one that differs from concepts of responsibility based on cause-effect relationships, roles, consequences, impersonal principles, or abstract duty. Namely, 'alternity' responsibility (from the Latin *alter*, meaning 'the other [of two]') is tied to the presence of, and lived proximity to, a 'you' (alternity) — in contrast to Lévinasian responsibility, which arises from the other's radical strangeness (alterity) — not merely as a response, but as a moral attentiveness and care that actively attends to the other's unique needs and circumstances and shapes them for the sake of his or her well-being and unfolding. The study distinguishes between 'proximic', 'mediative', and 'distal' types of alternity responsibility based on the degree of closeness and distance, and argues that the first type — characterized by asymmetrical devotion (care, giving, self-sacrifice) — precedes and lays the foundation for subsequent norms of reciprocity and justice: For only sufficient proximity to the other person enables one to recognize and respect that person as a concrete 'you' — which, in turn, is a prerequisite for turning away from ourselves toward the other, eventually adopting the other's perspective, or even subordinating our own interests to those of the other. In short, close relationships create a 'proximity field' that provides the setting for the genesis of genuine, personal, and unconditional responsibility toward the other, which selflessly shapes the personality in a way that reciprocity alone cannot achieve. The study concludes by emphasizing that personhood is therefore contingent and fragile, depending on whether others assume responsibility for us — others who, in this regard, do not represent a rupture in our world but embody the promise of an ethical order of proximity.

Zsuzsanna Lurcza's study focuses on two important aspects of the philosophical significance of the so-called 'event-medial' approach, which is reflected in the linguistic phenomenon known as the 'middle voice' — typically found in ancient Indo-European languages — as outlined in the Introduction to this volume. On the one hand, it reconstructs the pertaining views of Benveniste, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida on the impact of grammar on thought, as well as their responses to the resulting 'ontological' consequences. On the other hand, it examines the ways in which certain East Asian languages express that 'pre-subjective dimension' of actions which the middle voice captures as 'event-medial'. The author elaborates that Nietzsche is profoundly distrustful of language: He critiques grammar itself for fabricating subjects and 'doers', turning happenings (sheer becoming) into actions of fictional, metaphysically posited agents (being); that Heidegger, by contrast, embraces subject-less verbal structures — such as 'the world worlds' (*die Welt weltet*), or 'the naming calls' (*der Ruf ruft*), etc. — that give voice to the appropriating event (*Ereignis*) of the 'truth of Being' as a mediating middle within the 'difference' between 'world and things'; whereas Derrida invokes a middle-voice logic by his notion of *différance*, which destabilizes subject-centered grammar, displacing thereby the traditional role of the subject as the source of meaning. As its second main move, the study shows that Byung-Chul Han regards Old Chinese as a language of emptiness, in-difference, and flowing, in which signs possess no intrinsic traits and acquire identity only within a given context, reflecting a worldview based not on opposites but on complementary qualities and continuity, without a need for presence or absence, identity or difference; and that he considers Heidegger's notions of 'being', 'home', and 'dwelling' as standing in sharp contrast to the images of non-being, non-dwelling, selflessness, and aimless wandering found in Chinese philosophy and Zen Buddhism, where 'emptiness' is a central motif (opposing substance) that overrides the logic of subject/object and active/passive dichotomy. The author also shows that all of this resonate with both François Jullien's notion of 'blandness' — that pervades the entirety of Chinese culture, and functions as a middle associated with neutrality, indefinability, evanescence, transience, and balance — and the examples taken from Korean and Japanese for expressing the event as 'subjectless'. The study concludes that although the middle voice also points to such a pre-subjective field, being attuned to the 'pre-linguistic' flow of the world, it nevertheless internalizes the event within a subject rather than completely removing the subject, as is the case in Far Eastern thought.

