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Editorial preface

Dear Readers!

The current issue contains ten studies, one of them a short study, the rest are regular studies assigned to two major topics: spatial planning and a bulk of studies addressing core issues of the journal like cross-border studies, mobility and energy transition.

The main group of studies is addressing the basic characteristics of spatial planning systems from various national, economic, political and social contexts: Switzerland, Hungary and Romania. According to the fundamental thesis of international comparative research, spatial planning, as a component of the administrative system, is shaped primarily by the national law, the structure of public administration and political culture. Following this line of argumentation, the papers have adopted a structuralist/legalistic approach, common for comparative planning studies and for planning system analysis, looking at the same time behind the systematic description of administrative and legal characteristics for comments on the practice of spatial planning. In addition, a fourth paper focuses on the European level, offering valuable insights into the Europeanization process of spatial planning across countries.

The second group of papers are offering empirically well documented analysis on cross-border resilience and the role of minorities in cross-border cooperation, issues of strategic importance for the region where the journal operates. Finally, the last two articles are dealing with social innovation and mobility, respectively the role of cities in achieving sustainable energy transition, topics with equally high relevance both for the Northern Hungarian Region.

I hope that the issue will attract the attention of academic scholars and businesses as well.

Cluj (Kolozsvár) – Miskolc, December 2023.

Prof. Dr. József Benedek

Editor of the Issue 4-2023

TANULMÁNYOK / STUDIES

Paul Messerli[1] ***– Hans Weiss***[2]

Raumordnung und Raumplanung in der Schweiz

Die meisten europäischen Staaten verfügen heute über ein Planungssystem, das durch die territoriale Organisation und politische Konstitution strukturiert ist. Im folgenden Text skizzieren die Autoren das Raumplanungssystem der Schweiz im historischen Kontext. Nach einer Begründung der Notwendigkeit einer Planung des Raumes als Instrument der politisch gewollten Raumentwicklung macht die Beschreibung wichtiger Erweiterungen rumplanerischer Massnahmen deutlich, durch welche raumerschliessenden Technologien und gesellschaftlichen Problemwahrnehmungen diese ausgelöst wurden. Das heutige dreistufige Planungssystem der Schweiz wird dann im Rahmen des Verfassungsauftrages und der raumordnungspolitischen Ziele vorgestellt. Mit der abschliessenden Beurteilung der Wirksamkeit unseres Raumplanungssystems mit seiner mehrstufigen Kompetenz- und politischen Machtverteilung werden schliesslich dessen Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ausgelotet.

Spatial Planning in Switzerland

Most European states today have a planning system structured by territorial organization and political constitution. In the following text, the authors outline Switzerland's spatial planning system in a historical context. After justifying the necessity of spatial planning as an instrument of politically desired spatial development, the description of important expansions of spatial planning measures makes it clear which spatial technologies and social problem perceptions triggered them. Switzerland's current three-level planning system will then be presented within the framework of the constitutional mandate and the spatial planning policy goals. With the final assessment of the effectiveness of our spatial planning system with its multi-level distribution of competences and political power, its possibilities and limits are finally explored.
Keywords: multilevel space-time organization, territorial development in a federalist state, Swiss governance of territorial development, spatial planning in Switzerland, spatial planning policy.
JEL code: O21, R58

https://doi.org/10.32976/stratfuz.2023.32

Die Raumplanung strebt nach Kontrolle über Raum und Zeit

Ohne Raum kann nichts stattfinden und alles, was sichtbar stattfindet, manifestiert sich im Raum. Davon sind alle Menschen betroffen und je mehr sich der Raum mit menschlichen Artefakten füllte, umso mehr verwandelte sich das, was da war ohne Menschen in eine Technosphäre als menschliche Umwelt. Aus dieser Leonardowelt (Mittelstrass, J. 1992) gibt es keinen Weg zurück, weshalb dem Instrument der Raumplanung eine hohe Zukünftigkeit zukommt (Lauer, D. 2022). Versteht man Planung als die Vorwegnahme von Entscheidungen über künftige Entscheidungen, dann muss Raumplanung zwar Entscheidungen in eine

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gewünschte Richtung treffen, aber Handlungsspielräume für Entwicklungen offenhalten, die wir heute noch nicht kennen.
Wenn sich menschliche Verbände territorial organisieren, rückt der vorgefundene oder eroberte Raum als nutzbarer und gestaltbarer Lebensraum ins Zentrum dieser Gemeinschaften. Die Territorialisierung der Gesellschaft wird somit zu einem historischen Ausgangspunkt rumplanerischer Tätigkeit. Werden in dieser historischen Entwicklung herrschaftliche Strukturen als hierarchisch organisierte Verfügungsgewalt über Personen und ihre Güter zu Gunsten aufgeklärter demokratische Strukturen überwunden, kommt die ökonomische Herrschaft über Raum und Zeit ins Spiel. Sie schafft eine neue Ordnung, in dem sie in ihrer Logik Raum auf Zeit und beides auf die soziale Währung Geld reduziert. Der Raum schrumpft mit der besseren Erreichbarkeit wirtschaftlicher und politischer Zentren und die Zeit wird zum neuen Massstab der räumlichen Dimensionen.
Wenn Raumplanung Weichen für die Zukunft unseres Lebensraumes stellen will, dann muss sie in dieser Logik nach der Kontrolle über Raum und Zeit streben, was den raumerschliessenden Technologien eine grosse Bedeutung als zentraler Hebel der Raumentwicklung gibt. So hat nach der Eisenbahn und der Elektrifizierung die Automobilität zu einer ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Neubewertung der bis dato vorhandenen Raumstrukturen geführt.



Fig.1: Auf einem 1/3 der Landesfläche wird der „Wettstreit um den Boden“ ausgetragen.

Die komplexe Topographie und Kleinräumlichkeit der Schweiz gibt bereits erhebliche Rahmenbedingungen für eine flächendeckende Raumplanung vor (Fig.1). Sie modelliert in erheblichem Mass die Raum-Zeit Struktur des Territoriums und spiegelt sich in den historisch gewordenen Siedlungs- und Verkehrsstrukturen wider. Diese Ausgangslage setzt jeder Raumplanung klare Grenzen insofern als sich flächendeckende Raumentwicklungsmodelle an diesen Strukturen abarbeiten müssen. Darin liegt die grundsätzliche Herausforderung einer staatlichen Planung, die sich immer wieder der Frage stellen muss, auf welcher Massstabsebene

(Land, Region, Gemeinde) sich die vereinbarten Ziele mit welchen Konzepten und Instrumenten verwirklichen lassen.

Wie der moderne Territorialstaat die Raumentwicklung steuert

Die moderne Schweiz schafft ab 1848 mit der ersten Bundesverfassung die Voraussetzung, den aus 26 Kantonen bestehenden Territorialstaat nicht nur nach aussen mit einer Stimme zu repräsentieren, sondern auch nach innen dem kantonalen Föderalismus Grenzen zu setzen, wenn das öffentliche Interesse durch Volks- und kantonale Initiativen eingefordert wird. Der Publikation „Die Schweiz plant“ (2017), eine reich illustrierte Dokumentation zur Geschichte der Raumplanung entnehmen wir, dass der Bundesstaat 1876 in diesem Sinne aktiv wurde als er das eidgenössische Waldgesetz zur forstpolizeilichen Erhaltung der schweizerischen Waldfläche erliess. Dies auf dem Hintergrund der grossen Überschwemmungen, die Teile des Mittellandes verwüsteten. Dahinter stand die auch von der Wissenschaft gestützte Überzeugung, dass der Wald das Niederschlags- Abflussverhältnisse so reguliert, dass die Hochwasserwellen reduziert werden und der Abfluss verzögert wird. Der Wald war vor dieser Zeit besonders für die Bergbevölkerung eine wichtige Futterquelle. Das in den Wald getriebene Kleinvieh behinderte den Aufwuchs durch ständigen Verbiss. Er wurde aber auch zur Gewinnung von mehr Weideflächen zurückgedrängt.
Zum ersten Mal wurde so eine Flächenkategorie gesetzlich und gesamtschweizerisch absolut geschützt, was bis heute gilt. Dieses Vorgehen kommt in der Folge immer wieder zur Anwendung, meist ausgelöst durch Volksinitiativen. Heute stehen die Gewässer und Gewässerräume, die Acker- und Fruchtfolgeflächen, die Landschaften von nationaler Bedeutung und die Naturgefahrenzonen unter besonderer Gesetzgebung und sind somit mit Einschränkungen ihrer Nutzung belegt. Dies gilt auch für die Hochgebirgszonen, in welchen technische Erschliessungen und permanente Nutzungen nur ganz eingeschränkt möglich sind. All diese Flächen wurden im Laufe der Zeit einer weiterführenden Planung entzogen.

„Jeder Ordnung Anfang ist der Plan“
(*Alle Zitate aus „Die Schweiz plant“, 2017)*

Armin Meili, von dem dieses Zitat aus dem Jahr 1933 stammt, gilt als Begründer der schweizerischen Raumplanung. Er skizzierte schon damals einen Landesplan der Schweiz mit den drei Zonen Naturraum, Produktionsraum und Verkehrsraum. Auch mit der von ihm konzipierten Abteilung „Städtebau und Landesplanung“ an der Landesausstellung 1939 in Zürich, forderte er den Blick auf das ganze Land zu richten, wohl aus der Überzeugung, mit dem ordnenden Plan lasse sich die räumliche Entwicklung steuern oder zumindest lenken. Noch in den Kriegsjahren kommt es zur Gründung der Vereinigung Landesplanung Schweiz und an der Eidgenössisch Technischen Hochschule in Zürich (ETH-Z) des Institutes für Landesplanung.
Nach 1945 werden für die Raumnutzung zwei Wachstumsgrössen besonders bestimmend: die explodierende Nachkriegsbevölkerung und der Siegeszug des Autos. Die zwei folgenden Zitate beschreiben den unvorbereiteten Zustand, in welchen diese Entwicklung fiel. *Alfred Künzle* schrieb 2006: „Damals (in der Nachkriegszeit) galt noch alles Land als potentielles Bauland“. Und *Fritz Berger* 2006 im Rückblick: „Die Wohnungsnot habe die Raumplanung angeschoben“. Aus diesen Boomjahren ab 1950 blieb eine Zahl hängen, die wie eine Naturkonstante seither die Raumplanung bewegt. Pro Sekunde wurden 1m² Kulturland verbaut und nach den 1950erJahren wurde insgesamt mehr Fläche verbaut als durch alle Generationen zuvor (Häberli, R. et al.1991:15).
Rudolf Schilling schrieb 1973: „Der Anstoss zur Landesplanung kam von der Beleidigung des Auges“. Bereits 1969 kam durch Volksentscheid der Verfassungsartikel über die Raumplanung in die Bundesverfassung und 1971 jener über den Umweltschutz. Dieses Tandem bereitete in der

Folge den Weg über viele Stolpersteine zum heutigen Konzept einer nachhaltigen Raumentwicklung.
Der damaligen Not gehorchend wurde der Bundesstaat 1972 mit dem Beschluss über dringliche Massnahmen auf dem Gebiet der Raumplanung handlungsunfähig gemacht., dem erst 1980 das Bundesgesetz über die Raumplanung folgte.
Zusammen mit dem Institut für Orts-Regional- und Landesplanung der ETH-Z legte die Chefbeamtenkonferenz CK-73 als erstes landesplanerisches Leitbild (CK-73) ein Siedlungsdispositiv vor, das allerdings von den Kantonen als Einmischung in ihre Hoheitsrechte abgelehnt wurde. Nach 8 Jahren auf Notrecht beruhender Planung wurde 1980 das Bundesgesetz über die Raumplanung erlassen und damit die Aufgaben und Kompetenzen der schweizerischen Raumplanung geregelt. Gestützt darauf sind seither etliche Volksinitiativen lanciert und einige wichtige davon angenommen worden. So 1987 die Rothenturminitiative zum Schutz der Moore und Moorlandschaften in der Schweiz, 1994 die Alpenschutzinitiative, die verhindern soll, dass weitere alpenquerende Strassenprojekte realisiert werden und der alpenquerende Schwerverkehr weiter zunimmt. Seit 2008 wird die Landschaftsinitiative über verschiedene Teilrevisionen des Raumplanungsgesetzes abgearbeitet, und 2012 wurde der Zweitwohnungsbau in den Berggemeinden kontingentiert.
Der Bund wurde auch auf der landesplanerisch- konzeptionellen Ebene aktiv und legte 1996 die Grundzüge der Raumordnung Schweiz vor und 2010 das heute gültige Raumkonzept Schweiz. Interessant und hervorzuheben ist, dass *drei Grundvorstellungen***,** wie die Kontrolle über Raum und Zeit beeinflusst werden soll, über die Zeit konstant geblieben sind.
Für die Siedlungsentwicklung das Konzept der dezentralen Konzentration, oder der konzentrierten Dezentralisierung, womit vor allem der Zersiedlung der Schweiz Einhalt geboten werden soll.
Für die Entwicklung der Verkehrsinfrastrukturen gilt das Konzept der drei Geschwindigkeiten. Einerseits die Anbindung an den europäischen Schienen- und motorisierten Verkehr, dann landesintern der Stunden- oder Halbstundentakt, der die Verkehrsknoten mit dem öffentlichen Verkehr verbindet und von dort die Feinerschliessung der Städte und Agglomerationen sowie der ländlichen Regionen.
Für die offenen landschaftsprägenden Produktions- und Erholungsräume hat sich das Konzept des Schutzes durch ressourcenschonende Nutzung durchgesetzt, welches nach der Landschaftsinitiative in die aktuelle Revision des Raumplanungsgesetzes Eingang finden soll.

Die staatliche Organisation des Raumes durch die Raumplanung

Dass Raumplanung als bundesstaatliche Aufgabe 1972 mit dem „Bundesbeschluss über dringliche Massnahmen auf dem Gebiet der Raumplanung“ beginnt (auf Kantons- und Regionsebene bestand sie schon früher), ist einem Bevölkerungswachstum von 4.7 auf 6.2 Millionen im Zeitraum 1950-70 und einem beispiellosen Wirtschaftswachstum geschuldet. Dass es dann 8 Jahre dauert, bis die Schweiz über ein verbindliches Raumplanungsgesetz verfügte, ist die Folge eines zeitraubenden Ringens um die Kompetenz- und Aufgabenteilung im dreistufigen politischen System der Schweiz. Die Hoheit der Kantone und die Gemeindeautonomie sind so etwas wie „heilige Kühe“ im politischen Verständnis des Landes. Das Ergebnis dieser Aushandlung ist zudem stark durch das Subsidiaritätsprinzip bestimmt, wonach in unserem direkt demokratischen System Lösungen auf der tiefst möglichen Entscheidungsebene, nahe am Stimm-und Wahlvolk gesucht werden. Fehlen dort die politischen und administrativen Kompetenzen, wird die Problemlösung auf die nächst höhere Entscheidungsebene gehoben. Das ist der *politische Kontext*, in den unser Raumplanungssystem eingebettet ist.
Der *wirtschaftliche Kontext* ist bestimmt durch eine liberale Wirtschaftsordnung, welche die unternehmerische Freiheit der Niederlassung stützt und für die wichtige Exportwirtschaft günstige Rahmenbedingungen wie Transportkapazitäten, Energieversorgung usw. geschaffen werden.

Nicht zu vergessen ist der *kulturelle Kontext,* der eine wichtige Rolle spielt bei der Aushandlung, wie viel Natur- und Kulturerbe in Siedlung und Landschaft durch die Raumplanung geschützt erhalten oder aber aufgegeben werden soll.
Diese drei Kontexte spannen das Koordinatensystem auf, in welchem Ziele und Massnahmen der Raumplanung immer wieder verordnet werden müssen. Im heutigen Raumordnungssystem der Schweiz nimmt zwar die Raumplanung eine zentrale Rolle ein, sie wird aber flankiert von der Regionalpolitik einerseits und den raumrelevanten Sektoralpolitiken wie Umweltschutz, Agrarpolitik, Energiepolitik, Infrastrukturpolitik (Schien und Strasse) andererseits. Das gemeinsame Ziel ist für eine geordnete, haushälterische und ausgleichende Entwicklung des Landes zu sorgen, was in einem topographisch stark strukturierten, somit bezüglich Standortgunst für viele Arten der Landnutzung reich differenzierten Land und für den inneren Zusammenhalt von entscheidender Bedeutung ist.

Von der Kontrolle über Raum und Zeit zur Standortproduktion

Mit den raumerschliessenden Infrastrukturen, deren Bau für die Eisenbahn in der 2.Hälfte und der Strassenbau Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts einsetzte, folgte ab den 60er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts der schrittweise Ausbau des Nationalstrassennetzes, das heute in den Grundzügen realisiert ist. Damit wurden entscheidende Rahmenbedingungen für die öffentliche und private Bodennutzung festgelegt. Für die Netzstruktur von Bahn und Strassen sind der Bund und die Kantone zuständig. für die Feinerschliessung der Siedlungsräume die Gemeinden. Die Transversalen und nationale Netze sind bis auf Erweiterungen weitgehend gebaut, was bedeutet, dass die Erreichbarkeitsqualität eines Standortes durch die Netzstrukturen, ihre Kapazitäten und die zugelassenen Geschwindigkeiten der Verkehrsmittel definiert ist. Die Feinerschliessung der Siedlungsräume durch den ÖV und den Individualverkehr wiederum definiert die Nutzungspotenziale der öffentlichen und privaten Grundstücke. Durch die Erschliessung und planerische Festlegung von zulässigen Nutzungen werden laufend ökonomische Werte geschaffen oder auch vernichtet. Von daher kommt ein Hauptwiderstand, dem sich die Raumplanung bei der konkreten Umsetzung oft ausgesetzt sieht. Weil sie im öffentlichen Interessen Festsetzungen verfügt, die weit in die Zukunft weisen, deren Konsequenzen aber erst viel später erkennbar werden, muss sie diese immer wieder gegen meist private Interessen durchzusetzen versuchen.

Die planerisch-rechtliche Rahmen der Raumplanung Schweiz

Gestützt auf das Raumplanungsgesetz 1980 ist die Raumplanungskompetenz auf die drei politischen Ebenen Bund, Kantone und Gemeinden verteilt, wobei für die Um- und Durchsetzung die Kantone mit den Gemeinden das Zepter in der Hand haben.
Der Bund ist zuständig für die übergeordneten Sachpläne, die im Rahmen seiner Kompetenzen insbesondere in der Sicherheits-, Versorgungs-, Verkehrspolitik erlassen werden können.
Die Kantone verfügen mit dem Richtplan über das stärkste Planungsinstrument, das einerseits die Sachpläne des Bundes berücksichtigen muss, andererseits verbindliche Vorgaben für die Ortsplanungen der Gemeinden macht (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2: Richtplan Kanton Bern 2030: räumliche Hauptziele.

Auf Gemeindeebene kumulieren die Vorgaben vom Bund und Kanton im umfassenden Planungswerk der Ortsplanung, das die Hauptthemen Nutzung des Siedlungsperimeters, Verkehr, Landschaft, Gewässer (und mehr abdecken) muss.
Diese administrative Struktur kann über Volksinitiativen auf Stufe Bund und Kanton jederzeit inhaltlich durch neue Verfassungsartikel und Gesetzgebungen verändert oder ergänzt werden.
Durch die starke Entwicklung der Agglomerationen, die mehr und mehr mit den Stadträumen zusammenwachsen, wurde dieses vertikale Schema durchbrochen, um für diese neuen gemeindeübergreifenden Siedlungsstrukturen funktional sinnvolle Perimeter zu definieren und die Planungen vor allem im Bereich Siedlung und Verkehr zusammen zu führen. Nach diesem Prinzip werden auch im ländlichen Raum und in den Berggebieten neue Funktionsräume durch die Fusion kleiner und dünnbesiedelter Gemeinden geschaffen, um Schrumpfungsprozesse in grösseren Raumeinheiten auffangen zu können.

Trotz diesem beschleunigten Zusammenwachsen der Siedlungsflächen um die grossen Städte und grenzüberschreitend wie in den Räumen Genf, Basel, Zürich und Lugano gelten als übergeordneten Ziele der Raumplanung Schweiz nach wie vor jene, die der Bundesrat in seinem Bericht „Grundzüge der Schweiz“ 1996 festgehalten hat.

Städtische Räume sollen optimal miteinander und mit dem ländlichen Raum vernetzt werden. *Ländliche Räume* sollen in ihrer Funktion als Wohn- und Lebensraum für die ansässige Bevölkerung gestärkt werden. *Die Schonung des Natur-und Landschaftsraumes* mit ökologischen Leitplanken für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, ist Pflicht für alle Planungsebenen. Und ökonomisch bleibt die *Einbindung der Schweiz* als offene Volkswirtschaft in die europäischen Infrastrukturnetze vorrangig.
Diese Ziele werden durch eine polyzentrische Siedlungsstruktur als Grunddispositiv einer ausgleichenden Raumentwicklung angestrebt. Diesem Leitbild entsprechend soll die Bevölkerung in allen Landesteilen und Regionen angemessen Zugang zu den öffentlichen und privaten Dienst- und Versorgungsleistungen erhalten, ohne die Entwicklung der Tertiärwirtschaft in den grossen Zentren zu behindern. Allerdings hat das starke Wachstum der kommerziellen Dienstleistungen und die Konzentration von Headquarterfunktionen in den grossen Zentren im Zuge der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung diese Vorstellung längst überholt. Der international bekannte amerikanische Stadt- und Regionalplaner John Friedmann hinterliess 1980 bei einem Besuch in der Schweiz die folgende Skizze (Fig.3.), welche die künftige Metropolisierung des schweizerischen Wirtschaftsraumes vorwegnimmt.
Und Thierstein, A. et al. 2003 bestätigen diese Entwicklung (Fig. 4).



Fig. 3: John Friedmanns Sicht um 1980 der Metropolitanentwicklung in der Schweiz.
Nach einer unveröffentlichten Skizze von John Friedmann
(1980)



Fig.4: Europäische Metropolregion Zürich.
Quelle:Thierstein et al., 2003: 29

Das ETH-Studio Basel zeigte 2005 in seiner Publikation auf, dass die Schweiz als urbanisiertes Land aufzufassen ist, das den Ausgleich durch offene Landschaften suchen muss. Dies auch unter Aufgabe von nicht mehr rentablen und zu finanzierenden Gebieten hauptsächlich im Alpenraum, die sie als alpine Brache bezeichnen (Fig.5).
Die jüngste Analyse von BAK economics AG 2020 zur aktuellen Raumzeit-Topographie der Schweiz auf Gemeindeebene (Fig. 6a und 6b), lässt unschwer erkennen, wo die Anziehungspunkte einer mobilen Arbeits-, Einkaufs- und Freizeitbevölkerung liegen. Der Ausbau von Schiene und Strasse mit kürzeren Fahrzeiten und hören Taktfrequenzen (1/2 zu ¼ Std. Takt) verstärken diese und lässt den Raum schrumpfen, wodurch diese Zentren immer weiter ins Hinterland ausgreifen. Bei wachsendem Wohlstand der Bevölkerung und steigendem Kapitalvermögen der Sozialwerke und Altersvorsorgen steigt die Nachfrage nach Wohnraum und Bauland und hält so den Siedlungsdruck bis weit in den ländlichen Raum hinein aufrecht.



Fig. 5: Alpine Brache (braun), wo die Schweiz nicht mehr rentiert.
Alpine Brache (braun) aus: Diener R. et al.;2005: Die Schweiz ein städtebauliches Portrait. Bd.3: 929 ff.,Birkhäuser.