Lasma Pirkatina's article traces the rise of 'event' as a key concept in postmodern continental philosophy, distinguishes three methodologically distinct approaches

in event philosophy, and offers a possible typology of the events in life. It points out that in postmodernism, interest in events is linked to criticism of the unified, transparent, rational, and active subject — emphasizing instead contingency, passivity, and openness to the Other — and that events only have meaning for free and responsible individuals who stand outside the totalitarian perspective of the system. Having emphasized the fact that the concept of the event is ambiguous and diverse, and that there is (and can be) no single, comprehensive philosophy of the event, the study goes on by characterizing the phenomenological-hermeneutic approach (e. g., Marion and Romano) that highlights how the event shows itself and demands interpretation; the structuralist-poststructuralist perspectives (e. g., Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida) that remove the subject entirely and instead analyze impersonal processes and transformations; and finally the so-called metaphysical or negative-ontological approaches (e. g., Heidegger, Levinas, Henry, Badiou, Derrida) that treat the event as transcendent, non-phenomenal, or beyond being. The author further argues that — despite the differences — all of these approaches ultimately describe the event as a break, intrusion, or transcendence of the subject's world, and that events must also be studied through lived experience, to which the typology she proposes aims to contribute. It distinguishes and briefly describes nine types of events according to their 'structures' — namely, that of the world, of truth, of a self, of vitality, of trauma, of stepping outside oneself, of the in-between, of entanglement, of beginning, and of the end — with the aim of illuminating life by preserving the diversity of events and avoiding totalizing theories.

*Ulrich Arnswald's* article interprets Wittgenstein's statement in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that "death is not an event in life; death is not lived through", with the aim of clarifying what the Austrian philosopher refers to as an 'event in life', and as the 'experience of death'. The study begins with the observation that the first part of the sentence has two possible interpretations. Namely, the statement "death is not an event in life" could mean that 'death is not a fact at all', or it could mean that 'death does not belong to the world'. Considering these two interpretative possibilities leads to the conclusion that our own death represents a boundary of what can be experienced in life, and thereby a boundary to our own world, which is coextensive with our sphere of experience. Although the experience of the death of other people makes it clear that a certain way of talking about death makes sense in life, it turns out to be pointless to talk about our own death because we do not know what the case is if that talk is supposed to be true. However, this cannot be a valid interpretation — the author objects — since Wittgenstein understood his *Tractatus* primarily as an ethical text, and although he does not attach any value connotation to death, he

nevertheless maintains that the right — and therefore ethical — life can only be seen against the backdrop of death. The study seeks to resolve this dilemma by pointing out that Wittgenstein proves to be a transcendental idealist, in the light of which the sentence in question can be interpreted as follows. On the one hand, death is that of the subject, the transcendental subject does not belong to the world (the world understood as a fact) but constitutes the condition of the world, thus the death of the subject is the point at which the world itself ends for that individual. On the other hand, death remains an abrupt, transitory, *sui generis* event between life and non-existence, the boundaries of which are impossible to determine, and it is for that reason that Wittgenstein does not give it either a positive or a negative connotation. What is decisive for a life, however, is the metaphysical relationship of the self to the world: Since death transcends the existence of a subject, yet it does not determine the events of life, it is possible to reflect on the authorship of life in the face of inevitable death, and therefore to give one's life an ethical direction. According to the study's ultimate argument, since for Wittgenstein the boundary between the totality of facts in the world and the world of the transcendental subject cannot be clearly defined, and since death is a *sui generis* event taking place between life and non-existence, the boundaries of which are impossible to define, the philosopher deliberately left the sentence about death vague. The author concludes that according to Wittgenstein, as his words attest, the fulfillment of the purpose of existence involves the pursuit of the 'absolute': "And the only absolute is, to battle through life toward death, like a fighting, a charging soldier. Everything else is wavering, cowardice, sloth, thus wretchedness."

Yuewen Hu's study examines the problem of event individuation through the lens of Quine's extensionalist ontology, starting from his logical reconstruction of Heraclitus' saying: "No one steps into the same river twice." The study argues that traditional metaphysical approaches struggle to account for diachronic identity — that is, how entities or events remain identical through change — because they tie identity to changing attributes, constituents, or causal descriptions. Drawing on Quine's principles of ontological commitment — namely, his recognition criterion: "to be is to be the value of a bound variable", and his test criterion: "no entity without identity" — the paper proposes that any entity posited by a theory must possess clear and determinate criteria of identity. By interpreting the river as a four-dimensional spatiotemporal continuum composed of temporal stages, the analysis shows that persistence through change can be explained without appealing to stable material composition or qualitative sameness. Instead, identity through time is grounded in the continuity of a spatiotemporal trajectory. Extending this model to event theory, the paper argues

that events can be understood as spatiotemporal regions composed of temporal parts, whose identity depends solely on the continuity of the region they occupy. Thus, two events are identical if and only if they occupy the same region of space-time. This extensionalist framework avoids traditional disputes about intensional criteria — such as causal roles, meanings, or essential properties — and instead establishes a clear standard based on logical and linguistic demarcation of space-time regions. Through Quine’s methodological strategy of semantic ascent, questions regarding event identity are reframed to concern how language logically refers to entities, and in particular, how our theories delineate regions of space-time. The paper concludes that, although Quine did not explicitly develop an ontology of events, his extensionalist framework provides a parsimonious and naturalistic account of event individuation that is consistent with scientific reasoning and offers a logically rigorous alternative to traditional metaphysical approaches.

*Marc Heimann’s* study interprets the operational mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) in light of certain key insights from the theories of language developed by Heidegger and Lacan, while also highlighting the limitations of these models, especially with regard to the emergence of the Event as a radical ‘novelty’. The author argues that Heidegger’s ‘something-as-something’ (*als*) relation — which structures language at a pre-predicative level — shows a close parallel to a certain aspect of how LLMs function, namely, the aspect based on metonymically associative, vector-based token relations. In turn, Lacan’s understanding of metaphor — according to which new meanings are generated through the shifting of signifiers across domains — bears a close parallel to another aspect of how LLMs function, namely, the so-called attention mechanism and re-weighting process therein, which enables LLMs to link together different domains of relational metonymic structures. Supported by examples, the study demonstrates that, since the attentional mechanism serves as the site of metaphorical operation, prompt engineering becomes a form of ‘violent hermeneutics’ that reorganizes the model’s symbolic network by shifting the boundary between the accessible and the inaccessible within a given symbolic configuration, thereby rearranging the model’s syntactic and semantic defaults into an entirely new articulation and even — without any retraining — changing its grammar. This amounts to a ‘weak technical Event’ — that is, as the author argues, an engineered example of the effects of an Event — which must be strictly distinguished from Badiou’s Event proper: The resulting novelty here is merely a new pattern of linkage between already existing elements, a temporary ‘worlding’ under inscription that changes the limits of what can be said at all by the model. This is not an ontological rupture, not a true Event (there is no truth, no subject,

no subtraction from the situation), not something ‘incalculable’ in the strong philosophical sense — the metaphorical force, language itself, lies beyond the boundaries of the model. The study concludes that, due to LLMs’ dependency on metaphorical inscription, the interaction between humans and technology evolves from something logical and machinic into a form of hermeneutic literacy: Poetics, metaphor, and literary practices take on a central role in the technological condition, transforming the way technological systems articulate and reorganize the calculable field of meaning.

### III. The Event: Literary and Cultural-Theoretical Approaches

Csongor Lőrincz’s essay examines the interrelations and tensions between breathing, voice, and language in poetry and their role in poetic performativity. It does so through a dual approach. On the one hand, it outlines possible theoretical thematizations of breathing, also taking into account its strong poetological, cultural, and religious associations (including inspiration and spirit), its historically varying significance, as well as the impact of modern media technologies on the perception of breathing. On the other hand, it raises the question — How can lyric acts be understood as aspects of breathing, or vice versa? — and examines it through an analysis of the poem entitled *Lélegzet* (*Breath*), written by the Hungarian poet Ágnes Nemes Nagy (1922–1991). The study points out that breathing is both a physiological foundation of speech, and at the same time a phenomenon shaped by language and cultural interpretation, functioning as a liminal medium between body and language. It also calls attention to the fact that historically, breathing had a prominent role in oral reading and rhetoric, while silent, internalized reading partially obscured it; that romanticism’s various poetics of breath can be seen as compensations for this partial loss of the function of breathing; and that the diverse forms of modern messaging and storage technologies (recordings, telephone, digital communication, etc.) mark a new form of ‘re-entry’ of breathing’s perception that leads to distinct ‘uses of the body’ (breathing), realizing correlative forms of life. Drawing on Ágnes Nemes Nagy’s poem, the author demonstrates how breathing itself first becomes a genuine linguistic event of prayer (which summons the air as if it were a gift capable of providing both inspiration and the element for its vocalization, exposing the lyrical I on the bodily level of breath); how the poem stages a hybrid relation between human breath and the natural world; how its poetic forms — including pauses, line breaks, and rhythm — mirror the dynamics of breathing and introduce moments of interruption; and ultimately, how breathing becomes a passage from vegetative life to spiritual life, enacting a religiously tinged spiritual-healing renewal, thereby transforming the poem itself into breathing — that is, into a way of writing breath as the very form of lyrical

life. The study concludes that insofar as the act of reading the poem participates in its performative structure, the poem presents breathing as a kairotic event (cf. “*Atemwende*” in Paul Celan) between historical time and a dimension beyond it, institutionalizing the practice of breathe as a kind of counter-signature, an affirmation, a saying yes.