Fig. 6a: Regionale Erreichbarkeit der Gemeinden im mobilisierten Individualverkehr (MIV), 2020.
Von blau zu rot nimmt die Erreichbarkeit ab.
Quelle: BAK economics AG 2021:8



Fig.6b: Regionale Erreichbarkeit der Gemeinden im öffentlichen Verkehr (ÖV) 2020.
Von blau zu rot nimmt die Erreichbarkeit ab.
Quelle: BAK economics AG 2021:10.

In diesem Dilemma zwischen Standortattraktivität als räumlichem Wettbewerbsfaktor und einer nachhaltigen Raumentwicklung steht die Raumordnungspolitik und Raumplanung. Als institutionell und ressourcenmässig relativ schwach ausgestatteter Politikbereich ist sie mehr zum Nachvollzug der Entwicklung gezwungen als zur aktiven Zukunftsgestaltung.

Erreichte und verfehlte Ziele der Raumplanung Schweiz: Ursachenanalyse und Therapievorschläge

Die Schweiz hat in diesem Jahr (2023) die 9 Millionen Grenze der ständigen Wohnbevölkerung überschritten. In den 1960er Jahren prognostizierte Professor Francesco Kneschaurek von der Universität St.Gallen bereits eine 10 Millionen Schweiz nach 2000 und erntete damit scharfe Kritik, weil er damit ein Gespenst an die Wand malte. Denn bei etwa über 5 Millionen Einwohnern damals war eine solche Zunahme kaum vorstellbar. Diese Prognose gründete auf der damaligen Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften, welche die stark wachsende Wirtschaft aus dem Süden Europas anzog. Nach den heutigen Prognosen des Bundesamtes für Statistik (2020) wird bei gleicher Zuwanderung aus dem EU Raum und im Asylbereich zwischen 2040 und 2050 die 10 Millionen Grenze erreicht.
Dieses Bevölkerungswachstum verlief nicht linear, sondern beschleunigte sich über die letzten Jahre, verbunden mit einem stark wohlstandsbedingten Wohnflächenwachstum pro Kopf und stetig zunehmenden Einpersonenhaushalten. Dadurch wird der Druck auf die Siedlungsfläche weiter steigen. Alle Prognosen gehen von einer Zunahme der Mobilität aus, auf die die Politik mit dem Ausbau der Verkehrsträger, vor allem der Strasse, reagiert. Immer schneller, immer häufiger von Ort zu Ort ist die Devise auch im öffentlichen Verkehr. Dadurch wird die Wahlfreiheit für Wohnen, Arbeiten und Freizeit durch die bequeme Erreichbarkeit laufend erhöht. Das stellt die Raumplanung vor die ewig gleiche Herausforderung, mit dem Begrenzen Gut Boden haushälterisch umzugehen und das in einer Zeit, wo sich die Nachhaltigkeitsansprüche an die Bodennutzung ständig erhöhen.

Welche *Besonderheiten des schweizerischen Planungssystems* stehen nun diesen Entwicklungen und gesellschaftlichen Ansprüchen gegenüber?
Zum einen ein Politikbereich mit einer rein planungsrechtlichen Kompetenz und geringer administrativer und finanzieller Ausstattung.
Zum zweiten aber ein demokratisch breit abgestütztes Planungssystem mit umfangreicher Partizipation und gleichzeitig einem hohen privaten Rechtsschutz.
Zum dritten ein föderales Planungssystem mit weitgehend autonomen Planungsebenen, die territorial nicht immer kohärent aufeinander abgestimmt sind.
Und viertens zeitlich träge Planungsabläufe, die sowohl in der Festsetzungsphase (Gesetze, Planungswerke) wie in der Umsetzungsphase durch demokratische Rechte und Rechtsmittelverfahren (Einsprachen) verzögert werden können.
Diese *besonderen Eigenschaften implizieren Erwartungen* an die Gestaltungsfähigkeit unserer Raumplanung, die aufgrund ihrer peripheren Stellung in Politsystem der Schweiz, der bescheidenen Ressourcenausstattung und den direkt demokratischen Interventionsmöglichkeiten auf drei Ebenen nicht zu hoch angesetzt werden sollten. So steht der ordnende Nachvollzug der stattfindenden Entwicklung deutlich vor einer durchsetzungsstarken Instrumentierung einer gewollten Entwicklung. Wunsch und Wirklichkeit lassen sich kaum zur Deckung bringen, weil in der Abwägung, wie viel Markt und wie viel Staat diese Entwicklung steuern soll, stets Kompromisse gefunden werden müssen.
Als für die Schweiz wohl typische Eigenschaft kann nicht unerwähnt bleiben, dass es einen föderalistischen Widerstand vor allem der ländlichen Kantone gegen Erlasse von oben besonders dann gibt, wenn sie Eigentumsrechte oder territoriale Hoheiten der Gemeinden und Kantone beschneiden. Selbst wenn diese aus allgemeinen und übergeordneten Interessen erlassen wurden, führt diese Haltung zu Vollzugsdefiziten. Auch das Vorhaben Raumplanung muss sich dieser politischen Kultur unterziehen.
Eine systematische und breit angelegte Evaluation der Zielerreichung der Raumplanung fehlt weitgehend und scheitert auch am Fehlen verbindlicher quantitativer Zielgrössen in den gesetzlichen Grundlagen. Dennoch kommt das Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung im 2005 veröffentlichten Raumentwicklungsbericht zu klaren Aussagen, wo es die *grössten Mängel* erkennt.
Leitbilder haben einen schweren Stand; sie werden durch das Trickle-Down Verfahren im dreistufigen Prozess bis hinunter auf die Ebene der 2200 Gemeinden bisweilen sehr abgeschwächt und verflacht.
Die *Siedlungsbegrenzung* bleibt ein ungelöstes Problem, obwohl die Bauzonen immer noch zu einem Viertel unüberbaut sind. Da diese Baulandreserven oft falsch lokalisiert sind, lässt die Konzentration der Siedlungsentwicklung an gut erschlossenen Standorten zu wünschen übrig. Zudem bilden diese unüberbauten Flächen potenzielle Vermögenswerte für die Bodenbesitzer, weshalb eine Rückzonung mit erheblichen Kosten für die öffentlichen Hände verbunden sind. Eine Umlagerung von Bauzonen von einer Gemeinde in eine andere lässt sich somit nur schwer realisieren. Allerdings liesse sich ein solcher Baulandtransfer über das Instrument der Mehrwertabschöpfung (im revidierten RPG seit 2013 verankert) finanzieren, indem der Mehrwert des neuen Baulandes die Rückzonung des andern zumindest teilweise entschädigen könnte.
Hilfe zur Begrenzung des Siedlungsraumes kommt oft von
anderer Seite, vor allem aus dem Umweltschutz. Zum Beispiel wird kein Gebäude ausserhalb der Bauzone an die öffentliche Kanalisation angeschlossen, was einem strikten Bauverbot gleichkommt.
Bauland bleibt grundsätzlich Spekulationsobjekt, das bedingt durch die starke Zuwanderung und die Öffnung des Immobilienmarktes für ausländisches Kapital den Druck auf die Baulanderweiterung vor allem in den Agglomerationen erhöht.
Mit dem Ausgreifen der Städte in die Agglomerationsgürtel und die umliegenden Pendlereinzugsgebiete durch den Ausbau der Verkehrsinfrastruktur werden heute *neue*

funktionale Räume geschaffen, die bezüglich Wohnen, Arbeiten und Versorgen eng vernetzt sind. Dies erfordert eine Abstimmung der Siedlungs- und Verkehrsentwicklung in Raumeinheiten, in denen die rumplanerischen Kompetenzen nicht nur der betroffenen Gemeinden, sondern auch der beteiligten Kantone berücksichtigt werden müssen. Die föderale Kleinteilung der Kompetenzen erschwert eine erfolgreiche übergreifende Planung, weshalb neue Modelle der institutionellen Zusammenarbeit entwickelt werden mussten und müssen.

Da Raumplanung immer mit Einschränkungen oder Auflagen privater Verfügungsrechte verbunden ist, besteht bei hohem existierendem Rechtschutz die Gefahr, dass tangierte *Partikularinteressen* Einzelner ein im öffentlichen Interesse stehendes Vorhaben vereitelt, zumindest aber verzögert werden kann. Das gilt nicht nur für die Raumplanung, weil aber der Boden in den Siedlungszonen weitgehend im Privatbesitz ist, wirken diese Bremsen besonders stark.

Es ist *eine erkennbare Tendenz*, den Vollzug der Raumplanung vor allem auf der untersten Stufe der Gemeinden durch eine Standardisierung der Raumplanungsnormen stärker an quantitative Ziele zu binden. Gleichzeitig sollte aber der Spielraum für lokal und regional angepasste Lösungen dadurch nicht behindert werden, damit die gewordene Vielfalt als Reichtum unserer Siedlungs- und Landschaftsräume erhalten bleibt.

Die Schweiz steht heute bei 9 Mio. Einwohnern, Tendenz steigend. Ihr stehen 1/3 des Territoriums oder 1'350'000 ha für die Befriedigung der wachsenden gesellschaftlichen Raumansprüche zur Verfügung. Im „Wettstreit um den Boden“ wird sich die Raumplanung nur behaupten und für die haushälterisch und nachhaltig Bodennutzen einstehen können, wenn sie der Devise folgt: die Schweiz ist gebaut. Das schränkt a priori die Möglichkeit ein, in der weiteren Versieglung des Bodens Lösungen zu suchen. Mit dem festen Blick auf die gebaute Schweiz stellt sich dann die grosse Herausforderung für Raumplanung und Städtebau, durch Umbau und Neuordnung der Siedlungsräume aus dem Bestehenden heraus, neue Alltags- und Lebensqualität im grossen Massstab und durch die Erhaltung und qualitative Aufwertung der Freiräume im kleinen Massstab zu schaffen.

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József Benedek[3]

The Spatial Planning System and Practice in Post-Socialist Romania: Between the Heritage of "Systematization" and Europenization

This paper offers an overview of the major processes and characteristics of the spatial planning system and practice in Romania. It is largely based on document analysis, proposing an evaluation of the major legislative documents regulating the field of spatial planning (the basic Law nr. 350 from 2001 for Spatial Planning and Urbanism, and additionally, the seven laws composing the National Spatial Planning Act). We focus on the description of the planning practices indetified in the official spatial planning documents from various spatial scales, from regional to local, by considering the interactions established between institutional, economic, political and cultural factors from the socialist period and during the post-socialist transition period. The article argues for the major effects related to a low-speed but obvious Europeanization process of the spatial planning institutions and practices expressed through the uncritical and unreflected introduction of neo-liberal ideas in the spatial planning legislation and practices. The resulting spatial planning system has taken a hybrid shape, represented by a mix of three major European planning styles: comprehensive integrated, land-use oriented and urbanistic planning styles.

Keywords: Spatial planning, Planning practice, Systematization policy, Europeanization, Romania, European Union
JEL-code: O21, P21

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Introduction

Largely based on my previous analysis published exactly ten years ago in Benedek (2013), but consistently completed with the latest developments and reconsidered in its essential parts, this paper considers spatial planning as a fundamental part of the state administrative system. We do so in the conceptual and methodological framework represented by the international comparative research on spatial planning systems (Reimer et co., 2014; Nadin and Fernández-Maldonado, 2023). As a consequence, it is shaped primarily shaped by three basic factors: 1. a range of national regulations like laws and government acts; 2. the competences and territorial structure of the public administration; and 3. political culture (Reimer and Blotevogel, 2012). Therefore, the Romanian planning system is considered in this paper as a national planning system with a strong internal coherence and homogeneity in comparison with the other national planning systems, but influenced also by its perpetual and constant internal reforms and external adaptation contexts and pressures. It represents also a comprehensive and complex spatial system that comprises spatial planning institutions and practices at various scales from local, to regional and national levels.

We consider in the same time the Romanian spatial planning systems as a particular case in European context, which has been radically transformed form the territorial systematization of the totalitarian Ceausescu-regime towards a democratized and inclusive form. A crucial role in this transformation has played the European integration process resulting in a convergence of the

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Romanian planning system towards the European discourse on spatial planning. With other words we assume that the Romanian spatial planning system has undergone an important Europeanization process.
The main perspective of this paper is represented by a structuralist and legalistic approach, common for comparative planning studies and for spatial planning system analysis, looking in the same time behind the systematic description of administrative and legal characteristics for explanations related to the practice of spatial planning. The rest of paper presents the following structure: in the next section we will present the general framework of spatial planning in Romania: the territorial governance of the Romanian state and the competences and structure of public administration; the third section will focus on the evaluation of the the institutional and legal bases of spatial planning. We will conclude with the discussion of Europeanization process of the spatial planning system and the establishment of the main characteristics of planning style in Romania.

Territorial governance in Romania

The transition period following the collapse of state socialism and planned economy from 1989 has led to the strong privatization of economy, and to the establishement of democractic political institutions. However, it does not represented a crucial shift in the top down approach of developmental policies and strategies. Romania has a centralized, hierarchical organization of the public administration. With other words, although there is a certain degree of decentralization of some state functions (education, health care, taxation etc.) from the national level towards the local authorities (41 counties – NUTS 3 units, and 2859 rural communes and 319 cities), there is a dominance of the central government related to the conceivement and implementation of sectoral and regional development policies (Benedek, 2004). Hence, Romania promotes rather an interventionist than cooperative state model, including the spatial planning system as well, organized in fact in two vertical systems, with a small degree of horizontal cooperation.
Accordingly, the first vertical system includes the formal spatial planning, articulated in relation to the administrative-territorial structure of the country, which comprises two levels: communes (groups of villages) and towns on the lower level and counties on the upper level. The Law no. 215 from 2001, with an impressive number of later adjustements and modifications applies the principles of good governance by regulating the organization and functioning of the local public administration. The law foresees as basic principle of the functioning of the local public administration the decentralization and local autonomy. The local autonomy is understood as ‘the right and effective capacity of the local public administration authorities to solve and manage public duties, on behalf of and in the best interest of the local communities they represent’ (Article 3/1). This right is exerted by the local councils and mayors, respectively by the county councils and their presidents. In addition, the law defines the administrative and financial local autonomy as being related to ‘the organization, functioning, competencies and prerogatives, as well as the management of resources which, by law, belong to the commune, town, city or county’ (Article 4/2). Both local and county councils have a category of competencies related to the social and economic development, and to urban development and spatial planning as well. Each county council and city and the local counties of the biggest communes have a spatial planning department, coordinated by a chief-architect, while the spatial planning activities of the smaller communes are taken over by the spatial planning department of the county council.
The second vertical system, represented by the eight development regions created in 1998, has a statistical character, in accordance to the functioning of the European NUTS system. This level is not integrated in the territorial-administrative structure of Romania, has resulted from the grouping of the existing 41 counties into larger, NUTS 2 level units for gathering statistical data, and generating a kind of soft coordination at regional level. Things have changed starting with

the actual programming period (2021-2027), when the eight development regions have started to implement their own Regional Operational Programmes, being elevated to the status of managing and implementation authorities. In order to give more power and a public administration status to the regions, the Constitution should be changed, a long and difficult process (Benedek et co., 2018).
All this territorial governance arrangements have resulted in the establishement of an important local level authonomy of the public administration in terms of attributions but not in economic terms, with missing of substantial financial resources in order to fulfill their atributions granted by law. As a consequence, tha vast majority of the rural communes and the small sized cities are still relaying in economic terms on the redistribution policies of the state (Török and Benedek, 2018).

The heritage of socialist systematization policies

In Romania, the same as in other countries of Eastern Europe, the 1945–1989 period was marked by the communist ideology and a planning system characterized by top-down approach under the total control of the state. The economy came almost entirely under the direction of state control and planning (for which the term of "systematization" has been used) based on state ownership on the means of production. The private initiative was much restrained, and the modernization policies targeted the heavy industry and urban centres as key interventions areas.
The beginnings of the socialist spatial planning are linked to the creation of the State Office of Studies and Research within the Ministry of Construction in 1948 which then was followed in 1952 by the establishment of the State Committee for Construction and Architecture subordinated to the Council of Ministers and further, the establishment of architecture and systematization departments subordinated to the regional and municipal People's Councils. Basically, the Decision of the Council of Ministers 1248/1962 represented the formal birth certificate of the socilaist spatial planning (Benedek, 2004). This set up the preparation and approval of systematic plans and of technical and economic studies, later supplemented by the Act 58 of 1974, which defines the purposes and tasks of systematization at the levels of urban and rural development as well.
It is interesting to note that, if we compare the overall objectives of the socialist and Western-European spatial planning systems development programs (Benedek, 2001), the differences are less pronounced. Even the United Nations Report on spatial planning (UNECE, 2008) considers that, despite of political and economic differences, certain principles (democracy, subsidiarity, participation, policy integration, proportionality, and the precautionary approach) are applicable for all planning systems. It may be noted that in general, the major planning objectives of countries with a market economy and the ones with command economy, were similar. Both societies with market economy and with command economy were concerned about localizing their activities and resources and the rationalization of services. The major differences were related to the position of the state, the applied planning tools, the resources allocated to spatial planning and the different political nature of the two ideological systems.
In addition to these, there were certain elements of communist propaganda, which proposed utopian solutions in order to solve social or territorial problems, such as the gradual disappearance of differences between urban and rural areas or the ambitions of producing a perfectly equal and homogeneous society where the working class will be the engine of development (Benedek, 2001).
In fact, social and territorial inequalities, differences between urban and rural settlements are constant elements of any society; the state can only intervene with the aim of improving these in cases when it is considered that inequalities have exceeded an acceptable threshold of values and norms of the dominant system. The socialist heritage of spatial planning is exerting its influence with specific spatial structures generated by the planned economic interventions and the "systematization" policy:

a. the large industrial platforms in cities have turned during the transition period into brownfield with little regeneration capacities;
b. the large housing units created during the mass urbanization and insudtrialization of the ’70-es and ’80-es of last century have created poor housing and living conditions and have generated during the transition period – thruogh increased motorization and spatial mobility – immense traffic problems in the large cities (Bodocan et co., 2018);
c. half of the villages underwent a passive deurbanization: that means that no public investemnts in their housing stock or economic diversification was allowed during the ’systematization’ policy which has generated a massive outmigration and reduction of vital functions like education, sanitation, transportation or infrastructure, generating during the transition period one of the most territorially unequal societies in Europe (Veres et co., 2022).

The planning system resulted from the Europeanization process could’nt tackle all this immense socialist heritage, one reason more to consider non-traditional factors of planning systems like the recent historical development path and history (Bădescu et co., 2024).

The establishment of a democratic institutional framework for spatial planning

The basic question of this paper is concerned with the major shift that have marked the spatial planning in Romania, following the change of regime started in 1989. We assume that institutions plays an important role for the content and quality of the spatial planning activities, or, with other words, “institutionalization” matters. Moreover, legal instruments are intensively used in the international literature as classifying criteria of the spatial planning systems.

The analysis of the legislation offers three turning points in the evolution of the post-socialist spatial planning. Following a change of the ideological system, after 1989, spatial planning was placed on new grounds: new legislative framework was adopted, the old planning institutions were restructured and new specialized institutions were established. Therefore, during the so called “Romanian revolution”, the new post-socialist transitory government have abolished the socialist spatial planning law adopted in 1974 and the State Planning Offices working at county level, but failed to develop soon a new law for spatial planning. As a consequence, we have a short period of time, between 1990 and 1991, when spatial planning and development was not regulated. The outcomes were disastrous, mainly in the cities, where this time we used for occupying public space with new functions and for the mixing of functions on small areas.

The second stage of spatial planning evolution (1991-2001) was an under-regulated period. The first law for spatial planning, adopted in 1991, was a first step forward the democratization of the planning system. It has failed to produce any important effect, lacking mainly on methodological details related to the structure and content of the planning documents. However, on this legal basis a range of local and county authorities became engaged in developing spatial planning documents in a wide variety of structure design and content.

The third period started when, as a result of new socio-territorial realities (restructuring, deindustrialization, liberalization, etc.) and the influence of external factors (integration into the EU and NATO, etc.), the spatial planning objectives were reformulated. The Law no. 350 of 6 July 2001 introduces two concepts for the regulation of planning activities, first being spatial planning and seconds the urbanism. It represents a more sophisticated and detailed law on spatial planning and urbanism, which permitted the development of spatial planning documents of the second generation. The law introduces the difference between spatial planning and urbanism, which is mainly a conceptual and scale-related differentiation. Spatial planning operates at the national and regional level, when urbanism refers to the local level.

According to the law the main aim of spatial planning and urbanism is the spatial management of the country, in line with the community interests of the territory and the European integration requirements. Spatial management means the formulation and implementation of territorial strategies, policies and development programs as well as the follow-up of their application.

Urbanism on the other hand comprises land monitoring activities by creating and updating a local database.
On this legal basis it was created a planning system composed by three groups of actors: the local and central administration, planning companies and civil society. The local and central administration has specialized departments for spatial planning which have a trifold role: to formulate the main problems which has to be solved in the spatial planning documents, to control and monitor the spatial processes and the building activity, and to advice and implement the spatial planning documents. The planning companies are composed by private firms and public universities or research institutions whose activity is related to spatial planning. They are competing for winning tenders organized by public administration for the development of spatial planning documents. The civil society is involved at a low degree in the planning process and practice via public consultation. In each phase of the planning process there is a mandatory obligations for the public administration and planning companies to organize public consultation, with generally a low level of activity and with no direct consequences for the content of the documentations.

The Europeanization process and the spatial planning system

The major European trends of spatial planning and space management have been dominated in the last decades by the challenge of ensuring a more cohesive development in a way that do not undermine the international competitiveness of European regions and cities. The argument for an Europeanisation of planning is relatively recent in this field of study (Waterhout et co., 2016). Europeanisation means in this context "…an umbrella concept to describe the pattern of responses of EU member states to what has been termed the European spatial policy environment" (Waterhout et co., 2016, p. 240). During the negotiations for the EU integration, spatial planning was not among the chapters of the 'aquis communitaire', therefore there is no direct linkage between EU accession and the Europeanization of the spatial planning. But this moment had an important effect on the Romanian spatial planning by creating a regional policy system based on the law 315 from 2004, which has created eight NUTS 2 level development regions with the related institutional base (Regional Development Councils, Regional Development Agencies and a National Council for Regional Development). At this way it was created an institutional network which has set many objectives which have overlapped with development objectives of the spatial planning. Among the main objectives of the regional development are the followings: reduction of interregional disparities, correlation of the sectorial politics of the government on the regional level, support of the domestic, international, interregional and cross-border cooperation, the first two is overlapping with the main objectives of the spatial planning. As a consequence, the post-socialist regional policy and spatial planning in Romania have emerged as two completely parallel formal policy-systems, with overlapping attributions concerning spatial development but with no cooperation and dialogue between them. In this way spatial development policy is regulated by two laws, and the management of spatial development is organised by two institution where the horizontal coordination is compeletly missing. It is not a particular situation for Romania, we can find identical situation for many national settings (Trkulja et co., 2012; Schmitt and Smas, 2023).
Other consequence of the EU integration was that Romanian planners became part of what Waterhout (2008) has termed as European planning community. Despite the fact that the overall level of engagement of CEE actors in ESP is proportionally lower in comparison with that of the Northwestern European countries (Cotella and co., 2012), the progress in this respect is evident. A huge role in this integration was the interplay between policy and science after 2001, when policy actors realized the huge need for more evidence for empirical based policy interventions. The result was the increasing role assumed and played by universities where spatial planning have an important place in the curricula and research: Ion Mincu University of Architecture and Urbanism Bucharest, Babes-Bolyai University Cluj, Technical University Cluj, Al. I. Cuza

University Iasi. Moreover, the latest became the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) point for Romania. ESPON, together with the INTERREG IIIB programs are regarded as important pillars of the European spatial planning discourse. Some authors (Böhme and Schön, 2006; Waterhout, 2008; Nagy and Benedek, 2021) consider that the European spatial planning discourse is carried by influential documents like the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), the Territorial Agenda of the EU (TA) and the Territorial State and Perspectives of the EU (TSP). The adoption of this strategic documents has highly influenced the national spatial planning documents at national scale in Romania, but the diffusion of the European mainstream discourse remained concentrated at governmental level and in some smaller academic communities located at universities. The next milestone, the Territorial Agenda adopted in Leipzig (2007) and its up-date from 2011 adopted in Gödöllő, Hungary, proposes as a major objective of the European Union (EU) the achievement of territorial cohesion defined as a "set of principles for harmonius, balanced, efficient, sustainable territorial development" (Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning and Territorial Development, 2011, p. 3). The latest version of the TA 2030 adopted in 2020 in Berlin made two new additions to the existing TA-s: a renewed cohesion understanding and an active implementation of the cohesion concept (Böhme and Redlich, 2023). The TA 2030 is considered a key document for the European spatial planning (Lüer and Böhme, 2023).

Specially the call of the Territorial Agenda for an integrative territorial approach not only in the spatial planning but also in the field of regional development policy has found high resonance in Romania in the framework of the Regional Operative Programmes (ROPs), priority development axe nr. 1, aimed for supporting urban development (Benedek et co., 2022). In this framework the larger cities (rank 1 and 2 cities) had to develop so called *Integrated Urban Development Plans* (PIDU) in order to formulate their development priorities and to get access to EU financial support to achieve the proposed development objectives (Nagy and Benedek, 2018).

Table 1. The interconnection of spatial planning with sectoral policies in Romania

Sectoral policies	Policy Levels	Integrated	Coordinated	Informed	Ignored	Not relevant
Energy policy	National		x			
	Sub-national			x		
	Local			x		
Environmental policy	National				x	
	Sub-national			x		
	Local	x				
Transport policy	National	x				
	Sub-national		x			
	Local	x				
Cultural heritage and tourism policy	National	x				
	Sub-national			x		
	Local	x				
Housing policy	National	x				
	Sub-national					x
	Local			x		
Cohesion and regional policy	National	x				
	Sub-national			x		
	Local		x			

Agricultural and rural policy	National		x			
	Sub-national		x			
	Local		x	x		
Industrial policy	National		x			
	Sub-national		x	x		
	Local	x				
Retail policy	National				x	
	Sub-national				x	
	Local			x	x	
Waste and water management	National		x			
	Sub-national		x			
	Local		x			

Source: Schmitt and Smas (2023), own compilation.

This measure was one of the few initiatives to generate both vertical integration and horizontal coordination between planning documents from different spatial scales and between sectoral and spatial development policies. It does not change on the broad picture: that means a generalized mismatch in coordinating the two large vertical systems of spatial policy making: the spatial planning policy and the sectoral and regional development policies. This statement is largely reinforced by the latest study realized by Schmitt and Smas (2023), focusing on ten sectoral policies (energy policy, environmental policy, transport policy, cultural heritage, tourism policy, housing policy, cohesion and regional policy, agricultural and rural policy, industrial policy, retail policy, and waste and water management) from nine countries grouped in three macroregions (Scandinavian countries, Western European countries and Eastern European countries: Oland, Hungary and Romania), all assigned in the European Compendium to a comprehensive integrated planning type. The findings of this study indicate clearly low levels of vertical and horizontal integration, especially in the case of Romania (see table 1). for a wide range of policy-intersections. A similar recent result is indicated for the coordination between spatial planning and environmental policies (Erős et co., 2022), indicating a convergence of ideas stemming from empirical studies towards the unfit of Romania's assignment to the comprehensive integrated planning type.

The use of a significant amount of ESDP terminology like the concept of "balanced, harmonious and polycentric development" (CEC, 1999) can be documented (Cocheci, 2016). Although the regional policy measures adopted makes it clear that this simply reflects the adoption of EU rhetoric rather than the active engagement with such concepts. For example, the concept promoted by the ESDP, rural-urban partnership was not implemented in programs and projects. The establishment of ten metropolitan zones, including one major city and a varying number of communes offers a good framework for such partnerships, but this framework was used only for the benefit of the national growth poles, who needed such a partnership for creating and implementing the urban development goals in the framework of ROPs. Polycentric spatial development, another basic ESDP concept, was adapted in Romania, on the base of the settlement hierarchy developed in the National Spatial Planning Document (PATN), section four (settlement network), but the way of adoption favoured the seven urban growth poles, and the 13 development poles, which have earned the largest share of financial resources. At this way the implementation of the concept of polycentricity has rather contributed the growing territorial disparities than to the balanced spatial development of Romania (Benedek et co, 2019).

Characteristics of the Romanian Spatial Planning System

Newman and Thornley (1996) classifies the spatial planning systems in Europe in five legal/administrative families: Scandinavian, German, Napoleonic, British and East-European. There is little doubt that the Romanian planning systems belongs to the East-European family, characterized by its strong state planning system established after the Second World War, during the long-lasting period of socialism. Although the strong Europeanization of the spatial planning systems following the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, there is a distinct mixed between the inherited spatial structures and the planning instruments aimed for the solution of the problems resulting from this heritage that makes Romania and the Eastern European countries a homogenous group of legal/administrative family in Europe.

A more in depth insight was offered by the conceptual framework and systematic analysis offered by the "European Union Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies" (ECSP), published by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), a key reference publication for comparing spatial planning systems. It has identified the characteristics of different, ideal types of planning system according to the following eight criterias:

a. the scope of the system;
b. the extent and type of planning at national and regional levels;
c. the locus of power;
d. the relative roles of public and private sectors;
e. the nature of the system of law;
f. constitutional provisions and administrative traditions;
g. the maturity or completeness of the system;
h. and the distance between expressed objectives and outcomes (CEC, 1997).

This complex analysis resulted in the identification of four planning systems and traditions in the EU-15 member states:

1. The urbanism tradition (Mediterranean model) model concerned with urban design and building control through zoning regulation;
2. the land use management (British model) model with the main task of controlling the land use, with powers shared between local authorities and central governments;
3. the regional economic planning approach (French model) model, where spatial planning has a broad meaning related to the socio-economic regional inequalities, a strong position of central government in public investment; and
4. the comprehensive integrated approach (German model) model is considered a mature system and is based on: a) a vertical integration of plans and policies in the framework of a formal hierarchy of planning documents from the national to the local level; and on: b) the horizontal coordination of the spatial impacts of different sectoral policies, with local and regional authorities playing a key role (CEC, 1997).

Romania was at the time of the realization of the ECPS not member of the EU, being part of the study. Later, in 2006, the European Spatial Planning Observatories Network (ESPON) project 2.3.2 "Governance of territorial and urban policies from EU to local level" uses the same classification and focuses on the territorial governance as a process related to the development and implementation of policies. The Final Report of the ESPON project considers Romania as a centralized unitary state together with Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Hungary and the Baltic States. What concerns the dominant planning style, surprisingly, Romania is included in the category of countries with comprehensive integrated approach. Why the surprise? Because this approach considered a mature one, associated with countries like the Netherlands or Germany, having sophisticated institutions and mechanisms, a long tradition of spatial co-ordination, economic development coordination and of coordination of the public investments across different sectors (ESPON, 2007). The follow-up ESPON 2020 project on the Comparative Analysis of Territorial

Governance and Spatial Planning Systems in Europe (COMPASS) included Romania as well (EU 28 countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) was based on expert-interviewing, enlarging the empirical study field to 14 sectoral policies (ESPON, 2018), but did not provided any additional improvement on the assignment of individual countries to an idealized planning type or model.

We contest in this paper this assignment of the Romanian planning system to the comprehensive integrated approach. Our contest is justified by the more complex spatial and socio-economic realities – largely inherited from the socialist past - which are at the core of planning interventions. Not to speak about recent critiques and contestation in the international planning literature (Schmitt and Smas, 2023), which - based on recent empirical findings from nine countries – considers the comprehensive-integrative planning model as an idealised planning model being in a state of dissolution. Doing so we argue and try to bring arguments for a sensitized discourse in planning theory towards a culturally oriented interpretational context (cultural norms, values, traditions and attitudes) in line with Reimer and Blotevogel (2012), Getimis (2012) or Knieling and Othengrafen (2015). The later authors have even proposed an intriguingly provocative "culturized planning model" with three main dimensions: planning artefacts, planning environment and societal environment (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2015).

Turning back to the Romanian case, we observe that the spatial planning documents („planuri de amenajare teritorială") at national and regional scale, and the urbanistic documents („planuri urbanistice") at local scale are considered the most important tool of spatial planning in Romania (table 3). The strongest regulating and orienting function is held by the National Spatial Planning Document (PATN), which is constituted by six sectorial plans, each of them developed under governmental coordination and addopted as laws by the Romanian Parlament. As a consequence the development objectives and priorities formulated at this scale has to be taken over and detailed in all of the spatial planning documents situated at regional level and by the urbanistic documents of the local level. The six sectorial plans represents important elements of the national spatial developement policy: transport network, water management, protected areas, settlement network, natural risks and tourism. Two additional plans are under construction, representing the rural development and the educational infrastrucure, and are coming to complete the National Spatial Planning Documents.

The regional level corresponds to the style of the comprehensive integrated approach (table 2), the structure of the spatial planning documents reflecting this comprehensiveness: natural resources, economic potential, population, settlement hierarchy, public infrastructure, natural risks, integrated development strategy. It is the most weakest element in the hierarchical planning system. All spatial planning documents developed at this level have only orientative character, which means that the local authorities (local and county councils) or the deconcentrated institutions of the central government have no obligation in order to implement the development objectives formulated in this documents. As a result, although the high variety of documents existing at this scale (inter-county planning documents/PATIJ, regional planning documents/PATR, county planning documents/PATJ, inter-communal planning documents/PATIC, zonal planning documents/PATZ, etc.) the effectiveness is at a low level. In addition, the planning documents developed by the Regional Development Agencies (like the regional development strategies), or by the County Councils (like the county development strategies), all embracing the regional economic approach, have no legal obligations to take into account the development objectives formulated in the spatial planning documents.

Table 2. Planning styles and main characteristics of the planning system in Romania

Planning style/characteritics	**Comprehensive integrated approach**	**Urbanistic, land-use oriented approach**
Focus	Spatial structures and processes	Object-centred
Planning process	Cyclic, open, indirect	Linear, closed, direct
Character	Orientativ, weak	Normative, strong
Disciplines	Inter-disciplinary	Arhitecture
Output	Spatial planning documents	Urbanistic documents
Spatial scale	Regional	Local
Time	Middle- and long term	Short term

Source: Benedek (2013).

We find the greatest mixture at the local level, with elements of the land-use and urbanistic approaches. The local planning activity has theoretically a strong normative character. It is represented by three urbanistic planning documents related to different local and sub-local scales. The General Urbanistic Document (PUG) covers the entire administrative territory of a town or commune. It regulates the land-use, the functional zoning, the traffic, infrastructure, protected areas and historical monuments and limits the maximum build area, fulfilling a strong control role in the spatial planning on local level. In practice, the planning face in the main cities and in the dynamic suburban areas a strong pressure from landowners in order to increase the build up area, which, with few exemptions, happens, the PUG being updated in order to the rapidly changing ownership dynamic. There is generally a continuous adaptation of the planning instruments to the changing realities of individual building behavior. It means with other words that, although the regulatory character of planning, controlled by legally binding plans, in the planning practice we find rather a discretionary character, where planning action is shaped by contextually decisions.

The Zonal Urbanistic Document (PUZ) regulates the land-use in the main functional zones of the city (historic centre, industrial zones, recreational zones, residential zones etc.), while the Detailed Urbanistic Document (PUD) plans the building and the land-use paramethers on the smallest scale.

The local level of spatial planning in Romania has definitely an urbanistic tradition, common for the Mediterranian countries, where building regulations play a central role. It has a strong architectural focus and concern with urban design, townscape and building regulation, all undertaken through the strong codification building parameters and functional zones ("Regulament de urbanism"). This tradition have no great political priority or general public support. As a result it have been less effective in controlling development. In addition we can find also elements of the land use spatial planning, one of the main aim of local planning being the control of the change of land use with the instrument called "territorial balance" which aims the functional zoning of the territory, made in accordance with major land use categories. At this scale the regulation have normative character. In this situation, local authorities in cooperation with public or private planning companies undertake most of the planning work, but the central administration is also able to exercise a degree of control though supervising the system and through setting policy objectives at the national level.

In conclusion there is a mixture of three styles in Romania, and as opposite to the statements of the Final Report we can not identify a general convergence tendency in Romania towards the comprehensive integrated approach, the local level still presenting a mixture of land-use and urbanistic approach.

Table 3. The typology of spatial planning and urbanistic documents in Romania

	National scale	Regional scale	Local scale
Type of planning document	PATN (National Spatial Planning Document)	PATZ, PATIJ, PATR, PATJ	PUG, PUZ, PUD
Focus	Sectorial: transport infrastructure, water management, protected areas, settlement network, natural risks, tourism	Balanced spatial development	Urbanistic development, building control
Responsable authorithies	Government, Parlament	Local- and county councils	Local councils
Character	Normative, strong	Orientative, weak	Normative, strong

Source: Benedek (2013).

Conclusions: plea for a culturally contextualised categorisation of national spatial planning systems across Europe

Overall, the main findings of this article show the reductionist character of introducing of the Romanian spatial planning system in a certain general category of European spatial planning models. There are significant differences between our case study and the general characteristics of the four types identified in the European Compendium (CEC, 1997) in terms of the role of spatial planning, the legal/institutional arrangements, the territorial governance and planning practice. Hence, these contextualised differences are equally important for policy-makers and spatial planning scholars across countries.

In conclusion, we are questioning 'one size fits all' approaches in spatial planning and instead of doing so, we are arguing for a plurality of planning styles and types of planning action. Even more, our multi/scalar approach points at different actor constellations and policy styles at different spatial levels: at national level the Romanian spatial planning has a strong sectorial character, at regional level it takes a clear comprehensive integrated shape, while at local level it presents a mixture of land-use and urbanistic approach. In addition, the Law for regional development has created parallel institutions, which have adopted a regional economic approach. On the other side, we have identified a trend towards European convergence in the formal characteristics of the Romanian spatial planning system, and a gradual process of adaptation to the major European documents like the ESDP. Universities and research institutions have played a crucial role in this process. This convergence, which can be regarded as a sign of a clear Europeanization process, do not rule out the existence of cultural specificities in planning practice.

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Assessing the sustainability of spatial development decisions

Changing social and economic conditions justify a rethinking of the theory and practice of domestic spatial development and planning. Despite the progress made over the last thirty years, sustainability problems have emerged for some development projects following the exhaustion of budgetary resources. This paper presents a model developed by the authors for the ex-post and ex-ante assessment of the sustainability of spatial development decisions and suggests an aggregate index for quantifying the model, which can be used to support the preliminary analysis for spatial development decisions.

Keywords: territorial development, territorial policy, sustainability, balance, growth.
JEL code: O20, R11

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1. Introduction

From 1867 onwards, the aim, instruments and methods of Hungarian spatial development underwent paradigm shifts in line with geopolitical changes (dualism, interwar period, Soviet influence, and the planned economy). It was based on substantive but mostly short-term objectives, which were modified by successive governments according to their own visions.
The majority of development interventions (from the beginning until the late 1980s) were sector specific. The First World War and then the Second World War broke the previously coherent economic space, and a significant part of development was outside the re-drawn national borders, causing irreparable social and economic losses. For a long time, these factors determined the scope of Hungarian territorial development.
The first freely elected government following the geopolitical shift after 1989 inherited a heavy burden. The growing territorial disparities were only partially compensated by governmental and local development (concepts, strategies, programmes, and projects). Disparities between territorial units (districts, counties) have increased in areas such as health, education, social and income conditions and environmental conditions.
Hungary's accession to the EU (in 2004) transformed the domestic territorial development policy. Substantial resources have been allocated to help peripheral regions to catch up. However, the usability and the multiplier effect of these funds varies. There are several reasons for this (e.g., economic structure, age structure, life expectancy, and education level). The fundamental problem is that applications (and therefore applicants) focus on quantitative output results (number of jobs created/retained, length of new road built, etc.) rather than on the sustainability or effectiveness of interventions. Parallel with this, the effectiveness of the EU aid system has been criticised in several ways in the EU member states. For example:

- The crowding-out effect, i.e., part of the development funds support investments that would otherwise be undertaken by the competitive sector;
- In some cases, the funds support prestige investments in local politics, the usefulness of which is doubtful;
- The spill-over effects of the resources allocated to investment are modest, because some of the investment goods are imported;

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- Despite the available resources, the spatial dispersion of GDP per capita (NUTS-3) has continued to increase in the countries that joined the EU after 2004 (known as the new member states) (Kocziszky & Szendi, 2023). This can be underlined by the fact, that despite the growth in economic output of the Hungarian counties, they are not able to break out from their own convergence club;
- Territorial aid has failed to achieve the overarching objective of improving the quality of life and well-being of the stakeholders. The latter is more than an improvement in the economic performance.

In the past 15 years, our experience in analysing and evaluating national spatial development strategies, programmes and projects has shown that some of the plans (about 20%) are not implemented or not implemented as envisaged, while others (about 15%) are difficult to sustain after the mandatory maintenance period. It is therefore appropriate to carry out an ex-ante sustainability assessment at the planning stage and an ex-post sustainability assessment after the implementation of the development. In this study, we recommend a methodology for such an assessment and present the results of the pilot application of our model.

2. Development policy considerations

The wellbeing of citizens can only be ensured by a set of values on which the society and the economic policy are based. This requires a sustainable market equilibrium and economic growth (Figure 1). Numerous examples in economic history show that growth without equilibrium is unsustainable in the long run (in the case of Hungary, an economic growth of 3.0-3.5% and inflation of 3.0+1.0% have been observed over the last two decades).

The global financial crisis of 2008, followed by the COVID-19 crisis (pandemic) in 2020 and the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian war, have created imbalances and growth problems in all EU countries. Governments responded to internal and external shocks with fiscal easing, leading to an increase in public debt, which subsequently pushed up inflation. The unwinding of this inevitably leads to monetary tightening in the economy, with higher interest rates on loans and deposits. This has led to a reduction in private and public consumption and investment. The resulting unfavourable trends have a negative impact on the convergence objective of territorial policies, as because of high inflation the real value of the planned investments has decreased. This is unfortunate because a well-functioning territorial policy helps to create harmony between balance and growth.



Figure 1: The role of territorial policy in strengthening balance, growth and sustainability
Source: own edition

However, unsecured economic expansion on credit is unsustainable. The allocation mechanism of territorial policy can help to resolve this contradiction.

3. The concept and pillars of sustainable territorial development

The experience of the past 30 years justifies a paradigm shift in spatial development practice. The value system underlying spatial development, based on neoclassical economics and neoliberal social thinking, needs to be revised.

The neo-liberal market economy is insensitive to social problems, especially the demographic problems that have led to the ageing of societies in (especially European) developed countries. In the last two decades, especially in North America and Europe, this neo-liberal concept has deteriorated further under the influence of various ideologies (e.g., woke; so-called "parasites", see Saad, 2021). This is underlined by the fact that while the basic idea of the so-called Freiburg Memoirs (1942-43), edited by Dietrich Bonhoffer, was based on the social principles of Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism, the so-called Christian social values (Kluge, 1988) postmodernity movement that has been gaining momentum since the 1970s, has sometimes modified this.

On the other hand, economic output growth still relies on large externalities. The resulting linear (extraction-processing-consumption-waste) management chain is now not only threatening the production and consumption system, but also generating unmanageable amounts of waste. Meanwhile, the energy intensity and environmental burden of the real economy is still high and will remain so due to the current energy crisis and the steps taken to address it (e.g., restarting coal-fired power plants, etc.) (MNB, 2022). A problem similar to the energy crisis is the climate crisis, which is making it increasingly difficult to provide the population with healthy, non-GMO food that uses less fossil energy than at present.

The predictability of territorial development objectives, instruments and institutional arrangements must be created. Constant political and economic policy changes reduce both the quality of territorial development concepts, strategies and programmes and the resources invested in their implementation. Greater emphasis should be placed on the predictability and sustainability of developments and their regular monitoring. Sustainability and predictability do not mean "freezing" systems. On the contrary, a sustainable system is resilient, able to remain close to equilibrium over the longer term, or to return to a near-equilibrium state within a short time if it is pushed out of balance by internal or external forces.

Our model differs substantially from the three-pillar (economic, ecological, social) construction of the literature in that it takes values as a basis and proposes a four-pillar solution (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Sustainable spatial planning model
Source: own edition

Box 1: **Dependency theories**

Economic, geopolitical and cultural constraints are fundamental to the development of each region or country. Thus, the division of labour, technological and technical potential in the world economy creates peripheries, semi-peripheries and centres (core areas). The peripheries are characterised by cheap raw materials and labour, while the centres are characterised by the concentration of capital and knowledge. The semi-peripheries are dependent both on the peripheral regions and on the centres (Wallerstein, 2010; Kocziszky, 2021).
The political influence of a given geographical area affects its society (population, ethnicity, education, etc.) and its economy (imports and exports, weight of economic sectors, etc.), which has a significant impact on its room for manoeuvre and its capacity to assert its interests.
Dependency is not only a matter for nation states, but also for the subnational regions that form them. In their case, a distinction can be made between so-called internal (within a country) and external (globally) dependency, which is reflected in the development trajectory of the region. In other words, a region's room for manoeuvre is determined by its development path.

Territorial processes are not independent because no territorial unit (region) is closed. Their global and national embeddedness influences the institutional system of development, local society, the economy and the environment (Box 1).

3.1 Values

Spatial development is a question of values, because it is not all the same whether:
- the basic aim of spatial development is economic growth or prosperity;
- territorial redistribution is based on justice or utility;
- the criterion for territorial redistribution is economic efficiency vs. community needs;
- the principles for the use of resources allocated to the territorial level are return on investment or community needs.

The answers are determined, not least, by the community's perceptions of family, faith, natural resources and environment, social sensitivity, fairness and spatial justice, transparency, the importance of diligence and knowledge, respect for laws and legislation, and the preservation of the built and spiritual heritage. The dimensions of each of these value dimensions are significant independently and in their interaction (Figure 3). It is therefore worth taking them into account.

Family and faith: the sustainability of society and the economy depends not least on the stability of faith and the family. Spiritualism has an impact on individual and collective needs and wants. It is therefore a question of values, how and with what needs are met, and who has access to them, and under what conditions. The aim of sustainable territorial policy cannot be anything other than to serve the community, and the market is a tool of this.



Figure 3: The values of sustainable planning
Source: own edition

Since the last third of the 20th century, the search for the relationship between faith and the economy has once again become an important research topic in economics, economic history and sociology (Botos, 2009; Krenzhof, 2007; Sárvári, 2019; Sebestyén, 2019). The way of approaching the issue naturally varies in space, time and disciplines (sociology, theology, economics, etc.), but the authors agree that faith has an important role to play in our understanding of work, performance, human well-being, compliance, and the relationship between the economy and the environment.
According to statistics, one of the consequences of secularisation across Europe is a deterioration in demographic trends, a decline in the willingness to have children, and a labour shortage that is becoming an increasing problem in the beginning of the 21st century. Research shows that the relationship to transcendence also influences people's relationships with each other, solidarity, and relationships with nature (e.g. Fowler & Dell, 2006; Hunt, 2015). A 2016 national survey in Hungary found that religiosity significantly strengthens family stability (Pusztai, 2019).