*Hajnalka Halász’s* study interprets Rilke’s *Ninth Duino Elegy* — from the perspective of Derrida’s late writings — as an exemplary poetic preparation for the event of the arrival of the absolute other, departing from standard interpretations of lyric address. It begins with the Derridian claim that a genuine event is singular and unrepeatable, unconditional and therefore cannot be mediated through prior conventions; one can only prepare for it by turning toward the future or the absolute other. The central thesis of the study is that it is precisely the poetic address — the lyric apostrophe, as a ‘turning-toward through turning-away’, in a sense that differs from the meaning generally attributed to it in literary studies — that paradigmatically enacts such a preparation: The apostrophe does not create or mediate the event of the coming of the absolute other (the secret, God), but rather prepares for it as a kind of exposure, an affirming turn toward it, thus keeping the future open to all that may arrive. The author examines Rilke’s *Ninth Duino Elegy* — in which the speaker addresses the Earth — as a pertinent example of this kind of poetic exposure, and argues that, alongside the addresser and the addressee, the third figure of the witness — in contrast to de Man’s position and also differing from that of other interpreters — plays a key role in Rilke’s work. Specifically, the apostrophe is reinterpreted not as a symmetrical dialogue, but as an indirect yet irreversible appeal addressed to the Angel in the *Elegy* — as one who is not timeless transcendence, but a radically inappropriable ‘other within me’ — because it is the Angel who must bear witness to our turning toward the Earth as our testimony to the singular traces of our mortal lives, without guaranteeing their permanence. An examination of Gadamer’s and de Man’s interpretations shows, furthermore, that while the former regards the Angel as confirming — in the very ‘*parousia*’ of the spoken word — the unprovable, yet absolutely certain inner reality of human feeling, the latter points to a structure that systematically excludes any such presence and instead emphasizes the rhetorical emptiness of poetic figures, affirming the Angel’s role as an ‘empty guarantor’ of the irrevocable outer trace of inscription, whose power stems from figural motion. Finally, the reconstruction of Derrida’s pertaining thoughts highlights that, for him, the notion of God refers to an inappropriable other who invisibly countersigns my own, unrepeatable trace (my hand-signature). Thus, the study concludes that — in the absence of a self-identical ‘I’ — the Angel of the *Elegy* is at once our irresolvable, secret interior and our absolute exterior (the

other), and consequently, Rilke's lyric apostrophe functions as both an exposition of the irreversible temporality and finitude of human existence, and a performative preparation for the impossible event of encountering the absolute other.

*Xiaoyue Zhang's* study examines the extent to which the recent revival of Lovecraftian (Cthulhu) themes — as pre-figurations of an 'ultimate event' — in Chinese online literature can be viewed as a cultural response to the immense social impact of the digital and technological transformations taking place in contemporary China. First, it characterizes Lovecraftian literature as depicting a cosmos inhabited by extra-human deities who defy human rationality, evoking unspeakable horror. It then points out that the Chinese Cthulhu tradition diverges from both the original narrative form (insofar as it combines its motifs with popular elements such as time travel and transmigration) and the narrative structure of the broader Chinese online literature (in that it undermines the relevance of rationalist narratives by an imaginative world dispersed by absurdity, chaos, and suffering). To support the study's central argument — that the popularity of this new genre in China reflects social anxieties about rapid technological change, algorithmic governance, and digital surveillance — the author explains that China's recent development has been driven, among others, by its National Strategy for Big Data Development (2015), and the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017), which — though now closely intertwined with national pride — instill in many Chinese citizens a sense of being trapped within opaque technological networks beyond their control. The study interprets such anxieties through the philosophical concept of the 'event', which — as something that disrupts existing linguistic and symbolic frameworks — can be likened to Lovecraftian 'speechlessness' in the face of the unknown, the horror of which here symbolizes people's inability to articulate the overwhelming 'event' of technological transformations. As the author argues, this collapse of the symbolic order reinforces the motif of 'madness', which is central to Lovecraft's works but takes on a new significance in Chinese Cthulhu novels: Instead of representing an exceptional state of psychological disintegration, madness becomes part of everyday digital existence primarily as an adaptive strategy for navigating fragmented realities and hybrid virtual-real worlds, giving rise to the formation of new symbolic orders and an emerging identity in a performative, fractured space. The study concludes that the Chinese revival of Cthulhu-inspired narratives functions as a cultural response to the digital age, exploring new ways of living amid technological uncertainty and a chaotic post-rational world order.