Social responsiveness: the social element in the value system depends on the extent to which society has succeeded in enforcing social norms alongside economic ones, sometimes at the expense of the latter. The market does not create enough social norms for the functioning of the economy.
Economically determined social relations are governed by the principle of achieving maximum return with the means available, or a given return with minimum expenditure. Society must therefore develop and implement a social order that meets the needs of the community (above all the objectives of social justice, social security and social peace). The higher the economic and social demands on the social order, the more successfully the value system is adapted to the simultaneous achievement of economic and social goals. In spatial planning and development, listening to and understanding the feelings and thoughts of others is a key element.

Solidarity, individual and social responsibility: humans are responsible for their actions and must be held accountable for them. The essence of solidarity is relationships and respect for the interests of a group and helping others.

Solidarity is motivated by the stark difference between people and different social groups (e.g., the elderly, the poor) on the one hand, and interdependence on the other. Solidarity is nothing other than the voluntary limitation of self-interest. Social solidarity implies the assumption of individual responsibility and state coordination, as opposed to the strict pursuit of "homo economicus" (an integral part of economic thought since the 18th century), which contradicts the requirement of solidarity. The aggregation of individuals pursuing self-interest (within a given institutional framework) is no guarantee of serving the common social interest.

Fairness, spatial justice: the question of fairness and unfairness arises in the context of distribution and redistribution, the functioning of markets and public regulation. Income inequality and wealth inequality because of unfair distribution have come increasingly to the fore in empirical economics over the last three decades (one reason being the growing wealth and income inequality of households).
Inequality leads to political and economic instability in the longer term. Therefore, fair taxation and fair taxpayer behaviour are of particular importance in the context of redistribution and redistribution mechanisms (it is no coincidence that there is extensive literature on this issue).
According to Rawls (1997), spatial justice is a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of society. The legal role of justice is to provide the right answers to social questions, and its social role is to ensure that everyone gets what is due to them.
Justice is therefore fundamentally an ethical question, a question of what obligations we have to others and what rights others have over us, whether the goods are distributed in accordance with society's expectations. This is based on the right to the use of goods, which requires a minimum income that is given to all members of society (regardless of the will of the person in question) and is beneficial and reasonable for all members of society. Justice means the reduction of social inequalities, equal rights, equal treatment, and freedom for all. Neither corrective nor distributive justice can be provided or restored by the market alone. The rule of law has the task of solving this.

> Fair and equitable spatial distribution is multiscale in nature, encompassing issues of distribution on a global scale between North and South, between developed and developing countries, as well as on a continental scale, and on various sub-national levels (between sub-national regions, between municipalities, etc.) This means that unequal spatial distribution of wealth and income is a fundamental feature of the spatiality of society. Inequality is one of the spatial manifestations of the social structure, which determines the organisation of space in a centre-periphery type and the differentiation or segregation of urban spaces. (Benedek, 2019. p. 111)

Diligence and knowledge: in the values of the last 200 years, knowledge has always played an important role as the basis of human existence, a characteristic of homo sapiens. Its importance should be stressed because knowledge not only serves the interests of the community; in many cases, but it is also counterproductive. Knowledge and information are the capital of the 21st century. Knowledge and skills play an important role in the development of territorial disparities. Sustainability depends on the continuous development of available resources, including knowledge potential. The motivation to acquire knowledge and diligence are linked to the values that are developed in the family. An economy without knowledge and diligence is unstable and its ad hoc results are felt only for a short term. This is no different in development policies. Lack of knowledge and diligence is one of the reasons for poor sustainability.
Respect for resources and the environment: man is not the governor, and not the owner of the nature around him. Respect for the environment means the conscious (and sustainable) use of natural resources. The emergence of modern industrial society has brought with it the need for constant economic growth, which has placed increasing pressure on the environment around us, through irreversible processes. The developments thus created are unsustainable in the long term because they consume our natural resources. Legal instruments are necessary to acknowledge

and sustain this relationship, but they alone are not sufficient. Respect for environmental values depends on education and teaching.
Work, performance: a sustainable market economy is inconceivable without work and performance. The relationship to work plays an important role in the quality of life of a community. It makes a difference whether the prosperity of a given community is envisaged in terms of work or profit. International and national research shows that job satisfaction is reflected in performance and income. It is no coincidence that the external appearance of settlements in close proximity to each other and the living standards of their inhabitants can vary considerably depending on the attitude of the inhabitants towards work.
Respect for heritage and traditions: respecting and preserving the values of the built and intangible/spiritual heritage is a surplus that helps to develop and expand resources. On the other hand, it has a permanent relationship with the environment, with social and economic spill-over effects.

3.2 Institutional framework for sustainable spatial development

The institutional system is a broad concept, encompassing the existing legal order, the distribution of functions that operate the system and its operational framework, the decision points and information network that affect society, and the conditions and legal framework for the operation of public and private property. The operationalisation of any operational system is value and policy dependent. Everyday life has always been, and still is, regulated by spiritual, political and economic institutions, which vary in space and time. The nature of regulation and the organisation and functioning of its implementation are fundamentally influenced by the values of society. This is no different for territorial development (regional) policy.
The institutional system of territorial development is sustainable if it ensures balance and predictability between the market and the public sector, and represents the public interest, i.e., neither market nor public interest can be strengthened at the expense of the other. It also ensures the values and conditions for distribution and redistribution.
The sustainability of the institutional system is closely linked to the legal and funding system and to the organisations supporting regional development. For all three, values are significant (Table 1).

a) A sustainable legal framework: the basic requirement for sustainability in spatial development is that it is legally determined, i.e., the way in which aid is granted and its organisation is determined by law. Given that the lead times for decisions on spatial development are generally longer than a calendar year, stability and predictability of rules are essential. Of similar importance is the predictability of the economic legal environment (e.g., tax laws, budget, etc.). Any drastic change in these in an unfavourable direction puts sustainability at risk.
b) Sustainable financing ensures, on the one hand, that the solvency of the actors is maintained in the longer term without harming the fulfilment of the commitments made. On the other hand, green finance (e.g., green loans, green bonds, etc.) is used to implement environmental and energy efficiency solutions (e.g., green energy, green buildings, greening water, and wastewater management, greening transport, improving energy efficiency) (ICMA 2021).
c) An organisation that supports sustainable territorial development is characterised by a stable, predictable operation, composed of a professionally competent staff, that believes that the development of settlements and territories helps to improve the living conditions and well-being of the people living there. It is also important for sustainability that stakeholders have confidence in the integrity of the organisation and that it operates in a lawful, transparent, and non-influenced manner.

Each of these three sets of factors has important links to ethics and the values of lawmakers, with their responsibility to serve the public.

Table 1: Sustainability indicators for the Spatial Development Institutions

No.	Name of indicator	indicators	sustainability condition	Data source
1.	the legal stability of the organisation supporting territorial development	laws modified during the period (number)	$OReg\ (t_1) \leq OReg\ (t)_0$	legal directory (directory of laws)
2.	permanence of the area eligible for territorial development funds	laws modified during the period (number)	$DReg\ (t_1) \leq DReg\ (t)_0$	legal directory
3.	frequency of changes to corporate tax legislation (T)	corporate laws modified during the period under review (number)	$T\ (t_1) \leq T\ (t)_0$	legal directory
4.	frequency of changes to personal income tax (IT)	income tax laws modified during the period (number)	$IT\ (t_1) \leq IT\ (t)_0$	legal directory
5.	changes to the rules in force concerning the property tax exemption (PTE)	modified laws on tax exemptions during the period under review (number)	$PTE\ (t_1) \leq PTE\ (t)_0$	legal directory
6.	changes to existing rules on public procurement	public procurement acts modified during the period under review	$PReg\ (t_1) \leq PReg\ (t)_0$	legal directory
7.	amount of foreign/external capital raised after completion of the development	working capital in the three years following the completion of the development (in M€)	$\sum_{i=1}^{3} C_i > 0$	KSH
8.	number of R&D patents	patents registered in the three years following the end of the project (number)	$\sum_{i=1}^{3} P_i > 0$	KSH
9.	number of R&D projects	R&D projects launched in the three years following the end of the project (number)	$\sum_{i=1}^{3} RD_i > 0$	KSH
10.	share of own resources supporting development	own resources involved in R&D projects launched in the three years following the end of the project (%)	$\sum_{i=1}^{3} RDs_i > 0$	KSH

Source: own edition

Note: t_0 = base year; t_1 = calendar year, KSH: Hungarian Central Statistical Office

3.3 Sustainable local and regional societies

A sustainable local and regional society is based on participation and autonomy, with a focus on community alongside social security.

> A sustainable society is built from the whole of the individuals and their communities into a system. The mutual generosity, the revival of the community sense in this structure is not a will from above, but the possibility of the individual's existential fulfilment, that is, the community's own. In contrast to the monolithic power structure that distributes binding commands to all, which has led to the impoverishment of reciprocity and the emergence of individual and group interests, in the structure of a sustainable society, reciprocity becomes the organising force of the community, where the local community manages its own affairs in a system of self-management. Decision making is shifted to the level of subsidiarity, central responsibility and the potential for error arising from schematisation is reduced (Gyulai, 2005. p. 6).

There are several key criteria for a sustainable society:

- Promoting sustainable demography, i.e., a healthy age structure of the population in the area, expressed as a change in the average life expectancy at birth, the total fertility rate and the ageing index. Population decline, an ageing population, life expectancy at birth, total fertility and ageing rates below the national average indicate sustainability risks.
- The sustainability of material and social security can be expressed in terms of the poverty rate of people living in the area, the share of households without employed

persons, the share of early school leavers, the gender and regional wage shares, and household indebtedness.

– Without the trust and active involvement of society, no development programme can be sustainable in the long term. The literature is unanimous in its assessment of the importance of trust, but the methodology for measuring it is not uniform. Confidence in development concepts that have been implemented (Annex 1 and 3) or are in the pre-implementation stage (Annex 2) can be measured by questionnaires. In addition to trust, it is important that the spatial development concept contributes to improving the sense of security (health, social, and material) of the community concerned (Table 2).

Table 2: Sustainability indicators for the local society

No.	Elements	interpretation	indicators	sustainability condition	data source
1.	Sustainable demography	The given population (number of inhabitants) is consistent with nature's carrying capacity	permanent resident population (persons)	$Pop(t_1) \geq Pop(t_0)$	KSH
			average life expectancy at birth (years)	$LE(t_1) \geq LE(t_0)$	KSH
			total fertility rate (%)	$FR(t_1) \geq FR(t_0)$	KSH
			ageing index (%)	$AI(t_1) \leq AI(t_0)$	KSH
2.	Sustainable financial and social security	Community well-being	poverty rate (%)	$PR(t_1) \leq PR(t_0)$	KSH
			percentage of people living in a household without an employed person (%)	$HwE(t_1) \leq HwE(t_0)$	KSH
			early school leavers (%)	$ESL(t_1) \leq ESL(t_0)$	KSH
			gender wage gap (%)	$WG(t_1) \leq WG(t_0)$	KSH
			equal wage among regions (HUF)	$EW(t_1) \leq EW(t_0)$	KSH
			household indebtedness rate (%)	$DR(t_1) \leq DR(t_0)$	KSH
3.	Sustainable social trust and activity	Cohesion within society	satisfaction with the development (based on a value scale, %)	$SAT(t_1) \geq SAT(t_0)$	KSH
			sense of security (based on a value scale, %)	$SoS(t_1) \geq SoS(t_0)$	KSH
			number of active NGOs (number/person)	$NGO(t_1) \geq NGO(t_0)$	KSH

Source: own edition

Note: t_0 = base year; t_1 = survey year/current year

3.4 Sustainability of the regional economy

One key area of economic analysis is sustainable economic growth and development. As in other cases, it has been defined in many ways (e.g., Anderson, 1960; Erdős, 2003). Our understanding is that sustainable economic growth means sustained and financeable output growth that does not trigger inflation. Expanding the real economy is not an objective but a tool. This is worth emphasising because there is good and bad economic growth. That is, there is output growth that is in line with the needs of society and the resources available, and there is output growth that is not. Some activities meet real needs, others are geared to creating unjustified demand generated by producers-suppliers. Excess demand creates an incentive to acquire surplus goods, which generates new surplus demand (e.g., the increase in alcohol consumption and the need to care for alcoholics; the overconsumption of sweets and the need to care for the growing number of people with diabetes). The five elements of a sustainable economy are summarised in Table 3.

Economic output is only sustainable if it is not accompanied by a persistent financial imbalance (according to Matolcsy (2015), one of the biggest problems of the Hungarian economy was the persistent financial imbalance between 1974 and 2014). On the other hand, sustainable economic growth is green (carbon-free) growth, i.e., the growth of emissions is achieved with reduced and

more efficient use of resources. In an optimal case, the path of economic growth is therefore divorced from the path of energy use and emissions. Thus, the growth rate of economic output is greater than the ecological footprint and the use of non-renewable natural resources. In the case of absolute decoupling (green growth), output increases as the ecological burden decreases.
Criticism of economic output growth has intensified in recent years. Criticisms have been levelled at the unfair distribution of resources ("the poor get poorer, the rich get richer") and the scarce nature of resources, which does not allow for infinite growth. Much of the criticism is therefore based on the idea of measuring development rather than growth (GDP), which would make it possible to monitor quality of life (health, material well-being, quality of public services, demographic trends, state of the environment) (EESC, 2009; Kocziszky & Szendi, 2021).
It follows from the above that instead of measuring growth based on GDP, a more complex measure is needed, based on value added, activity rate, net self-financing capacity, investment rate and green purchasing rate (Table 3).

Table 3: Indicators of sustainability of the regional/local economy

No.	Name of indicator	definition	sustainability condition	data source
1.	value added (VA)	difference between output produced and inputs used in the process of producing goods/services (thousand Ft, %)	$VA(t_1) > VA(t_0)$ $\frac{VA(t_1)}{VA(t_0)} > 0$	KSH
2.	activity rate (ar)	economically active population (15-64) as a percentage of the total population of the same age (%)	$ar(t_1) \geq ar(t_0)$ $\frac{ar(t_1)}{ar(t_0)} > 0$	KSH
3.	net self-financing capacity (NSF)	NSF = turnover - purchases - accumulation (thousand Ft, %)	$NSF(t_1) \geq NSF(t_0)$ $\frac{NSF(t_1)}{NSF(t_0)} > 0$	balance sheet data of the beneficiaries
4.	investment rate (i)	value added to investment (%)	$i(t_1) \geq i(t)$ $\frac{i(t_1)}{i(t_0)} > 0$	KSH
5.	green public procurement rate (GPR)	number (value) of public procurements with environmental (green) aspects as a percentage of total public procurements (%)	$GPR(t_1) \geq GPR(t_0)$ $\frac{GPR(t_1)}{GPR(t_0)} \leq 1$	documentation analysis of the beneficiaries

Note: t_0 = base period; t_1 = reference period
Source: own edition

3.5 Sustainable environment

Human activity in shaping – destroying – the environment is not new, as historiographic research shows (Demeter et al. 2021). The development of modern manufacturing industry has led to a particular increase in the pressure on the environment. Economic growth has gone hand in hand with the provision of the environment and the depletion of natural resources, with the destruction of habitats and some species. These factors threaten sustainability and undermine the gains made in increasing prosperity.
Since the Club of Rome Declaration (1972), attention has focused on the sustainability of resources and the balance between the economy and nature, because the carrying capacity of the environment around us is of growing importance. The constant increase in emissions is leading to a loss of biodiversity, increased soil erosion and the depletion of some natural resources. Slowing down or even stopping this undesirable process is not a simple task, because on the one

hand the footprint of those involved is considerable, and on the other hand we do not have the secure knowledge yet that is essential for it. However, it is positive that international and national literature is now paying particular attention to the study of environmental pressures and environmental assessment (e.g., OECD, 2011; 2015; 2016; 2017; IEA, 2016; EEA, 2018; ECA, 2019; ICMA, 2021).

In the case of sustainability, the environmental burden meets international and national standards. Basically, the state of the environment can be covered within the following categories (Table 4):

- air quality (pollution, emission);
- soil quality (chemistry, sensitivity);
- water quality (surface water, groundwater treatment);
- waste management (generation, collection, transport, hazardous waste management, processing, recycling);
- nature conservation (protected areas);
- and conscious consumer behaviour.

Several indicator systems can be used to characterise the state of the environment (e.g., OECD, 2017; KSH, 2022; Eurostat, 2023).

Table 4: Indicators of the sustainability of the local environment

No.	Element	Name of indicator	interpretation	sustainability condition	data source
1.	sustainable use of resources	renewable energy rate	share of renewable energy in total annual energy consumption (%)	$RE(t_1) \leq RE(t_0)$	documentation
		proportion of solid waste recycled	recycled solid waste as a percentage of total annual waste (%)	$SWR(t_1) \leq SWR(t_0)$	documentation
		treated wastewater rate	share of physically vs. biologically treated wastewater in total wastewater (%)	$\mathrm{WW}(t_1) \leq WW(t_0)$	documentation
		specific CO_2 emissions	CO_2 emissions per capita (t) change (%)	$CO_2(t_1) \leq CO_2(t_1)$	documentation
2.	responsible consumption	responsible use of goods, services, and natural resources	untreated municipal waste (%)	$MW(t_1) \geq MW(t_0)$	KSH
			food waste rate (%)	$FW(t_1) \leq FW(t_0)$	KSH
3.	green public procurement	green public procurement document rate	the percentage of suppliers with a green document from all public procurement procedures	$GPR(t_1) \geq GPR(t_0)$	documentation

Source: own edition

Note: t_0 = base period; t_1 = reference period

4. Measuring the sustainability of regional development

The holistic approach outlined above provides an opportunity for multi-perspective sustainability assessment and measurement, even though there is no agreed position on either the number of indicators or the way they are aggregated (Box 2).
The Aggregate Spatial Sustainability Index (ASSI) proposed in our report is defined in four steps (Figure 4):

- analysis of the matrix of value-added relationships;
- compiling a database;
- normalisation of the values of the indicators with a sign, formation of sub-indices;
- determination of an aggregate sustainability index.



Figure 4*: Logical process of the Aggregate Spatial Sustainability Index*
Source: own edition

Box 2: **Sustainability indices**

Over the past decade, several indicators and measurement methods have been published for measuring sustainability. Some of these focus on environmental factors, while others aim at a more complex calculation (see Parapatits, 2019):

- There are 17 indicators based on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) created by the United Nations in the Sustainable Development Report (SDR), which can be rated on a scale of 0-100 (ESD, 2019).
- The Sustainable Society Index (SSI) reflects also the UN approach but operates with a simpler set of indicators. The index examines a total of 21 indicators for three main categories (Technische Hochschule Köln), which are assessed using a scale of 0-10 points (Kowalski & Veit, 2020).
- In recent years, in line with the restructuring of monetary policy and financing systems, both national and commercial banks have paid special attention to monitoring sustainability. The index developed by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank assesses countries' sustainability based on four pillars (environmental, social, financial, real economy) and 108 indicators (Baksay, 2021). Sustainability assessment has also been integrated into the lending practices of commercial banks, which primarily focus on the sustainability of borrowers (K&H, 2023).

Table 5: Examples of composite sustainability indices

No.	Organisation	indicator groups	number of indicators	total number of indicators
1.	Magyar Nemzeti Bank: Sustainability Index (Baksay, 2021)	– environmental sustainability	6	27
		– social sustainability	8	
		– financial sustainability	7	
		– sustainable growth	6	
2.	Commercial and Credit Bank (K&H): Sustainability Index	– management attitude	8	48
		– environmental footprint	9	
		– social responsibility	8	
		– sustainability strategy	12	
		– management activity	11	
3.	UN Sustainability indices - SDG	– no poverty	13	225
		– zero hunger	12	
		– good health and well-being	21	
		– quality education	9	
		– gender equality	16	
		– clean water and sanitation	12	
		– affordable and clean energy	15	
		– decent work and economic growth	10	
		– industry, innovation, and infrastructure	7	
		– reduced inequalities	15	
		– sustainable cities and communities	19	
		– responsible consumption and production	14	
		– climate action	13	
		– life below water	6	
		– life on land	12	
		– peace, justice, and strong institutions	20	
		– partnerships for the goals	11	
4.	KSH sustainability progress indicators	– human resources	32	131
		– social resources	24	
		– natural resources	52	
		– economic resources	23	

a) Compiling the database

In selecting the indicators, our aim was to:

- be related to the sustainability of the development,
- be understandable and definable,
- be numerically available and able to be repeated at any time,
- allow international comparison.

The database contains 35 indicators (Table 6).

Table 6: Distribution of the sustainability model indicators

No.	pillar	number of indicators
1.	sustainable institutional system of the regional development	10
2.	sustainable regional/local society	13
3.	sustainable economy	5
4.	sustainable environment	7
	Total	35

Source: own edition

Of these, 29 indicators can be obtained from the database of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), three indicators from questionnaire surveys and three indicators from the data provided by the stakeholders. Each indicator can be associated with one or more value element/dimension (Table 7).

b) Normalisation, formation of sub-indices

The conversion of different indicators into the same unit of measurement can be done by normalisation (DTF method), so that the data can be placed on a scale of 0-100.

Table 7: Relationship between values and sustainability indicators

No.	values	social sustainability	economic sustainability	institutional sustainability	environmental sustainability
1.	family/faith	– sustainable demography	– activity rate	– sustainable trust	– consumption
2.	social sensitivity	– sustainable material and social security – community well-being	– value added	– proportion of foreign capital	– green public procurement rate
3.	diligence / knowledge	– sustainable social activity	– value added – activity rate – net financing capacity	– number of R&D patents – number of R&D projects	– renewable energy rate – proportion of solid waste recycled – treated wastewater rate
4.	transparency	– sustainable social trust and activity	– green public procurement rate	– stability of the resource allocation mechanism – legislative stability	– green public procurement rate
5.	respect for resources/ environment	– responsible consumption	– green public procurement rate	– sustainable trust and activity	– responsible consumption
6.	fairness/spatial justice	– sustainable material and social security	– activity rate	– proportion of foreign capital	– renewable energy rate – responsible consumption

No.	values	social sustainability	economic sustainability	institutional sustainability	environmental sustainability
7.	individual and collective responsibility	– responsible consumption	– activity rate	– proportion of foreign capital	– proportion of solid waste recycled
8.	respect for laws and regulations	– responsible consumption	– green public procurement rate	– the stability of existing legislation	– specific CO_2 emissions – solid waste management – wastewater treatment
9.	respect for heritage	– responsible consumption	– responsible consumption	– responsible consumption	– responsible consumption

Source: own edition

The correlation used to convert a given indicator into a score when the higher value of the indicator is the more favourable (e.g., output, employment, etc.) is as follows:

$$X_{norm} = \frac{x_i - x_{min}}{x_{max} - x_{min}} * 100$$

If the higher value of the indicator is unfavourable (e.g.: environmental stress, unemployment, etc.), then:

$$X_{norm} = \frac{x_i - x_{max}}{x_{min} - x_{max}} * 100\,,$$

where: x_{max}= maximum value; x_{min} = minimum value. The advantage of this methodology is that it does not require a normal distribution of the raw data. The scoring tracks the variance of the values of the areas in the sample, and the value considered to be optimal varies from indicator to indicator. Thus, for each indicator it can be decided individually whether its minimum, maximum or even its sample average is optimal.
Based on the ratio scale values of the indicators belonging to the same group, four sub-indices (institutional, social, economic, environmental sustainability) can be defined by arithmetic averaging, as follows:

$$SI_j = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{norm})/n_i\,,$$

where: x_{norm}= number of normalized indicator points, n = number of normalized indicators. The sub-indices are (for simplicity) arithmetic averages of the normalised indicator values. (The use of weights other than these requires further research.)

c) Definition and interpretation of the aggregate sustainability index

$$CSI_j = \frac{\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n} SI_j\right)}{m},$$

where: SI_j - j-th block sub-index, CSI - complex sustainability index.
The index basically has a benchmark role; it provides an opportunity to examine the expected (ex-ante), past (ex-post) or interim sustainability of a given regional development strategy, programme or project. The latter can be justified primarily by exogenous (e.g., changes in the geopolitical situation, disruptions in long supply chains, resource supply problems) and endogenous (e.g., inflation, changes in the legal environment) risks arising from interdependencies.

5. Testing the applicability of the model

The applicability of our model was tested based on the ex-ante sustainability analysis of the 2014-2020 plan of a district (so-called priority axis) in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County in North Hungary.

The plan set out the following six objectives:

- improving economic competitiveness,
- improving the adaptability of the local society to the needs of the labour market,
- improving the accessibility of job centres,
- sustainable use of unique natural and cultural resources,
- promoting the production and local use of energy from renewable sources,
- improving the state and safety of the environment.

In the period considered, 300 projects received support (based on the data of palyazat.gov.hu) from the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Of these, 74 projects supported the creation and maintenance of jobs. Their sustainability was assessed based on the documents submitted.

The calculation results show that the greatest change was observed in the sustainability of the district's economic indicators (54.6%). The impact of the projects on social (19.5%) and environmental sustainability (9.8%) was more modest, while the proportion of legislative changes (12.8%) was relatively high (Table 8).

Table 8: Quantification of sustainability indicators (%)

social sustainability		**economic sustainability**		**institutional sustainability**		**environmental sustainability**	
Name of the indicator	**Value**	**Name of the indicator**	**Value**	**Name of the indicator**	**Value**	**Name of the indicator**	**Value**
poverty rate (%)	2	value added (%)	127	legal stability of the organisation supporting territorial development (%)	24	renewable energy rate	0
percentage of people living in a household without an employed person (%)	0	activity rate (%)	8	frequency of changes to corporate tax legislation (%)	8	proportion of solid waste recycled	31
early school leavers (%)	0	net self-financing capacity (%)	124	change in the rules in force on the property tax exemption (%)	16	treated wastewater rate	0
equal wage among regions	15	investment rate (%)	12	change in public procurement rules in force (%)	12	specific CO_2 emissions	4
satisfaction with the development (based on a value scale, %)	82	green public procurement rate (%) during project implementation	0	amount of working capital raised after completion of development (%)	3	responsible use of goods, services, and natural resources	24
				share of own resources supporting development (%)	14	green public procurement documentation rate	0

Source: own edition (Note: base year)

6. Summary

The improvement of the situation of disadvantaged, peripheral regions has always been a major or minor part of the economic and social policy of the state over the last 150 years. To prove this, the first part of our research report reviews of the practice of spatial development in Hungary between 1867 and 2020. In doing so, we concluded that geopolitical changes (1867, 1920, 1945, 1989) induced paradigm shifts in the goals, instruments, and institutions of domestic spatial development. After 1989 (not least due to the harmonisation of legislation in preparation for our accession to the European Union), the practice of spatial development in Hungary was raised to the level of regional policy, which gave the opportunity to develop more complex, holistic spatial development goals, strategies, and programmes.

The solutions adopted in this spirit have contributed, sometimes more effectively and sometimes less effectively, to reducing disparities between territorial units. There are many reasons for this, both economic (e.g., lobbying interests overriding economic rationality) and methodological (e.g., failure to assess the impact of territorial interventions). Territorial development does not seem to be able to break out of its partial objectives favouring economic growth.

In the second part of our research report, we outline an integrated, sustainable spatial development model to address this problem, based on a community value system that provides the opportunity to preserve and maintain intergenerational values.

Sustainable spatial and urban development is based on four pillars:

- on society,
- the local economy,
- the institutional system and
- relies on the environment.

Ex-post and ex-ante analysis of these pillars is an important prerequisite for a paradigm shift in spatial and urban development. That is why we have:

- defined the indicators needed to measure and analyse the sustainability of each pillar;
- proposed threshold values for the analysis of individual indicators;
- determined the method for aggregating the individual indicators, and then
- proposed an index to assess the sustainability of spatial and urban development plans.

The index can be used for ex-post and ex-ante development plans with a range of values between 0 and 100. The index's basic purpose is to inform decision-makers, draw conclusions and support possible corrections.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Questionnaire to assess satisfaction with the spatial development strategy, programme or project

Nature of development:	□ strategy □ programme □ project
Place of implementation (county):	
Nature of realisation:	□ implemented
Respondent gender:	□ female □ male
Age of respondent:	□ Under 20 years □ 21-30 years □ 31-40 years □ 41-50 years □ 51-60 years □ 60 years or older
Education level of the respondent:	□ Less than 8th class □ 8th class (primary school) □ skilled □ secondary school leaving exam □ tertiary level
Respondent's labour market status:	□ inactive (childcare, retired, etc.) □ student □ unemployed □ employed

Please give one answer per line for each of the following questions, where:
0 points = the question is not relevant or there is no noticeable impact
3 points = the impact of the activity is medium
6 points = the impact of the activity is good
9 points = the impact of the activity is outstanding

No.	Question	response rating			
		1	3	6	9
1.	Do you think the development was in line with the community's interest?				
2.	Do you consider the communication on the effectiveness of spatial development to be reliable?				
3.	Do you trust the organisation issuing the communication?				
4.	Do you consider the information you received during the implementation to be credible?				
5.	Do you consider the organisation managing the implementation credible?				
6.	Do you consider the public procurement procedures carried out during implementation to be credible?				
7.	Do you think the implementation process was free of conflict?				
8.	Do you think the result of the development is workable?				

Source: own edition

Annex 2: Questionnaire to assess the feasibility of a spatial development strategy, programme or project

Nature of development:	□ strategy □ programme □ project
Place of implementation (county):	
Nature of realisation:	□ implemented
Respondent gender:	□ female □ male
Age of respondent:	□ Under 20 years □ 21-30 years □ 31-40 years □ 41-50 years □ 51-60 years □ 60 years or older
Education level of the respondent:	□ Less than 8th class □ 8th class (primary school) □ skilled □ secondary school leaving exam □ tertiary level
Respondent's labour market status:	□ inactive (childcare, retired, etc.) □ student □ unemployed □ employed

Please give one answer per line for each of the following questions, where:
0 points = the question is not relevant or there is no noticeable impact
3 points = the impact of the activity is medium
6 points = the impact of the activity is good
9 points = the impact of the activity is outstanding

No.	Question	response rating			
		1	3	6	9
1.	Do you think the development concept is in line with the interests of the community?				
2.	Do you consider the spatial development concept to be credible?				
3.	Do you consider the staff conditions for implementation credible?				
4.	Do you consider the timetable of the spatial development concept to be credible?				
5.	Do you consider the material conditions available to implement the idea credible?				
6.	Do you consider the expected results credible?				
7.	Do you consider the management supporting the implementation credible?				
8.	Do you think the idea can be implemented without conflict?				

Source: own edition

Annex 3: Questionnaire to assess perceptions of security in spatial development

Nature of development:	□ strategy □ programme □ project
Place of implementation (county):	
Nature of realisation:	□ implemented
Respondent gender:	□ female □ male
Age of respondent:	□ Under 20 years □ 21-30 years □ 31-40 years □ 41-50 years □ 51-60 years □ 60 years or older
Education level of the respondent:	□ Less than 8th class □ 8th class (primary school) □ skilled □ secondary school leaving exam □ tertiary level
Respondent's labour market status:	□ inactive (childcare, retired, etc.) □ student □ unemployed □ employed

Please provide one answer per line for each of the following requests, where:
0 points = the question is not relevant or there is no noticeable impact
3 points = the impact of the activity is medium
6 points = the impact of the activity is good
9 points = the impact of the activity is outstanding

No.	Question	response rating			
		1	3	6	9
1.	Do you think the development has improved the safety of healthcare?				
2.	Do you think the development has contributed to improve the safety of the infrastructure?				
3.	Do you think the development has contributed to improve public safety?				
4.	Do you think the development has contributed to improve your personal social security?				
5.	Do you think the development has contributed to improve the social security of the community?				
6.	Do you think the development has contributed to improve road safety?				

Source: own edition

Teodor Gyelník[6]

Formulation of the Slovak national narrative and its Slovak-Hungarian constellation[7]

National and collective identity research allows us to understand the formation of national identity. It supports us to comprehend the linkage between past-present and the silhouette of the possible future. Analysis of the Slovak identity formation, national logics, identity-framing, boundary structures and its call for a more cooperative understanding of identity might lead to an environment enabling successful cooperation and cross-border interactions with Hungary.

Key words: nation, nationalism, identity
JEL-code: H79

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Introduction

Central Europe is a geopolitical space which has been divided into several small countries for a century. This division has been done either by physical borders, by mental borders or by both of them at the same time. In spite of its century long dividedness, Central Europe exists as an exceptional shared meta-space with connected culture, history, memories and future fate of different nations and nation-states.

Geopolitical identities are in powerful shifts in our age, urging us to make effort in understanding the geopolitical space of Central Europe, its nation-states and their collective identities. The Central European space is characterised by two basic attributes. On the one side, it is a space with a post-socialist legacy, generating significant (meta)narratives of nationhood, where the old structures of political and economic organization were destroyed in parallel with rejection of social cohesion (*Bassin* 2012). On the other hand, the post-socialist space is characteristic with unstable national and geopolitical goals (*Balogh* 2020), while Slovakia has been suffering from identity ambivalence (*Bátora* 2004), armoured with combined eastern and western frames of civilization, thus formulating an unclear and 'hybrid' collective identity (*Gonda et al.* 2003, p.16) which can be aptly described in the following way "*we know that the Slovak Republic is a state, but we do not know what kind of state it is*" (*Bátora* 2010, p.174).

The aim of this research article is to critically analyse the Slovak national narrative, collective identity and its relationship towards the Hungarian 'other', to reflect on its historical development and to describe its shapes and formulation; thus gaining a clearer picture and insight into the contemporary collective identity and mentality of Slovakia. The analysis builds on desk research and secondary sources, like study of the already published academic literature, media content and survey of public attitude.

The first part presents a short insight into the historical development of Slovakia. The second part describes the formation of the Slovak national narrative and collective identity. It is followed by the articulation of new narrations, 'new wine in old bottles', that underline more attention on co-existence and might have the capacity to go beyond the dominant 'Self – Other' paradigm. The fourth part initiates us to rethink the relationship between the Slovaks and the Hungarians and it portrays the positive mutual shift in the representation of the neighbour; while

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the last part deals with the elements of mutual trust, interactions and the bottom-up approaches towards identity structure with the ability to generate an environment suitable for cooperation.

Short insight into the historical development of Slovakia

The Slovak collective identity strongly builds on the historical idea of Great Moravia, its socializing efforts into the international society and on the mission of Methodius and Cyril. Revival of the memories about the Slavic Great Moravian history surfaced with intellectuals such as Pavol Jozef Šafárik and Ján Kollár since the beginning of the 19th century. In their approach, the Slavic nations represented a civilizational community with Slavic reciprocity. The collective remembering to Great Moravian and the Methodius/Cyril legacy is visible in the Preamble of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, specifically "*...mindful of the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of Great Moravia*". Moreover, two historical artefacts can be immediately found in the reception hall of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic that further strengthens the mentioned collective remembering. One is a copy of a Byzantine ivory pyxis, found in 1974. It is considered as a gift to the ruler of Great Moravia from the Byzantine emperor. Another artefact is the papal Bull of Pople John VIII, '*Industriae*' that addresses Svätopluk as '*comes*' that can be interpreted as an evidence that the ruler of Great Moravia was recognized on par with the Latin Christendom (*Bátora* 2014).

Later, territory of Slovakia became part of the Hungarian Kingdom, then of the Habsburg Empire and then of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. The Slovak elites did not formulate open anti-Hungarian nationalistic positions during the existence of the Kingdom/Monarchy until the rise of modernity in the 19th and 20th century that triggered a powerful development of national awakening all over the European continent. The pre-modern period was characterized with multi-layered and mutual cultural, linguistic and ethnic interactions (*Kollai* 2021) which could be brilliantly mirrored by Matthias Bel who claimed about himself as a person with 'lingua Slavus, natione Hungarus, eruditione Germanus'. The idea that Slovakia could be separated from Hungary was indeed present in political debates, but it was substantially outside of the mainstream until 1914 (*Kováč* 2013; 2016). Rather, the Slovak approaches and endeavours supported such a development that could have promoted a reformed Kingdom with multi-lingual and multi-ethnic, even federative, structure instead of a separate state and disintegrated Kingdom (*Hudek* 2011; *Kocsis* 2020; *Maxwell* 2005).

The First World War substantially altered the 'European chessboard' and it led to the disintegration and disappearance of many empires on the European continent, namely the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Tsarist empire, thus opening institutional and organizational space for the formation of the newly emerging nation-states, including Czechoslovakia. The central and eastern parts of the European continent became fragmented and disintegrated among many smaller nation-states, where the winners dictated the post-world war order (*Gerbet* 2004).

Czechoslovakia was constructed as a common republic of the Czech and the Slovak nations under the political, ideological, and spiritual leadership of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. Nonetheless, the idea of a joint Czechoslovak nation was only marginal among the Slovaks, the Slovak society never accepted it widely and it does not accept it even today. This means that the idea of Czechoslovakia was rather a pragmatic political concept that aimed to find a solution for the Czech and Slovak nations (*Hudek* 2011). As Nič (2010) expresses, the Slovaks became a state-creating entity together with the Czechs in a very controversial formulation of the 'Czechoslovak nation'. The first decades of the First Czechoslovak Republic experienced development of liberal democratic establishment with strong agricultural and centrist parties; although, these decades were followed by harsh traumas (*Kováč* 1998).

The following geopolitical shifts included several modifications of borders in Central Europe. On the one side, the German administration received control over the Czech and Moravian

territories. On the other side, the Hungarian and Polish administrations ruled over the Slovakian territory after the Vienna Arbitration. These shifts within the sovereignty resulted in the establishment of the Second Czechoslovak Republic that existed only for 169 days and it was disintegrated by the invasion of Germany to Bohemia and Moravia. Subsequently, the (First) Slovak Republic, known as the Slovak State, was born with the leadership of the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. This wartime Republic still remains one of the most controversial part within the Slovak historiography. The end of the Second World War once again restructured the borders and the emerging Third Czechoslovak Republic linked its roots and heritage to the Czechoslovak ideal embodied by the First Czechoslovak Republic. The third Republic lasted until 1948 when the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was established by the communist coup d'état with strong Soviet backing.
Czechoslovakia was peacefully disintegrated on 1st of January 1993 and two sovereign political entities emerged on the map of Europe as heirs of the former joint state, specifically the Czech and the Slovak republics. In other words, since the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic, Slovakia has gone through dramatic developments, namely six constitutional models, three political systems and several regimes succeeded one another (*Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí Slovenskej republiky* 2011).

Formation of the Slovak national narrative and collective identity

The Slovak collective psyche and identity has been powerfully influenced by the fact that the Slovak nation constituted a minority for a long time, either during the era of the Monarchy or in the Czechoslovak republics, while the Slovak nation constituted a majority in two exceptions, namely within the institutional frame of the Slovak State between 1939-1945 and since the independence in 1993 (*Kusý* 2002; *Kováč* 2016; *Čaplovič et al.* 2000). The independence and the sudden feeling of being a national majority have generated a certain form of closeness of the Slovak society and state. This closed state structure was inaugurated with the inability to digest the past, unwillingness to include all its citizens and was paralleled with a ceaseless tradition of fear (*Chmel* 2010). The elements of closeness are visible in the national anthem that addresses only the ethnic Slovaks, while the other parts of the society are left outside (*Kusý* 2002). As Hudek (2011) notes, the Slovak ethnic understanding has been stuck within the traditional defensive attitude and search for an eternal struggle against the other.
The national awakening in the 19th century generated a phenomenon that can be identified as 'magyarization' after 1867, specifically a social process supported by government policies that promoted assimilation and acculturation. Closeness went hand in hand with the emotional Slovak narratives about the oppressive Hungarian rule, as Halás (2015, p.63) writes, "*Slovak nationalists after the 1989 revolution often emotionally described Hungarian rule of the territory as a 1000-yearslong oppression of the Slovak nation.*". 'Magyarization' is undeniable, but its lengths is questionable. The current Slovak collective memory articulates a millennia of oppression; although, the Martin Declaration of the Slovak Nation from 1918, which was a declaration of independence from the Kingdom and an expression of a Slovak will to unify with the Czech lands, explicitly speaks about decades long of 'magyarization' instead of a millennia (*Gyulai – Demkó* 2020), specifically the Martin Declaration says "*…the Hungarian government, which for decades has not known a more serious task than suppressing everything that is Slovak…*" (own translation of the author).
In this narration, the Slovak identity approach towards the minorities, especially towards the Hungarian minority, mirrors certain measure of incomprehension which can be characterised by the expression, 'what are they (meaning the Hungarians) doing here?'. Consequently, the Hungarians were identified as a 'negative other' and/or as a 'traditional enemy' (*Hudek* 2011), they fulfil the role of the 'other' for the Slovak identity and as Kusý (2002, p.43, 180) expresses, the 'Hungarian (internal) other' is the constituting element of the Slovak identity. As a result, Slovak national identity is stuck within the antagonist approach and interpretation of 'self' and

'other'/'Hungarian'. Halás gives an interesting point on this Slovak antagonist identity. Namely, the Czech artist, David Černý, attempted to propose an ironic deconstruction of the European national stereotypes by his sculpture during the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2009. Slovakia was portrayed as a Hungarian sausage wrapped up by a Hungarian tricolour ribbon. A brief etymological explanation is needed to understand the performance, specifically 'uherák' is the Czech name of the Hungarian sausage, while the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is termed within the Slovak historiography as 'Uhorsko'. This means that this kind of portraying of Slovakia associates it with the pre-1918 Hungary and with the Kingdom/Monarchy. Immediate reaction emerged from the Slovak side, claiming that the portrayal is unacceptable. Nevertheless, "*Instead of saying: 'Good point! Show them we are not like that!', they said 'Yes, precisely! We are just like that!'*" (*Halás* 2015, p.63).
Additionally, the Slovak self-identification involves a lack of self-confidence that can be rooted in the historical fact that Slovakia lacks its own kings, kingdoms and/or saints that could form a solid basis for a collective identity (*Chmel* 2010). The Slovak self-identification recognizes the legacy of Great Moravia (*Findor* 2002); nevertheless, Great Moravia was not an explicit Slovak state, thus it assures only indirect links, and as Bátora explains that identification with Great Moravia rather brought a perplexity and flawed identity into the Slovak society based on memories and errors of interpretation. Misinterpretation of the position of Great Moravia and its identification with the East, the Byzantine Empire and Russia appears as a phenomenon 'lost in translatio imperii', thus "*until today, this flawed memory continues to produce all kinds of mnemonic practices and discourses*" (*Bátora* 2014, p.457).
The political elites of the independent Slovakia have attempted to structure the contemporary collective identity on the basis of nation, nationalism and privatization. The possibilities of the planned economy with limited forms of property were exhausted, hence the emerging liberal democracy was powerfully linked with market capitalism and privatization. However, the privatization was implemented as a rapid and comprehensive systematic change instead of progressive convergence that were implemented in the West in previous decades. The Central European region, including Slovakia, has undergone a laissez-faire capitalist transition, often labeled as a 'shock therapy', but this approach brought huge social and economic side-effects (*Beaulier – Boettke – Krasnozhon* 2012) and the state property was 'tunneled out' (*Leška* 2011) in such a scale that there was almost a need to once again establish the Republic. On the other side, the inflowing foreign-based capital and companies, like Kia, Hyundai, Peugeot, Citroen and many others are not appropriate to generate any pride and self-respect of the nation (*Chmel* 2010). And, it becomes visible that the idea of economic convergence, as a fundamental element of the post-socialist state system of Slovakia, based on highly disciplined, highly qualified and very low paid workforce as a tool of catching up with developed countries is already depleted. Consequently, Slovakia highly needs to find its inclusive identity that is less dependent on the search for a 'negative other' and/or as a 'traditional enemy'.

'New wine in old bottles?', as a call for a more cooperative Slovak identity

Different historical periods produce their own specific approaches with elements that are emphasized and celebrated and with elements which are overshadowed, ignored or forgotten. The Slovak historical approach is no exemption from this general phenomenon. Slovakia is characterized by frequent changes in interpretation of national history. Different generations were socialised with different interpretations of historical events. Lipták (1997) and/or Kollai (2021) describe how the different state systems, like the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938), the Slovak Republic (1939–1945), the Third Czechoslovak Republic (1945-1948), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic known as the Fourth Czechoslovak Republic (1949-1993) and the independent Slovak Republic since 1993 (has), interpret the same historical event in substantially different way. What is even more, Kusá and Findor (1999) underline the repeated changes, where changes were made even during the school years of the generation.

Fall of the bipolar world order, together with socialist mode of governance, separation of the joint Republic and the declaration of independent Czech and Slovak republics generated profound resonance within the domain of narration of history. Simply, the Slovak Republic, together with the Slovak society, have been searching their post-socialist and democratic interpretations even in our times. The interpretation of the conflict-based relationship between the Slovaks and the Hungarians, as the principal identity nexus, has not been exceeded, yet. The idea of the conflict is still present and it is undoubtedly a building block of the current Slovak collective memory. However, a new narration has emerged which prefers coexistence, cooperation and multi-layered structures instead of a never ending conflict. This new narrative has been articulated by the highest Slovak political levels (top-down) and by local historians (bottom-up) approach as well.

The former, top-down, narration is demonstrated by two speeches of the highest Slovak political representatives. First political representative was Pavol Hrušovský, who was the Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic between 2002-2006 and 2011-2012. The Speaker of the National Council, as the second highest constitutional political representative after the President of the Slovak Republic, gave a speech in 2003, titled as 'The Face of Slovakia: In Need of Historical Self-Reflection for the Future'.

Hrušovský summarized the main historic developments of the past decade, emphasized that the twentieth anniversary of the Republic is a suitable moment for critical reflection. The one thousand years period (from the 9th to 19th century) and the existence of the Hungarian Kingdom were presented as an organic and undeniable element of the Slovak history. To be more specific, "*distinctive feature in the face of the future Slovakia was the formation of the Hungarian Kingdom in the year 1 000. Slovakia became part of a kingdom, which for nine hundred years molded the history of Central Europe. The words of the founder of the Hungarian Kingdom, St. Stephen, have a prophetic value when he in his testament appealed to his son to respect the linguistic and ethnic variety of the inhabitants of his kingdom. For almost eight hundred years, his followers respected his recommendation, and that's also why for eight hundred years, Slovakia was not the object but the subject of the history of the Hungarian Kingdom. Thanks to this, our nation gained extensive experience and our country was marked by all the important events, which moved Europe (...) Let's proudly accept the history of the Hungarian Kingdom as part of our history*" (*Hrušovský* 2003, p.17).

Mr. Speaker articulated an opinion that the territory of Slovakia was an organic part of the Kingdom and the Slovaks were integral elements of it, "*Slovakia was the center of the history of the whole Hungarian Kingdom in general and its political history in particular*" (*Ibid.*); therefore, 'participation in the history of the Hungarian Kingdom is one of the basic features printed on the face of Slovakia'.