*Simon Angerer's* article examines how, according to Günther Anders — one of television's earliest and philosophically most rigorous theorists — images broadcast on television transform the concept of the event. The author situates Anders' reflections within the historical context of early American television in the 1950s, arguing that Anders' media theory was primarily shaped by his exile experience in the United States. By drawing a comparison with Boorstin's concept of 'pseudo-events' — that is, staged events intended for media coverage — the study points out that, although both thinkers analyzed how television reshapes the production and perception of events, Anders takes a more radical approach, as he focuses on the ontological consequences of broadcast media. According to him, television fundamentally transforms the human way of being (*Seinsweise*) by altering the relationship between people and the world. Broadcast images are delivered into the home as commodities, creating a unilateral relationship between viewer and world: The spectator cannot 'talk back'; he or she is powerless, voiceless, and deprived of freedom; this leads to passive consumption and, through the loss of reciprocity, to an impoverishment of experience and language use. The decisive novelty of televised events is their ontological ambiguity. Broadcast events are neither fully present nor absent: They occur in real time and are therefore not mere representations, yet they lack interactive participation and to that extent are absent. That is why Anders refers to television images as 'phantoms' — entities that are both real and unreal. Unlike Adorno, who highlights the illusory nature and ideological-repressing function of television images, Anders argues that television does not simply distort and repress reality; instead, the broadcast world opens up a new ontological dimension: Due to the real-time nature and unilateralism of television images, they themselves become the 'real world' itself, rendering ideology obsolescent. Thus, events become socially significant primarily in their reproduced form. This leads to one of Anders' key concepts, namely, 'matrix-performance' (*Matrizenleistung*), where originals increasingly adapt to their reproduction. The author argues that, for Anders, the historically new cultural phenomena of media-events render traditional aesthetic categories — such as representation, image, or appearance — obsolete and require new categories for their critical analysis. In conclusion, the article shows that Anders' critique of television is not merely cultural pessimism, but rather, a philosophical rethinking of a new category of events, namely, those mediated realities that fundamentally determine human perception and the structure of the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), reshaping them in accordance with the delivered phantom world.

*Charlotte Reihs's* study in media archaeology examines the 'media rupture' triggered by the use of early radio technology as a revolutionary tool during the

German November Revolution of 1918. It focuses on the so-called *Funkerspuk* (Haunted Broadcasting) that was a novel form of participatory media usage utilizing radio technology as a communication system independent from the state — propagating messages to ‘everyone’ for the first time ever, years before public broadcasting officially began — introduced by the revolutionary Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils as a pivotal tool for their communication and mass mobilization during the collapse of the German Empire. The study reconstructs how the Councils occupied the central telegraph bureau in Berlin, appropriated former military radio infrastructure to broadcast their own political messages for actively shaping the course of events, and challenged the state’s monopoly over news distribution by implementing decentralized coordination among councils, creating thereby a new form of real-time political organization. It also reports on the government’s reaction to this autonomous broadcasting by prohibiting unauthorized transmissions and restoring state control. As a result, from 1923 onward, German public broadcasting developed as a centralized and regulated medium focused on entertainment rather than political mobilization. Ultimately, the article shows that *Funkerspuk* was a decisive media rupture that for the first time revealed both the emancipatory possibilities of radio and the state’s determination to control mass communication, and that the suppression of *Funkerspuk* shaped the future structure of German radio by limiting its democratic potential. More generally, the study demonstrates that a fundamental shift in media infrastructure profoundly modifies knowledge production, reorganizes perception and restructures social time and space, giving rise to a concomitant shift in the manner of mediation between the private and public spheres and the spatial and temporal parameters of conducting events.