The second speech was given 17 years later in 2020. The Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Igor Matovič, invited the representatives of the Hungarian community in Slovakia for a meeting to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Trianon Treaty. The Prime Minister issued a speech with title 'We did not write the past, the future is in our hands' and he articulated, 'historical Hungary was also ours (…) let us dare to say that Hungarian history is our common history, that the Hungarian kings were our common kings.' Furthermore, the Prime Minister underlined common grounds that mirror closeness of the two nations and that the Slovaks and Hungarians should be jointly proud to Hungarian art and literature, such great writers like Kálmán Mikszáth, Imre Madách, Sándor Márai and Lajos Grendel, and such world-famous musicians, like Ferenc Lehár or Zoltán Kodály (*Maďari* 2020). These expressions and speeches are appropriate symbolic spaces for cooperation in the realm of history in order to look for common ground of cooperation, and rediscovering common shared history with a less dialectic identity of Slovakia.

No longer afraid from the neighbour, or …

The relationship between Hungary and Slovakia has its own specific turbulences because they have an inseparable long history with each other, where both nations can enumerate their grievances and complaints. Both nations suffer, in different way, from the imperfect peace settlement after the First and the Second World War (*Kollai* 2021). Consequently, both nations looked at each other suspiciously.

The nationalist sentiments and the post-war settlement overshadowed the idea of cooperation and a more conflictual, war-driven and identity-struggle with zero-sum game approach (has) been prevailing for decades and it still dominates our times. Although, we can be an eyewitness that the two nations might have understood that the 'History' is not a zero-sum game, but it is rather a collective memory about living in the same Kingdom, under the leadership of the same kings and bearing the same conditions of the joint space. Simply, the two nations have started to realize that they are integral and inseparable parts of the same historic space and they have a joint fate in Central Europe. Nevertheless, a joint Central European space is not a new idea, both Slovak and Hungarian politicians wrote about this possibility.

In the case of the former, the Slovak politician Milan Hodža, who served as the prime minister of Czechoslovakia between 1935 and 1938, articulated the idea of a Central European Federation, where cooperation and mutual understanding is the tool to strengthen security, while the lack of cooperation is a direct critical point because of German domination. Cooperation is an absolute necessity in Central Europe and it is the only 'organism able to preserve national, individual liberty, ordered freedom and market policy' (*Hodža* 2004). While in the case of the latter, Lajos Kossuth, who served as the governor-president of the Kingdom of Hungary during the revolution of 1848–1849, imagined a Danube confederation/federation of states. This loose state structure would have been suitable to prevent oppression by the central powers, to prevent nationalist feuds and to guarantee the political freedom and independence of smaller nations (*Ács – Szakasits* 1943).

The principal question in creating a common space in Central Europe is the enemy of the neighbour. It is important to underline that the image of a 'Hungarian enemy' has been in alteration in Slovakia. According to the study of the Institute for Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, we can see a profound change on the issue of 'dangerous countries'. In 1996, Hungary was the most feared country for the Slovaks, because 40% of the respondents identified Hungary with insecurity issues. These feelings were even fuelled by some political representatives from Slovakia, who threatened by war between Slovakia and Hungary expressing that if there is a need 'we will go into the tanks and we will go and destroy Budapest' (*Sme* 1999). Nevertheless, this indicator was substantially decreased and reached only 5% in 2014 (*Bahna* 2014). In other words, Slovakia just acknowledged its independence during the 90s and it was searching its own identity and place in the world. It was a period of geopolitical uncertainty and the Slovak nation had a real fear that Hungary can occupy the newly formed independent state. As a result, Hungary resonated as a hot topic of national security issue. Today, Slovakia has a stable position within the international realm as a recognized subject of international society and the uncertainty disappeared. Along this ontological certainty, Hungary ceased to be a topic of national security for Slovakia.

Mutual trust and the rising bottom-up approach

The Slovak and Hungarian mutual trust is a key component of political, economic and societal stability of Central Europe. We can explicitly pinpoint some positive signs of this mutual understanding. Hungary and Slovakia has been experiencing a profound development of their bilateral contacts. The often conflicting relationship between Slovakia and Hungary has been substituted by more and more expanding mutual respect from 2012, where the two nations see each other as a valuable partner.

The development and expansion of infrastructure is substantially important element, since it reflects the permeability of the border section. Currently, the border section can be crossed at 35 locations. Significant increase and development can be experienced during the decade and 10 border crossing sites were built. The new road bridges have to be mentioned since they profoundly support the linkage of the two countries, e.g. the Monostor Bridge over the Danube between Komárno and Komárom was opened in September 2020 and Ipolydamásd ─ Chľaba was opened in July 2023. New road bridges are planned over the river of Ipeľ, namely between Drégelypalánk ─ Ipeľské Predmostie and Őrhalom ─ Vrbovka. Pedestrian and cycling bridge over the Danube is also agreed between the two countries and it links Szigetköz ─ Žitný ostrov, namely Dunakility ─ Dobrohošť.

Regarding the gas infrastructure, Hungary and Slovakia negotiated a development of the capacity of a natural gas pipeline border interconnector towards Slovakia by 2024 which allows bi-directional gas transfer. The pipeline was officially inaugurated at the beginning of 2020. In case of electricity infrastructure, Slovakia and Hungary are linked by the new cross-border 400 kV electricity lines. The cross-border capacities built between Gönyű-Veľký Ďur and Gönyű-Gabčíkovo, as well as Sajóivánka and Rimavská Sobota, are the longest and busiest cross-border sections in the north-south electricity flow direction, with a 400 kilovolt connection, each. The cross-border capacities increase energy security in East-Central Europe and it is a substantial stage to ensure energy supply for both countries. At the meeting of the Slovak-Hungarian long-distance power line connection, the Slovak Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, expressed, 'we are not concerned what divides us, but what unites us' (*Trend* 2021).

Besides, we can palpate certain disproportionality between the top-down and bottom-up interpretations of Slovak history and collective identity. The former one can be classified as the official interpretation, founded on the premise that the Slovak nation was oppressed during centuries, while the harming side is usually identified with the Hungarian elites. This top-down interpretation flirts with the 'zero-sum game' logic, where the essence of identity is a ceaseless conflict within the imagined self and other frame. Nonetheless, the bottom-up approach attracts more and more attention within the Slovak society and it is the ground of local historians and researchers who usually concentrate on local perspective, like the history of cities, castles, mansions, etc. This interpretation resembles 'non-zero sum game' logic and emphasizes centuries long peaceful, but sometimes conflictual, co-existence and cohabitation of the Slovak and Hungarian nations side-by-side.

For instance, this positive bottom-up trend is explicitly embodied by the city of Bratislava that was a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual city during the Monarchy; nevertheless, the Czechoslovak administration promoted homogeneity and the city was shifted towards national, linguistic and ethnic monogamy. After independence of the Slovak Republic, the city of Bratislava was nominated as the capital city and it has become integrated into the wide network of capital cities. Currently, Bratislava aims to rediscover its own multicultural roots. Since 2003, the capital city has been a site for coronation celebrations, commemorating the coronation of Maria Theresa who was the ruler of the Kingdom of Hungary between 1740 and 1780. It is one of the most important summer cultural events of Bratislava. The celebrations are done with the copy of the Holy Crown of Hungary, signalling positive memory and remembrance towards the Monarchy. Another example of this bottom-up shift in Bratislava is the remaking of the sculpture of Maria Theresa which was destroyed among strong anti-Hungarian tones in 1921. There were no protests against its remaking, while the destruction was condemned as an act of barbarism of past age (*Kollai* 2021).

What is more, a rising respect towards the Hungarian kings of the Árpáds dynasty is clearly palpable in the Slovak society which is embodied by the new statues on the territoriy of Slovakia, e.g. the statue of Andrew II of Hungary and the statue of Andrew III of Hungary in the vicinity of Zvolen or the statue of Béla IV of Hungary in Banská Bystrica. Moreover, a private university, Saint Elizabeth College of Health and Social Work, was established in Bratislava and is named after Elizabeth of Hungary who was a daughter of Andrew II of Hungary. Or, a statue

of Emeric Thököly, Prince of Upper Hungary, was inaugurated in the city of Kežmarok that symbolises an indivisibility of the Slovak and Hungarian past. Moreover, this bottom-up approach is also identifiable in other areas, like rediscovering local history of cities and settlements, castles or ruins of castles, mansions or parishes. This rediscovering uncovers a mutual co-habitation and co-influence between different nations, languages and ethnicities and it might generate an appropriate space for shared and common understanding.

Conclusion

Fragmentation of Central Europe by the imperfect peace agreements have generated implicit and explicit obstacles to fully develop the Central European space and have obstructed the utilisation of the unique feature of Central Europe, namely a multiple, multi-layered-lingual-ethnic identity. As a result, the Slovak and Hungarian tensions have not been spoken out, yet. Certain feeling of animosity is still present and if anyone scratches the surface of the Slovak – Hungarian relations, it can be immediately seen that the ember of the conflict can flare up at any moment.

It is important to underline that this ember of conflict has been built up without any serious direct conflict and clash between the two nations. The conflict aggregated on the back of other conflicts, in the shadow of geopolitical 'chess-game' of great powers. The missing direct military clashes did not build up irreconcilable emotions, thus deconstruction of the tension and conflict is a real possibility between the Slovak and Hungarian nations.

The often conflicting relationship between Slovakia and Hungary has been substituted by more and more expanding mutual respect and trust from 2012, where the two nations see each other as a valuable partner. Slovakia has been diverting itself from the narration of Hungarian thousand years of oppression and it rather searches its historical and valuable space within the structures of the Monarchy, thus searching for a common indivisibility of the Slovak and Hungarian past. This historical reconciliation offers valuable space for deepening of cooperation, mutual trust and creating a strong Central Europe. Perhaps, it will require decades of heavy work and strong willingness to avoid the 'trap of simplicity' in reading history, but it is the necessary and essential step to do.

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Gyula Ocskay[8]

The list of phone numbers and the paradox of representation. Reflections on resilience in a cross-border context[9]

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated unharmonised measures on behalf of the national governments without communicating with the local actors of the border areas, the representatives of the existing cross-border structures included. Against the conclusions of several studies discussing the topic, the author claims that, notwithstanding a few exceptions, the cross-border structures established so far all over Europe were not involved in the management of the extreme situation. Instead, these were the interpersonal contacts of border citizens and informal channels through which derogations of strict measures were achieved at the regional and national governments. The author finds the reason of this phenomenon in the 'paradox of representation' meaning the controversial procedure through which border areas gradually obtain the legal entity status but they lose their societal basis. To illustrate this procedure, the study refers to three communities of experts of network governance, and, through their theoretical models, it arguments that in parallel with the institutionalisation of cross-border cooperation, its participative aspects gradually weaken. The COVID-19 pandemic clearly showed in practice, how this process stabilised the territorial representation status of the cross-border structures while it emptied the participative platforms of the citizens therein.

Keywords: CBC, pandemic, paradox of representation, EGTC, participatory governance
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Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic and its effects to the relations between the EU member states shocked the EU citizens, especially those living in border areas (Coatleven et al. 2020; Albers et al. 2021; Giacometti and Meijer 2021; Opiłowska 2021) as "the negative impacts of the crisis *[were]* disproportionately more severe in border regions than in non-border regions" (Peyrony et al. 2021, 147). The measures adapted by the central governments which "after thirty to seventy years of open borders, were probably not fully aware of the consequences of such action" (Coatleven et al. 2020, 20) radically reduced the rights of "border residents to live similar lives to those residing further from the border" (Giacometti and Meijer 2021, 7). What was even worse, the member states introduced their provisions without coordinating them with their neighbours, nor the European Commission (Albers et al. 2021; EC 2021; ECA 2022). This unilateralism (Böhm 2020; Carrera and Luk 2020; Coatleven et al. 2020; Giacometti and Meijer 2021; Hennig 2021; Weber 2022), the "state-centric, inward-looking responses" (Giacometti and Meijer 2021, 12) not only facilitated the "renationalization of the border regions" (Coatleven et al. 2020, 17) but, in a certain way, they also brought back the past, as several border citizens mentioned (Beylier 2020; Böhm 2020; Buko 2020; CESCI 2021; Giacometti and Meijer 2021; Peyrony et al. 2021).

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Especially since the adoption of the Schengen Agreement, cross-border integration has become a label of the European project (Popescu 2012) where the freedom of cross-border movement was seen as "taken for granted" (Giacometti and Meijer 2021, 50; see also Radil et al. 2021) and in the most integrated parts of the Continent, through their daily practices, border people even experienced the abolition of these borders (Albers et al. 2021, 5). On the contrary, these achievements suddenly became questioned as a result of the measures of "covidfencing" (Medeiros et al. 2021), and events took place in the border areas which previously were considered impossible. Authors of the proliferating COVID-19 literature account many measures making border citizens' lives difficult. French nurses working in Germany could cross the border but they were banned to take their children attending the kindergarten or the school in Germany with them; a Belgian woman was not allowed to say goodbye to her dying mother in Aachen, the Netherlands (Coatleven et al. 2020, 18); it was a common provision in many countries that cross-border workers were banned to go to shopping after their working hours ended: they had to immediately return home (Unfried 2020; Albers et al. 2021; CESCI 2021); key services like cross-border rescue were suspended (Klatt 2020); a border fence blocking free movement was established at the Victoria square between Tornio (FI) and Haparanda (SE) considered earlier as pioneers of cross-border urban integration (Giacometti and Meijer 2021).
The most shocking phenomena are the examples of ethnic resentment stemming from the threat from persons coming from the other, the infectious side of the border. French citizens were insulted in Germany (Albers et al. 2021), Bavarians were handled with hostility in Western Czechia during the school holidays (Coatleven et al. 2020), Swedish cars were vandalised in Finland (Giacometti and Meijer 2021), Hungarian persons avoided from afar the Ukrainian cross-border commuters in the shops (CESCI 2021). Blaming (Buko 2020) and "corona shaming" (Giacometti and Meijer 2021) was further fuelled by lurid articles in media and adverse posts in social media (Giacometti and Meijer 2021; Weber 2022). As a result, mutual trust which had been the engine of both cross-border cooperation and European integration has been dramatically injured re-generating social and ethnic boundaries and restrengthening administrative borders separating EU citizens from each other (Böhm 2020; Coatleven et al. 2020; Fellner 2020).
The frustration experienced during the pandemic will have long-term effects: the emerging mistrust rendered many people to conclude that they should re-organise their lives within the national confines while the borderland authorities revised their so-far followed cross-border integration policies – especially with regard to cross-border public services (Giacometti and Meijer 2021). In a world where everyone is suspicious who comes from abroad and potentially infectious, even the European project is questioned – or "undermined" (Coatleven et al. 2020, 6). It is palpable how the most integrated regions of Europe, namely the Benelux and the Nordic states have estranged – as Unfried (2020) and Giacometti and Meijer (2021) highlight it. As a litmus test, the pandemic revealed the shortcomings of the Benelux Union and the Nordic Council which had created exemplary structures and procedures facilitating cross-border integration that they failed to use during the crisis…
This study investigates the role of cross-border structures during the pandemic and points at one potential reason of their failure, namely the paradox of representation which cannot be overcome but by another paradoxical step. The analysis is based on the international literature of COVID-19 and the testimonies of 19 interviews conducted in 2020 and 2021 along the Hungarian borders within the framework of the 5th Legal Accessibility project[10].

The role of cross-border structures during the pandemic

It is a common observation of the researchers that the measures against the spread of COVID-19 have been introduced in a centralised, nationalistic manner neglecting the existing frameworks

[10] See: https://legalaccess.cesci-net.eu/en/milestones/milestone-no-5/

of bi- and multilateral cooperation, as well as, the operational cross-border structures. As Giacometti and Meijer (2021, 13) underline: "In the retreat from international collaborative structures, the committees and councils established to facilitate cross-border collaboration have been virtually forgotten." Similar examples of negligence can be shown all over Europe. At the French-German border, seen as the laboratory of the European integration, "cross-border cooperation instances such as eurodistricts, the Upper Rhine Conference which still includes the working groups of 'Health Policy' (the Epi-Rhin network) and the 'mutual aid of catastrophes', the TRISAN competence centre, etc. are widely missing during the crisis" (Albers et al. 2021, 21). The Germany-Luxembourg border became closed in spite of the explicit disagreement of the border municipalities (Coatleven et al. 2020, 13). "Multi-level governance, and particularly paradiplomacy, the region-to-region perspective, and municipality-to-municipality relations have been largely underestimated as mechanisms for addressing the effects of the pandemic locally" (Giacometti and Meijer 2021, 51).

The centralised decision-making model partly adapted also by decentralised states like Switzerland, Spain and Germany prevented the introduction of tailor-made solutions respecting regional differences, especially during the first wave. Under these conditions, the existing cross-border structures could not fulfil their mission of integration. However, numerous examples are known, how they tried to facilitate cross-border mobility.

Typical reaction was the organisation of protests at the border crossings, e.g. in Luxembourg (Coatleven et al. 2020), at the German-Polish (Hennig 2021; Opiłowska 2021), the German-French (Wille 2020), the Slovak-Hungarian borders (CESCI 2021) and in the Nordic countries where the citizens even triggered legal actions against the border guards breaching the citizens' constitutional right to free movement (Giacometti and Meijer 2021).

If not protesting, local and regional actors from either side of the border reclaimed re-opening of the crossings and lobbied for alleviating measures together (Coatleven et al. 2020; Klatt 2020; Medeiros et al. 2021; Opiłowska 2021; Weber 2022). Many of existing cross-border structures (e.g. the PAMINA, the Pyrénées-Mediterranée, the Gate to Europe and the Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino EGTCs, the Euroregions Nouvelle Aquitaine-Euskadi-Navarre and Meuse-Rhine, and instances like the Euro-Institut in Kehl or the Greater Copenhagen cooperation and Info Norden offices, etc.) collected and shared information in all relevant languages through their own instances and social media platforms (Coatleven et al. 2020; CESCI 2021; Peyrony et al 2021).

Task forces designed to coordinate the steps to be taken and to guarantee the exchange of information were set up, especially along the borders of federal states (Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria) and Luxembourg (Coatleven et al. 2020).

The euroregions and similar cooperation bodies could be used as institutions of medical aid. The Eurodistrict Saar-Moselle facilitated the delivery of masks from Saarland to Moselle (Weber 2022); the BTC EGTC transported masks and fertilisers from Hungary to the Romanian member municipalities of the grouping during the first wave, when these types of equipment were missing there; the Tisza EGTC facilitated the transport of ventilators to its Ukrainian member region's hospitals (CESCI 2021). The Greater Region and the Eurodistrict Saar-Moselle played decisive role in transporting French patients to Germany and in setting up a joint testing centre at the border (Albers et al. 2021; Weber 2022).

Nevertheless, despite the empowering examples of solidarity, the leeway for action of these structures was very limited and it was rather based on interpersonal contacts than the competences of the structures themselves. "As we could see during the management of the COVID-19 crisis, cross-border cooperation mainly depended on the good relations between the individuals who had created the necessary trust for cooperation" (Albers et al. 2021, 47).

According to Horobets and Shaban (2020) everyday people gained the most reliable information through their social networks and at the social media platforms. Several ones of our interviewees confirmed that instead of following the official sights with their always-changing and sometimes controversial information, the friends and the Facebook groups provided up-dated information on the conditions of border crossing (CESCI 2021). Albers et al. (2021, 35) characterise this

situation with the importance of the address books and the lists of phone numbers: "Although it might seem trivial, in reality, it is simpler to pick up the phone to get important information if the partner on the other side is well-known. On the contrary, the over-institutionalised, sometimes complicated and too long procedures might mean an obstacle in times of crises."
Giacometti and Meijer (2021, 28) give the example of the mayor of Tornio who lobbied by himself at his colleagues to let the health workers cross the border. In the context of France and Germany, it was not the Cross-border Cooperation Committee (CCT) established by the Aachen Treaty (signed one year before the breakout of the pandemic) which played an intermediary role between the two governments – regardless of the fact that it had been set up for managing similar situations: it was the French-German inter-parliamentary group (APFA) whose members knew each other since long-time and had built up steady background for mutual trust. What is more, the transport of French patients to Germany was also initiated by doctors who were in contact with each other from the very beginning of the pandemic (Albers et al. 2021). The Greater Region has been providing well-based frames for integration around Luxembourg since many years which facilitated better coordination between the authorities. However, as Weber (2022) highlights: the informal contacts of the regional actors were as important in these processes as the formal ones.
To sum up, as the above examples show, these were not the existing cross-border structures that managed the best the crisis as their competences were paralysed by centrally defined policies and measures, but the individuals having the phone numbers of their counterparts and the relevant authorities on the other side of the border. Subsequently, this is the point where the paradox of representation comes into play.

The paradox of representation

By the concept on the *paradox of representation* the author refers to the double-faceted process within which, under the roof of the multi-level governance (MLG) model of the EU, partners cooperating across the borders are enabled to represent their border area through legally protected independent entities displayed on maps (territorial representation). At the same time, as a result of an evolving process, the same structures are losing their inclusive nature and their direct contact with the population living in the borderland (deficit of democratic representation). In order to clarify the concept, we need to identify the double-faceted and gradual process of cross-border institutionalisation (Durand 2014; Lange and Pires 2018).
The first, *informal level* is characterised with strong interpersonal ties; the initiatives which are fuelled by the geographic, cultural, historic similarity and territorial proximity (Medve-Bálint and Svensson 2012; Svensson 2013; Engl 2016). This level is generated by the leaders of local institutions and associations. The cooperation has neither a steady institutional background nor a fixed agenda, but it is rather spontaneous, where the partners can involve large groups of the local society in the cooperation, hence creating its social base.
In parallel with the intensification of the encounters, the partners get to better know each other and each other's capacities so that they recognise the potentials of a more integrated form of collaboration. They can share their assets through cross-border health, social, emergency, education, etc. services. This is the second, the *functional-territorial level* of cooperation. This level requires coordinated efforts, fixed agendas and procedures defined in common, as well as institutions or inter-institutional agreements guaranteeing the equal access to the services. Very often, the functional level presupposes the existence of joint cross-border territorial development strategies.
Strengthened functional integration then generates the need for joint management of the territory: the establishment of a permanent institution which is responsible for the cross-border realisation of the development plans. As the joint institutions presuppose the fixed legal background, the third level of cooperation can be named as *normative* one: here the conditions of cooperation are ruled by international (Madrid Outline Convention) or Community

(Regulations) law. In the first case, bi- or multilateral agreements facilitate the establishment and operation of cross-border structures, such as euroregions, eurodistricts, working communities, etc. In the latter one, the mandatory EU legislation (the 1082/2006/EC regulation, its amendment carried out in 2013 and the relevant national provisions) defines the frames for cross-border governance (i.e. the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, EGTC). As a result of the above evolution, cross-border initiatives gain visibility, stability and a certain level of competences. They can be displayed on maps so that these structures can *represent* a geographic area across state borders. As being permanent institutions, these entities are able to implement cross-border investments, to manage programmes, to maintain the results of cross-border projects, to provide services through their own institutions.

The "gradual institutionalisation of cross-border living areas" (Coatleven et al. 2020, 30) which cannot be separated from the Europeanisation (i.e. regionalisation and decentralisation) of spaces (Hennig 2021; Weber 2022) has a paradoxical character: in the very beginning, at the phase of informality, many citizens take part in the joint activities, and the interpersonal ties are very strong; at the final, normative phase, the cross-border structures take on a professional, managerial, sometimes elitist character, and, with a few exceptions, lose their socially inclusive features.

The theoretical frames of this double phenomenon are given by network governance theory. During the 20th century, based on the Weberian model of government political theorists shared the view that it is the state which owns the exceptional right to exercise power on its territory and to promote the well-being of its citizens within the frames provided by a (democratic) constitution (Peters 2014; Somlyódyné Pfeil 2019). According to this concept, the hierarchically constructed bureaucracy is the instance to guarantee the enforcement of the above principles within the confines of the so-called Westphalian state borders. The Westphalian Treaty making an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648 is considered the symbolic event which created the modern nation state borders in the West (Diener and Hagen 2012; Popescu 2012).

The widely-shared concept of the modern bureaucratic nation states confronted with a seismic crisis at the end of the last century, due to the parallel developments of globalisation and democratisation (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). In that period, the rise of the global market and the international companies challenged the monopolistic economic management role of the states (Virtanen 2004; Bevir 2013); today these are no longer the national governments but the key actors of the market who rule the global economic processes (Björk and Johansson 1999). Thanks to the achievements of communication, the feeling of mutual dependence of people and peoples has been strengthening contributing to the internationalisation of the civil society and the development of cross-border networks (Scott 2004; Levi-Faur 2014). More and more phenomena emerged whose handling exceeded the competences of the nation states and this resulted in the proliferation of supra- and subnational governance models, neglecting the traditional administrative borders (Allmendinger et al. 2015; Telle 2017; Ulrich 2021). The complexity of the contemporary challenges from climate change to globalisation of the economy and the use of ICT tools, etc. favoured for the recognition that the capacities and the resources of a state apparatus are insufficient to tackle them: the responsibility of the government must spread out both vertically and horizontally (Chhotray and Stoker 2009; Ansell and Torfing 2016).

In parallel with, and not independently from the above process, the spread of the principles of democratisation has generated new forms of interest representation (Chhotray and Stoker 2009), active citizenship (Ansell and Torfing 2016), participative-deliberative decision making (Levi-Faur 2014) and the evoking of the values of pluralism and differentiation (Ulrich 2016).

The governance literature shares the view that the European Union is the most advanced alternative of the Weberian model (Levi-Faur 2014; Ansell and Torfing 2016; Ulrich 2016), especially thanks to its multi-level governance solutions (Marks 1993; Hooghe and Marks 2003). The principle of subsidiarity created the model of shared competences between the state and the Union level institutions while the paradigm of regionalisation favoured for subnational

(territorial-statistical regions), supranational (macro-regions) and cross-border (euroregions, EGTCs) forms of governance. These achievements challenge the modernist state-centred governance practices when creating new scenes of policy-making.
The euroregions and other similar cross-border structures are considered as examples of horizontally organised network governance (Lissandrello 2004; Veggeland 2004; Medve-Bálint 2013) whose institutionalisation (stabilisation) is characterised by the above-mentioned paradoxical feature. In order to explain this paradox, let's cite here the outcomes of three author communities' works.
Zumbusch and Scherer (2015) make a difference between weak and strong institutionalisation (*See Table 1*) where the first form is rather flexible, its decision-making procedures are simple and the decisions have neither a mandatory character nor a strategic perspective as the network lacks the appropriate competences and capacities to realise far-reaching goals. On the contrary, networks of strong institutionalisation develop their stricter internal rules and procedures, and a hierarchical structure implementing the organisational strategy. Unlike the weak model, strongly institutionalised structures can guarantee the stability and reliability which are necessary for the realisation of long-term visions. These organisations (e.g. the EGTCs) "are able to offer a stable framework for long lasting continuity, for simplified decision making processes and for an enhanced potential to deal also with conflict-driven issues in the region" (Zumbusch and Scherer 2015, 516.).

Table 1 – Comparison of weak and strong institutionalisation

	Strong	**Weak**
Membership	closed, defined representatives	open, flexible
Legal form	defined legal form (public law)	loose network arrangements (private law)
Organisational structure	existence of several bodies, complex	simple structure, modest complexity
Decision-making	majority voting	consensus, unanimous votes
Character of decisions	binding character, mandatory	non-binding, without obligation
Political involvement	political as well as sectoral expertise	various experts, administration
Time perspective	long term perspective	short- or medium-term perspective

Source: Zumbusch and Scherer 2015, 505

In their model, Provan and Kenis (2008) differentiate between three forms of network governance (*See Table 2*).

Table 2 – Network governance models of Provan and Kenis

Governance forms	**Trust**	**Number of participants**	**Goal Consensus**	**Need for network-level competences**
Shared governance	High density	Few	High	Low
Lead organisation	Low density, highly centralised	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate
Network Administrative Organisation (NAO)	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High

Source: Provan and Kenis 2008, 237

'Shared governance' is the most democratic form which lacks a ruling centre. Cooperation is defined by domain similarity and high level of trust while the joint goals can easily be set without establishing an independent entity being in charge of managing the joint activities. This form which has an informal character confronts with difficulties if the quantity of joint tasks starts growing. As the partners have no dedicated staff to tackle the challenges, one of the partners needs to undertake the role of coordination, in the name of the network. This solution improves the effectiveness but generates extra burdens over one network member. This is the model of the *'Lead organization'* which means that instead of horizontal networking, where everyone cooperates with everyone in a democratic way, the position of one partner is strengthened. As a consequence, the leading partner acquires a central position: the other partners of the network communicate with this leading organisation while their horizontal ties start weakening which diminishes the level of mutual trust: the trust is rather enhanced toward the leading partner.

Once the hierarchical structure rises, the need for more advanced network competences may be growing which can facilitate the contracting of a *'Network Administrative Organization'* (NAO). The last model refers to the normative level of cooperation when an independent legal entity undertakes the role of coordination and management. In parallel with the development of a more effective model, the intensity of participation lessens (Ulrich 2021): the NAO manages the daily work without the direct involvement of the networking partners.

One of the main conclusions ("propositions") of the authors is that "[n]etworks face a tension between the need for administrative efficiency and inclusive decision making. In shared-governance networks, the tension will favor inclusion; in lead organization–governed networks, the tension will favor efficiency; and in NAO-governed networks, the tension will be more balanced but favor efficiency" (Provan and Kenis 2008, 245). To sum up, in parallel with the increase of the level of efficiency, inclusion is harder to be maintained in networks.

Davoudi et al. (2008) present a comprehensive picture on the different forms of cross-border cooperation and the potential ways of involvement of the citizens (*See Table 3*).

Limited *formal* involvement can target the organised groups such as chambers, civil associations, companies, media, etc. The joint field of interest between the network organisation and the above partners is ensured by consensus building and the provision of the access to political and financial resources.

Widespread *informal* participation is a better solution in the case of the everyday (or marginalised) citizens whose capacities for self-organisation are weak or completely missing. They can be addressed directly during a participative-deliberative planning process, for instance.

Table 3 – Main characteristics of limited and weak participation

	Limited participation	**Wide participation**
Subjects	organised groups	„the citizens"
Way of participation	formal participation	informal participation
Extension of partnership	limited	unlimited
Objective of cooperation	consensus building	to promote the construction of deliberative democracy and territorial cooperation
Form of cooperation	public-private partnership	micro-decisions, consultations, sharing of information

Source: Own compilation based on Davoudi et al. 2008

There is an obvious inherent relationship between less and more formal participation and less and more formal governance models. Zumbusch and Sherer interlink the informal model of cooperation with weak, while the formal one with strong institutionalisation.

The evolution of cross-border cooperation within the European Union is characterised by gradual institutionalisation (from the weak to the strong model) during which the shared governance forms are replaced by more hierarchical and centralised structures of lead organisations and network administrative organisations. In parallel with this process, examples of wide participation are gradually disappearing and are replaced by formal and limited forms of involvement (*See Figure 1*).

Figure 1: Reciprocity of institutionalisation and participation in network governance models



Source: Own compilation based on Zumbusch and Scherer 2015, Provan and Kenis 2008 and Davoudi et al. 2008

To conclude, the fact that the existing supra- and subnational cross-border structures could not play a decisive role in the management of the pandemic is hardly justifiable by their neglected status against the national authorities. In compliance with the paradox of representation, the more professionalised, the more institutionalised and the more visible these structures are, the weaker their relationships are with the border people affected the most by the border regime during the pandemic. At the same time, those interpersonal ties which either have been developed during a previous level of cooperation or ensured within the framework (!) of a Network Administrative Organisation (e.g. an EGTC) proved to be much more effective and successful. Even the positive exceptions of the PAMINA and the NAEN EGTCs, the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine, etc. include the informal factor of cooperation beside the formal one: without the address books, the coordination would fail everywhere.

The way out: more representation

When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s, he recognised those factors of the American governance model which he expected to become general in the forthcoming centuries in the Western civilisation. He also identified the main risks stemming from the enlarged freedom of the American citizens with unparalleled insight, and he concluded that these risks can be managed by providing the citizens with even more freedom (de Tocqueville 2002). This is a lesson which can be adapted to the paradox of representation: paradoxically again, the shortcomings of the operation of cross-border structures can be compensated by providing them with a higher level of representation.

The researchers of the COVID-19 pandemic concede that in similar crises, the subsidiarity principle should be applied also at the cross-border context (i.e. beyond the national confines). The recommendations formulated by them include mandatory consultations with cross-border entities before adapting national measures, as well as the territorialised, tailor-made management of the crisis which makes it necessary to empower the cross-border structures. As Coatleven et al. (2020, 12) stipulate: "nationwide approaches necessarily lead to a dilemma between disproportionality in less affected regions and inefficiency in heavily affected regions, which could easily be avoided by giving regional and local authorities more leeway". Instead, territorial derogations designed for border areas should have been applied (Albers et al. 2021).
Territorialised solutions presuppose the adoption of cross-border crisis management or emergency plans (Coatleven et al. 2020, 27, 30; Peyrony et al. 2021, 128), as well as the equipment of cross-border structures with political competences – "place-sensitive governance approaches" (Giacometti and Meijer 2021, 7) – and financial resources needed for the implementation thereof (CoE 2021, 8; Albers et al. 2021, 37; 52; Peyrony et al. 2021, 128). Several interviewees highlighted that during the crisis border citizens did not know which authority to contact to (this also points at the above analysed shortages of embeddedness of the existing structures). Therefore, in future crises the border areas will need a "lighthouse institution" (Albers et al. 2021, 52) which can provide citizens with updated information in each relevant language and is able to manage the procedures and implement the fit-for-purpose and tailor-made measures. For this sake, these entities should be enabled to collect data and information on the processes taken place within the cross-border living areas in order to facilitate tailor-made decision-making (Peyrony et al. 2021). At the moment the information on cross-border flows and the inter-dependencies of the border areas are missing at central level (Giacometti and Meijer 2021).
The involvement of the local and regional level is in the interest of the national governments as well. As that-time Commissioner, Jacques Santer interpreted the subsidiarity principle in 1998: "to act less in order to act better" (cited by Coatleven et al. 2020, 24). Furthermore, the delegation of certain competences to the local level enhances the legitimacy and transparency of the decisions (Coatleven et al. 2020; Albers et al. 2021; CoE 2021; Ulrich 2021) and strengthens mutual trust (Peyrony et al. 2021; Weber 2022) without which there is no cooperation and which presupposes the existence of strong interpersonal ties and those address books and phone number lists facilitating the adaptation of tailor-made interventions during a future crisis.

Conclusion – what is at stake in this context?

This study attempted to reveal the inherent, structural phenomenon of gradual institutionalisation of cross-border cooperation which, in parallel with the process of becoming the territorial (geographical) representative of a border area deprives these network governance structures from their social base. This phenomenon is named by the author as 'the paradox of representation' because it equipes the border area with a representative organisation, sometimes in the form of an independent entity (an EGTC) but, at the same time, this entity fails to represent the population living in the same border area. The paradox of representation reasons the fact why not the existing supra- and subnational structures were the factors playing the most important role during the COVID-19 pandemic but those inter-personal contacts which had been established within or out of these entities and bodies, at an informal level.
The management of the pandemic has been further strengthening the re-nationalisation and re-bordering tendencies which has been more and more defining the European discourse since 2015, when the so-called migration crisis broke out. We can conclude that statism is back, borders regained their significance and we are witnessing the corruption of mutual trust between the EU Member States with such a fierce that we thought to be left behind. Indeed, this is not an age favourable for cooperation.

However, in this adverse situation, many border people and numerous cross-border initiatives set a good example of solidarity and trust. What is more, paradoxically enough, the best examples of solidarity were shown by those affected the most by the pandemic. And this phenomenon may give us the hope: the paradox of representation can be resolved by awarding more representation, more competence to the cross-border entities. To put it in practice: in order to enable the political and social representation of a borderland, the leaders of the network administrative organisations have to involve the citizens through participatory deliberative methods and procedures (Ulrich 2021; Weber 2022). As the experts of the Council of Europe underline: the "current crisis has highlighted the importance of a robust system of civil participation in public decision-making" (CoE 2021, 8). This change could be initiated and promoted by the protagonists of cross-border cooperation. The "core idea of participatory governance is giving *voice and vote* and the possibility for verification by transparent information policy to the individuals and/or the representatives of the individuals who are primarily affected by the policies that are implemented" (Ulrich 2021, 70). For this purpose, the NAO-typed organisations "need to be more inclusive of civil society, and decisions made with input from citizens need to be more binding" (Ulrich 2021, 194). Once also having a cross-border emergency plan, in the event of future crises, the euroregions, EGTCs and other forms of cross-border governance mechanisms may become the key actors of mitigation. At the same time, the stakes are much higher. Through their para-diplomatic feature, cross-border organisations can contribute to both cross-border (inter-national) confidence and the re-structuring of trust in the European project itself…

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Melinda Benczi[11]

Sustainable cross-border cooperation? A case-study on the role of national minorities [12]

Cross-border cooperation within the European Union is a cornerstone of regional integration, fostering collaboration and solidarity among Member States. This article explores the role of national minorities, specifically in the Romanian-Hungarian border region, as contributors to the territorial impact and sustainability of cross-border projects. While existing research highlights their potential as bridge builders, this study critically assesses the tools used for measuring impact and sustainability in cross-border initiatives, uncovering a gap in acknowledging the role of national minorities. Through a case study of Romanian-Hungarian INTERREG projects between 2007-2020, this article sheds light on the nuanced relationship between national minorities and cross-border engagement. It underscores the need for further research, policy considerations, and emphasises that by harnessing the bridge-building potential of national minorities, they could be one of the guarantees for the cross-border projects' enduring results as well as collaboration, strengthening regional unity and prosperity in the European Union.

Key words: territorial development, cross-border cooperation, national minorities, impact evaluation
JEL code: JEL-code: H79

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Introduction

Cross-border cooperation stands as one of the main pillars of European Union (EU) integration, fostering collaboration and solidarity among Member States (Archick 2021). Rooted in the EU's fundamental principles of unity and cohesion, this cooperation transcends geographical boundaries (Scott 2016), enabling nations to jointly address common challenges and capitalise on shared opportunities (Adrot et al. 2018). With the aim of promoting peaceful coexistence (Gorzelak 2016), economic growth (Zabelina 2019), and social progress (Grix 2001), cross-border cooperation facilitates the harmonization of policies (Göllner 2014), the exchange of best practices (Glinos 2011), and the optimization of resources across diverse regions (Guo 2005).
Consequently, ensuring the sustainability of cross-border cooperation becomes of paramount importance (Ivanov & Rotanova 2019). Sustainable cross-border cooperation is generally understood to refer to collaborative initiatives, projects, or agreements between neighbouring regions or countries from two or more sides of a state border aimed at achieving mutual benefits while taking into account the social, economic, environmental, and cultural dimensions of development (Khmeleva et al. 2022). It involves fostering lasting partnerships that promote long-term stability, resilience, and equitable growth, ensuring that the needs of present generations are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Mensah 2019). Put in other words, sustainable cross-border collaboration not only guarantees the continuity of joint initiatives but also reinforces the resilience and adaptability (Korhonen et al. 2021) of interconnected regions to evolving challenges. By embracing a long-term perspective, sustainable cross-border projects can effectively address complex issues such

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as environmental protection, economic development, and social inclusion, fostering enduring benefits for both participating countries and their citizens (Basboga 2020). Moreover, sustainable cooperation reinforces trust (Koch 2018) and confidence among nations, laying the groundwork for deeper integration and lasting partnerships. By committing to sustainability in cross-border endeavours, the EU would strengthen its collective capacity to tackle global issues, solidifying its position as a beacon of regional cooperation and prosperity on the global stage (Fejes & Soós 2007).

The role of national minorities in cross-border cooperation has already been explored from a theoretical perspective. Research suggests that members of national minorities can act as bridge builders. The report entitled "Dynamics of Integration in the OSCE Area: National Minorities and Bridge Building" claims that members of the national minorities are able to initiate cooperation across state borders by relying on their intercultural knowledge and social capital (ECMI 2016, 10). Thus, their bilingualism and bi-cultural identities enable them to identify issues and areas where joint action across borders can benefit society as a whole (Komac & Vizi 2019, p. 15). National minorities may also play sub-functions, such as promoting the sustainability of cross-border cooperation (Portolés 2015) and ensuring the flow of information, especially due to their proximity to the border.

However, the role of national minorities in cross-border cooperation can, contrary to the above, even be negative with adversary consequences. Research findings point out that it is important not to overestimate the role of national minorities as "the presence of trans-border ethnic groups does not automatically lead to intensified cross-border cooperation" (Klatt 2006, 246). If national minorities cooperate in a way that excludes representatives of other nationalities from joint initiatives, it can lead to economic disparities, divisions within populations, and potentially amplify voices advocating for border revisions, especially in historically conflicted areas. This negative role can hinder cooperation and deepen conflicts (ibid).

While these theoretical insights have been examined in various contexts, their evidence-based application to the Romanian-Hungarian case is still somewhat missing, there are mostly only assumption such as that the presence of these minority communities, characterised by their unique cultural identities and historical ties, represent a vital force in enhancing the resilience and effectiveness of cross-border initiatives (e.g. Gualini 2003, Perkmann & Sum 2002, Adrot et al. 2018). In policy debates it is sometimes mentioned (e.g. Knoll 2009) that their involvement not only adds a layer of diversity and richness to these projects but also fosters a deeper connection between neighbouring regions, thus amplifying the positive outcomes.

This study aims to assess the extent in which the engagement of Romanians living in Hungarian border counties and Hungarians living in Romanian border counties translates to INTERREG projects. Thus, the focal objective of this article is twofold: first, to critically examine the existing tools used for measuring impact and sustainability in cross-border cooperation initiatives to see whether the addition of a new viewpoint is needed; and second, to see to what extent can the role the national minorities played in the INTERREG projects be tapped into with territorial analytical tools. By undertaking this dual exploration through the case-study of the Romanian-Hungarian INTERREG projects between 2007-2020, the impact and sustainability of cross-border initiatives will be better understood, enabling policymakers, practitioners, and stakeholders to make informed decisions and advance the cause of regional collaboration and development within the European Union.

Methodology

In order to provide an as well-rounded assessment as possible, the present analysis relies on a series of methods and data input. First of all, based on the literature it maps out some of the most often used methods for measuring the impact and sustainability of cross-border cooperation in order to see what roles the national minorities have been assigned or whether there is a potential gap that could be filled. Then a case-study was built on the Romanian-Hungarian INTERREG

projects between 2007-2020 through the analysis of statistical data collected by the national statistical offices of the two countries and the respective counties.
Secondly, to analyse the cross-border projects implemented in the examined border region between 2007 and 2020 within the framework of the INTERREG Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes the official EU database of keep.eu was used[13]. In total, 564 projects were analysed in detail, the vast majority (455) of which come from the period 2007–2013, and 109 from the period 2014–2020. After the database was downloaded and filtered for the relevant periods, each project was analysed in several ways. Some analyses were quantitative focusing primarily on the costs of the projects, their thematical focus and, to shed light on the territoriality of the projects, the location of their partners; while others were more qualitative in nature (e.g. when analysing the project description for signs of assigning any role to the national minorities). In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the regional context, maps were created to visualise the collected and interpreted territorial data.

Measuring the impact and sustainability of cross-border projects

The European Commission's commitment to policy evaluation has significantly intensified, particularly within the context of EU Cohesion Policy, where substantial public funds are allocated to mitigate regional disparities. This heightened emphasis stems from the imperative need to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of these policies. To address this need, a plethora of models, methods, and tools have been proposed to assess the cross-border projects. Table 1 summarises the most often used methods measuring impact and sustainability of cross-border projects for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers seeking to align their evaluation strategy with the specific needs of such initiatives.

1. Table: Critical summary of the most often used methods measuring the impact and sustainability of cross-border projects (Own collection and edition)

Method	Advantages	Limitations	Sources
Cost-benefit analysis	• Enables the analysis of the economic viability of cross-border projects	• May overlook non-monetary aspects of impact, such as social factors • Assigning monetary values to intangible outcomes can be challenging and subjective (biases) • Does not take the territorial aspect into consideration	• Glachant & Khalfallah 2011 • Boadway 2006
The social return on investment methodology	• Expands the assessment beyond financial outcomes to include social and environmental value	• Relies on stakeholder input and subjective valuations, which can lead to varying interpretations of impact • The participatory nature can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, limiting its scalability for larger projects • Does not take the territorial aspect into consideration	Pathak & Dattani 2014
The sustainable development goals framework	• Offers a universal standard for assessing the impact of projects in line with global sustainability objectives	• The broad scope makes it difficult to pinpoint the contributions to the goals • Focusing on goal alignment may overlook unique regional challenges and context-specific impacts • Does not take the territorial aspect into consideration	Griggs et al. 2014
The social network analysis	• Provides insights into stakeholder collaborations in and	• Requires substantial data collection and specialised expertise in network analysis • It does not directly measure project outcomes;	• Dörry & Decoville 2016

[13] The data was downloaded on 6 March, 2022.

Method	Advantages	Limitations	Sources
	influence over cross-border projects	the analysis may not capture qualitative aspects of impact • Does not take the territorial aspect into consideration	• Knoke & Yang 2019
The theory of change	• Provides a comprehensive and logical framework to understand the causal relationships between project activities and outcomes	• May require extensive input from stakeholders and a deep understanding of complex interventions • Highly dependent on accurate assumptions about how change occurs, which can be challenging to predict • Does not take the territorial aspect into consideration	• Gunitsky 2013 • Grove 1988
TEQUILA method	• It benefits from balanced elements like regional sensibility and policy intensity	• Does not consider territorial cooperation as a primary evaluation dimension • Cannot be used for ex-post evaluations	• Camagni 2020 • Abrahams 2014
EATIA	• Excels in emphasizing a participatory and bottom-up approach to evaluation	• Lacks a holistic territorial analytic view • Overlooks important dimensions like territorial governance and urban network arrangements	Fischer et al. 2015
STEMA method	• It heavily relies on a wide range of statistical analyses	• Primarily focuses on socioeconomic and environmental analysis, making it less suitable for evaluating territorial cooperation • Lacks a comprehensive evaluation procedure	Prezioso 2020
TARGET_TIA method	• Designed to assess the territorial impacts of cross-border cooperation programmes • Allows for the inclusion of tailor-made dimensions and components	• Not yet tested in practice	Medeiros 2020

Source: Own compilation

Assessing tools for measuring cross-border initiative impact and sustainability reveals various pros and cons. Cost-Benefit Analysis aids economic viability assessment but overlooks non-monetary aspects and lacks a territorial dimension. The social return on investment expands the assessment but relies on subjective valuations and is resource-intensive, without a territorial focus. The sustainable development goals framework aligns projects with global sustainability objectives but might miss regional nuances and lacks a territorial perspective. Social network analysis provides stakeholder insights but requires substantial data and does not measure project outcomes or address territorial aspects. The theory of change offers a comprehensive framework but needs extensive stakeholder input and does not consider the territorial dimension. Consequently, each tool has some shortcomings that turn them less than ideal for the purposes of the present study.

However, regarding the TARGET_TIA methods, there was a vocalised need for further research "on this very specific thematic of relating TIA procedures with CBC programmes, in order to contribute to a higher efficiency and effectiveness of the EU financed projects, programmes and policies" (Medeiros 2015, 112), it is only logical to attempt to broaden the list of potential tools of analysis by proposing solutions to measure the role of a specific group of stakeholders (in the present case-study the national minorities) in the advancement of cross-border cooperation. This approach is justified by the geographic pattern of ethnic communities in the analysed border area: their role in the implementation of the CBC programme should not be underestimated.

The Hungarian-Romanian border area

The Hungarian-Romanian border section, spanning 443 kilometers, serves as a historical and geopolitical crossroads within Europe. Historically, this border has witnessed frequent changes and disputes, with its origins rooted in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Sallai 2021). Its location as both an internal and external border often led to conflicts, impacting the lives of the diverse nationalities inhabiting the region.

In the early 21st century, the border underwent a transformation, marked by efforts at reconciliation and cross-border cooperation (Czimre 2018). Both Hungary and Romania joined NATO and the European Union, fostering new opportunities for collaboration and development in this previously contentious region (Deica 2006; Gasparini & Del Bianco 2011). Despite these positive developments, challenges remain, particularly concerning border controls due to Romania's delayed Schengen accession, which has periodically strained relations along the border (Hajdú & Rácz, 2020).

The Hungarian-Romanian border region is characterised by an intricate ethnic diversity, shaped by historical legacies. Notably, the Romanian side is home to a substantial Hungarian minority, ranging from 5.1% in Timiș to 34.5% in Satu Mare, with certain settlements like Cherechiu having up to 94% Hungarian population. Conversely, the Hungarian side hosts a smaller Romanian minority, constituting 0.1% to 1.4% of the population across various counties, but Romanian communities are notably prevalent in certain settlements like Méhkerék (78.2%) and Bedő (48.7%). It is assumed that ethnic relations similarly to other parts of Europe (see for example Klatt 2006) in the Hungarian-Romanian border region also play a multifaceted role in cross-border cooperation efforts. Minority organizations and cultural exchanges have fostered social connectivity between communities on both sides of the border. Town-twinning agreements, numbering 144 in total, demonstrate a strong willingness for local-level cooperation. While there's an assumption that ethnic ties extend to project-level cooperation, this has not been explicitly tested. Despite evidence of joint cultural events and activities promoting cross-border cooperation, the exact extent to which national minorities contributed to INTERREG projects between 2007 and 2020 remains a question.

Case-study of the INTERREG cross-border projects between 2007-2020

The case-study focusing on the Romanian-Hungarian INTERREG projects between 2007 and 2020, specifically exploring the role of national minorities in cross-border cooperation, holds significant potential for improving the current methodology of measuring the impact of cross-border projects and consequently enhancing sustainability through its ability to propose new aspects that could be taken into consideration. Albeit admittedly, a case-study is not enough to generalise a new model, it can be enough to inspire further research in the topic. Arguably, the Romanian-Hungarian border section is a suitable choice for the case-study for several reasons. Firstly, it has a significant population identifying as national minorities on both sides of the border (Waterbury 2017). Secondly, the cross-border cooperation at this borderland has already some history, but it is not as developed as in western states where the role of minorities might be more difficult to unravel (Toca 2012).

The Romanian-Hungarian border cooperation, initiated in 1996 and continuing uninterrupted, initially marked a significant shift from historical tension to cooperation between the two nations. However, there are differing opinions on whether it truly fostered closer ties and historical reconciliation (Salat 2009, 347). The EU-funded Phare CBC Fund, with a budget of 62 million EUR from 1996 to 2003, aimed to consolidate links between cross-border communities (Csoka 2018, 98) but predominantly focused on infrastructure development and environmental protection, neglecting projects directly benefiting national minorities or economic development. Subsequently, the 2007-2013 program, following Romania's EU accession, prioritized convergence, regional competitiveness, and European territorial cooperation (Feier and

Bădulescu 2016), allocating 275,179,861 EUR for joint sustainable development and social and economic cohesion. The 2014-2020 period continued to support border area cooperation, with a total budget of 202,134,399 EUR, supplemented by national co-financing. It included six priority axes focusing on social inclusion, environmental protection, employment, infrastructure, climate adaptation, and public administration. Throughout these phases, the goal was to reduce segregation effects and leverage the border region's territorial potential.

One of the ways to assess the role of national minorities in the INTERREG project is to look at the territorial distribution of the project partners (which often correlates with the location where the given project is implemented) and check for any correlation with ethnic ratios or the existence of twin cities. It is often observed that a higher number of project partners signifies a more active and dynamic engagement in cross-border activities. In the context of the Romanian-Hungarian border region, this principle appears to hold true to some degree.

Firstly, as seen in the data, the municipalities situated directly along or very close to the border tend to have a higher chance to have a project partner. This is especially the case on the northern part of the Romanian side as more than 40% of the municipalities with at least one project partner are located between Satu Mare and Oradea regardless of the fact that geographically this area only constitutes less than one third of the whole border section. At the same time, this is the territory where the Hungarian minority population is more significant. This pattern can be linked to the assumption that national minorities often act as catalysts for cross-border initiatives. As pointed out above based on the literature review, their unique position, straddling the border and possessing intercultural knowledge, allows them to identify shared challenges and opportunities that transcend national boundaries. Consequently, it seems that the regions with a more substantial minority presence are more likely to actively engage in cross-border projects, leading to a greater number of project partners. However, this pattern should be cautiously interpreted because from the data it is unknown whether a given involved partner organisation belongs to the ethnic Hungarian, Romanian or mixed community.

Figure 1 shows, it is evident that the aggregated number of project partners in larger cities, particularly the county seats, is notably higher. This can be explained by several factors. Larger cities tend to have a more extensive and diverse population, which naturally results in a more vibrant cultural, economic, and institutional life. Additionally, urban centers often serve as hubs for various sectors, including education, commerce, and governance. These cities not only attract a wide range of organizations, including local governments, educational institutions, businesses, and civil society groups, to participate in cross-border projects but also serve as centers for national minorities. For instance, cities like Oradea have their own universities teaching in native languages, providing educational opportunities and cultural enrichment for the Hungarian minority population. It seems that the higher population density and economic activity in urban areas create a fertile ground for collaboration, leading to an increased number of project partners.

Secondly, it is worth briefly analysing the correlation between the location of project partners and the network of twin cities that have sprung up along this border, serving as symbolic bridges between two nations and their respective minority populations because these twinning arrangements are often built on shared traditions, cultural exchanges, and economic partnerships. On the map below the twin city network was placed beside the map of the project partners to see whether there is a shared pattern. On the Hungarian side, 59% of the twin cities from the analysed region had at least one project partner in one of the INTERREG projects between 2007 and 2020. On the Romanian side this ratio is a bit lower, 54%, which might indicate that where there is a larger minority group the dependency on formalised relations – such as the twin cities – might be somewhat lower as the actors could also capitalise on their more extensive informal networks. It is also worth mentioning that 47% of the twin relations with at least one project partner were formed between a Hungarian city and a Romanian city where the ratio of the Hungarian minority is at least one third of the whole population.



Figure 1: The territorial distribution of the project partners and the twin cities in the analysed period and area
Source: Own compilation, edited by Viktória Jánosi, CESCI

Further aspects that can be telling are the size of the projects in terms of their budget and the involvement of the nationalities as partners (see Map 2). To analyse this, a more zoomed-in approach was taken in order to avoid the skewing of the data. Thus, the most relevant theme of the two analysed programme period was taken – namely, the "Community integration and common identity" – to see whether there was any link between the size of the projects' aggregated budget and the ratio of the national minorities.
Figure 2 illustrates that in both countries, the municipalities succeeding to apply for the highest ERDF contribution were not necessarily the municipalities with the highest ethnic minority population. Nyíregyháza, Debrecen and Szentes on the Hungarian side won 4 922 604 EUR, while their Romanian population was 0,25%, 0,35% and 0,14% respectively compared to other municipalities in the analysed territory with much higher ratios such as Méhkerék (78,21%), Bedő (48,75%) or Kétegyháza (27,57%). At the same time, it has to be noted that there were 7 project partners involved altogether from these municipalities too. On the Romanian side the municipalities with the biggest aggregated ERDF funding (5 960 953 EUR) were Satu Mare, Oradea and Dumbrăviţa, which had 34,6%, 23,7% and 14,3% Hungarian population respectively. Similarly, to the Hungarian side, here also the municipalities with the highest ratio of Hungarian minorities from the project partner database, such as Cherechiu (94,04%), Sălacea (92,79%) and Buduslău (92,08%) did not apply for the highest budget, but still had 6 project partners which is somewhat remarkable if their total population of 7 359 people is also considered.



Figure 2: Minority ratio in the programme area combined with the size of the project budget in Community integration and common identity Theme
Source: Own compilation, edited by Viktória Jánosi, CESCI

While the map clearly illustrates the spatial distribution of ethnic minorities and the aggregated allocation of resources in community integration and common identity, there is no clear correlation between the two. The divergence between ethnic ratios and project budgets raises essential questions for both the programme and the national organisations responsible for this priority. It prompts inquiries into the effectiveness of resource allocation mechanisms and the extent to which community development initiatives are attuned to the specific needs and aspirations of ethnic minority populations.

Regarding the topics under the above-mentioned priority area, the project description of all the 564 Hungary-Romania INTERREG projects realised between 2007-2020 were analysed to identify those which explicitly mention or assign any role to the national minorities. All in all, 10 such projects were found which delved deeply into matters concerning national minorities, accounting for a budget of 10,3 million EUR, which constitutes only 2,1% of the aggregated budget of the projects implemented. Based on their content, these projects can be categorised into two main areas: identity-related projects and educational initiatives. Identity-focused projects primarily aimed to bolster the cultural identity of Hungarians in Romania and Romanians in Hungary achieving this through various means, such as conferences, traditional events, theatre performances, and art and crafts camps. Some projects concentrated on promoting cultural traditions and resources through workshops on ceramics, pottery, and wooden crafts.

Education-focused projects often involved multiple educational institutions in collaborative efforts to organise teacher exchanges, seminars, and conferences. These initiatives aimed to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and the development of specialised educational programs. For instance, one project, "LearnByArt," fostered knowledge transfer and implemented specialised educational programs across partner institutions. Culture played a pivotal role in

these projects, serving as a bridge to connect people from both sides of the border, aligning with the idea that culture can strengthen cross-border cooperation while avoiding conflict-sensitive topics.
From the analysis of these closely examined projects, it becomes evident that these initiatives have mentioned a total of 15 different settlements where project activities were planned. Interestingly, the majority of these projects converge within the middle part of the border region, spanning between Debrecen and Oradea, and their respective hinterlands. This concentration is noteworthy as it occurs despite the fact that these are not the cities with the most striking ethnic ratios (in Debrecen the Romanian population is only 0.35% and in Oradea the Hungarian population accounts for 23%). However, in Oradea's case the significance of this concentration can be attributed to the cultural center that the city represents for the Hungarian minority in Romania. Moreover, the comparable sizes and complementary functions of these two settlements and their hinterlands likely also contribute to the extensive cooperation observed in this region, underscoring the multifaceted dynamics shaping cross-border collaboration.

Conclusion

This article has delved into the intricate world of cross-border cooperation, emphasizing the significance of sustainability in promoting harmonious relations, economic growth, and social progress among neighbouring regions. The exploration of INTERREG cross-border projects realised between 2007-2020 along the Romanian-Hungarian border region using theoretical and practical tools of territorial analysis has expanded our understanding on the potential link between the national minorities and their participation in these projects.
The findings of this study suggest that national minorities, particularly the Hungarian minority in Romania probably due to their larger ratio, play a multifaceted role in cross-border cooperation. Their unique position stemming from possessing intercultural knowledge and social capital, allows them to identify common challenges and opportunities that transcend national boundaries. Their involvement can lead to increased project engagement and foster social connectivity, thus enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of cross-border initiatives.
The analysis of cross-border projects along the Romanian-Hungarian border region revealed a nuanced relationship between national minorities and project engagement. While there is a notable correlation between the presence of national minorities and a higher number of project partners, suggesting their role as catalysts for cross-border initiatives, the size of project budgets does not consistently align with the proportion of minority populations. This indicates that project engagement is influenced by various factors beyond just ethnic demographics. Moreover, only a limited number of projects explicitly mention or assign roles to national minorities, and when they do, they primarily focusing on identity-related and educational initiatives.
Further research should develop territorial assessment methods to measure the different aspects of national minorities, while future policy considerations should explore ways to harness the potential of national minorities in cross-border collaboration when designing, implementing, and evaluating such projects. Whereas some of the findings of this study is not yet conclusive, they set several directions that open the door to further research with different tools and perspectives to better dissect the topic.
In conclusion, in harnessing the bridge-building capabilities of national minorities, one of the cornerstones could be unveiled to secure the sustained success of cross-border projects. The very existence of these communities could become a guarantee to nurture and develop the results of the different cross-border project.

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Aspects of social innovation promoting sustainability in the mobility sector

Abstract: The current economic environment is being significantly shaped by long-standing and emerging crises, which pose new challenges for the mobility sector that require a new approach and a new way of thinking. This report provides an insight into the role that social innovation can play in promoting the sustainability of mobility through the activities of an existing social initiative based organisation, Community Creates Mobility. The methodologies used in this paper are literature review and content analysis.

Keywords: social innovation, mobility, sustainability
JEL-codes: O35, J60

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Introduction

The current economic environment is significantly shaped by longstanding and emerging crises: the refugee crisis of 2015, the pandemic of 2019, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, the emerging Israel-Gaza conflict and the economic crisis that is linked to and a consequence of these events, and the climate crisis that is now unfolding. These events, together with decades of neo-liberal exploitation of resources (Lakes & Carter, 2011), pose new challenges to the mobility sector by causing downward social mobility, job insecurity, and an unequal society (Dello Buono & Bell Lara, 2007), threatening social rights for vulnerable populations (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012), and increasing vulnerability to climate-induced changes (Fieldman, 2011). As a result, a new approach and a new way of thinking is required. Innovation plays an important role in maintaining the competitiveness of companies, improving their profitability and can also help them to evolve in the right direction. This study aims to demonstrate the potential role of social innovation, a new and less explored form of innovation, in promoting sustainable mobility by presenting the activities of an existing social initiative-based organisation, Community Creates Mobility, which is successfully operating in Austria.
In 2018, EU Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science Carlos Moedas said: "*In the European Union, we will spend more money on social innovation, not because it's trendy - but because we believe that the future of innovation is social innovation.*" (Roberts, 2018) His words indicate an important paradigm shift: social innovation is no longer just a new, interesting concept, but part of the mainstream of innovation. One of the most striking phenomena of our society is the constant effort to create, adopt and spread innovation.

Theoretical background

When addressing challenges in the mobility sector, many key themes arise through various research efforts. The energy sector, as illustrated by Heindl et al.(Heindl et al., 2010), faces challenges concerning the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions and enhancing energy efficiency, as well as integrating new models for energy production and distribution, especially within the electric ecosystem facilitated by advancements in smart grid and battery technologies. Similarly, Robinson's analysis of the Canadian context (Robinson, 1997) emphasises the importance of transitioning the paradigm shift from mobility to access, with Transportation

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Demand Management (TDM) as a key strategy for reversing negative energy and environmental trends.

Society's transformation through digitalisation, globalisation, urbanisation, and sustainability mandates is reshaping mobility patterns, requiring a comprehensive approach to mobility research. This approach encompasses electric mobility, "Mobility on Demand," autonomous driving, and "Last Mile Logistic" solutions as highlighted by Hütter and Schug (Steffen Hütter & Dominik Schug, 2022). The automotive industry is currently moving towards a service-oriented, decarbonised model relying on digitalisation. This requires the integration of the energy, transportation, and information sectors to develop data-driven, digitalised mobility systems, an idea investigated by Tuncer et al. (Tuncer et al., 2022).

The narrative framework used by Kallenbach (Kallenbach, 2020) to analyse mobility culture shows the contrast between established car-centred urban narratives and emerging transformative discourses, implying a potential transformation in mobility culture. Moreover, Tun et al. (Tun et al., 2021) emphasize the significance of private investments in advancing sustainable mobility solutions. They identify the intricacies of impact investing in new mobility enterprises, which entail challenges such as impact dilution, regulatory obstacles, and entrenched interests.

Finally, Burkert and colleagues (Burkert et al., 2021) highlight the diverse obstacles to establishing electric mobility, such as technological progress, social approval, and infrastructural advancements. Their research centres around German involvement and the transformation in public attitudes towards electric vehicles over the years 2011 to 2020. These studies collectively demonstrate the complex interplay of technological, societal, and economic factors that need to be negotiated for sustainable mobility to be achieved. Sustainable urban mobility is multidimensional and encompasses a range of interconnected social issues, such as Sustainable Development Goals. Its adoption is influenced by a variety of acceptance models and information systems. (Rey-Moreno et al., 2022).

According to the definition of the United Nations Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) "Our Common World" (our common future), the concept of sustainable development is a development process that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". (Gyulai, 2015) In accordance with this definition, the concept of sustainable development emphasises the responsibility towards future generations by recognising the right of future generations to have their needs met. This requires that currently available resources do not exceed the needs of the current population. Unfortunately, humanity has already exceeded the carrying capacity of the Earth and is using additional resources to the detriment of future generations. According to Rees and Wackernagel's Ecological Footprint concept (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996), humanity is currently using one and a half times the Earth's ecological capacity (Albert et al., 2021). Ecological limits can be referred to as the carrying capacity of the Earth. The above definition and the report do not precisely define the objective ecological limit of the current generation, which is the carrying capacity of the Earth. Nobel laureate Herman E. Daly, the "father" of ecological economics, tried to fill this gap with his own definition: "Sustainable development is the achievement of continued social well-being without growing beyond the ecological carrying capacity". (Daly, 1991) It is important to clarify that the concept of sustainability means development and not growth. To interpret the concept as sustainable growth is a misunderstanding, as it very often means over-consumption of resources and depletion of future stocks. "Development means an improvement in quality, while growth means an expansion in quantity." (Daly, 1996)

On the other hand, according to neoclassical economic theory, increasing income and production is the only solution for people, regardless of their financial status, to satisfy their needs. At this point it is also necessary to clarify the difference between the concepts of demand and need. According to Kevin Lane Keller and Philip Kotler (Kotler & Keller, 2008), needs are basic human needs, the satisfaction of which - depending on the hierarchical level of Maslow's

pyramid (Maslow & Frager, 1987) - is necessary for survival or even self-actualisation. When these needs are directed towards specific objects that are expected to satisfy the need, they become demands. Our demands are always shaped by the society we live in. With current technological knowledge and lifestyles, humanity is exceeding the carrying capacity of the Earth. This can be deduced from the state of the environment, the ecosystem and its feedbacks. For our planet to be sustainable and meet the needs of future generations, either fewer people and/or greater efficiency or more advanced technology must be available - but our impact must be reduced, even by reducing consumption.

Now that we know what needs to be done, the question is how to do it. Finding possible ways forward is where social innovation could play an important role. While business innovation is one of the most important determinants of human well-being, there are other innovations that have a significant impact on social performance. In universities and other educational centres, for example, there are many innovations in teaching and learning that we consider to be in the public interest. This suggests that in order to fully explain the improvement of human living conditions, a new class of innovations, which cannot be identified with business innovations, needs to be introduced: the concept of social innovations. The concept of social innovation is now an integral and indispensable part of scientific research, journal articles, political and/or economic programmes and conferences. We would think that it is a new term, but the phenomenon was already the subject of research in the middle of the last century, as Cunha and his co-authors (Cunha et al., 2015) also mention in the background information chapter of their study. *Social innovation as a means to improve the quality of life* first appeared in the work of William Fielding Ogburn in 1922 (Ogburn, 1922). Improving quality is the aspect that qualifies social innovation as a possible solution for improving sustainability, as defined by Daly (Daly, 1996) above, noting that sustainability is development rather than growth, while development means improving quality.

For a better understanding of the concept, it is worth positioning social innovations and defining their role and place in innovation theory and methodology. In his study György Kocziszky (Kocziszky, 2021) examines the evolution and development of the concept of innovation in the light of different economic models (exogenous-endogenous-evolutionary), which he also illustrates in a table. In the course of his investigation, he concludes that although innovation itself is subject to all economic methodologies, innovations that are intended to provide answers or solutions to social problems fall outside the scope of the methodologies. The author also outlines the opportunities and dilemmas of social innovation. One of these main dilemmas is the focus of economic policy and literature on linear innovation processes, which, according to Kocziszky, played a major role in preventing the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy adopted by the European Union in 2000 (European Union, 2000) in addition to the global financial crisis of 2008. This strategy aimed to make the European Union the most competitive region in the world by 2010, and set five objectives, including social inclusion and the achievement of full employment. The Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010), which was further developed in 2010, set more specific targets, such as increasing the employment rate for the population aged 20-64 to 75% and reducing the proportion of the population living below the poverty line to below 25% - all of which are unthinkable without social innovation. In addition, the diffusion and acceptance of social innovation is hampered by the fact that social endeavours often do not appear to be innovations of great importance compared to the great inventions and discoveries expected in the technocratic approach. Social problems that require social innovation are often complex and cumulative. Kocziszky illustrates the possible cumulative interaction between different social problems and the complexity - resulting from the fact that social problems are primarily value problems - with the following diagram:



1. figure: Typical social problems, source: own editing based on (Kocziszky, 2021, p.51), translated from Hungarian to English

All social problems are typical in their own way, but precisely because of this, and because of their interdependence and complexity, individual, complex, personalised solutions are needed in every case. The state plays a prominent role in promoting social innovation processes and ensuring their sustainability. Current studies suggest that social problems associated with mobility involve challenges for people with impairments (Sammer et al., 2012), negative effects of low financial assets and poor social relations (Nilsson et al., 2010), and potential impacts on mental health (Abramson & Books, 1971) and social participation. (Wald et al., 2019)

Problems, conflicts

According to the Ecological Footprint, humankind consumes the resources of one and a half planets, which indicates that we are depleting the environment's resources at a much faster rate than they are being replenished. Consequently, only economic growth that is concomitant with a reduction in environmental impact can be deemed appropriate. Sustainable development is unfeasible within the present macroeconomic model, which relies on material consumption growth, exhausts natural resources, generates problems that require solutions, and necessitates both constant population expansion and the stimulation of consumer desires. Discovering the accurate measure is the moral prerequisite, and comprehending how to gain access to our resources sustainably is the technical requirement. The Commission proposed incorporating sustainability's three pillars (economic, environmental, and social) as follows: "Uneven development, poverty and population growth are causing serious problems of survival, putting unprecedented pressure on the planet's arable land, forests, water and other natural resources. A new era of economic growth is needed today. For growth that is both strong and socially and environmentally sustainable." (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1988) The logic of the idea is that if the economy grows, there will be money to eradicate poverty, more people will find work. If the economy grows, there will be money to solve environmental problems. If the poor get an income, they will be good consumers and the economy will grow even more. In order to try to eliminate the environmental burdens of growing economies and consumption, they felt it was necessary to change the quality of growth. "Sustainable development is more than just growth. The content of growth must be changed, it must become less material and energy intensive so that its impact is more equitable," the report said. Consequently, the Commission relies on a type of economic growth that doesn't result in environmental degradation and is just socially. Based on current technical knowledge, our planet cannot sustain seven billion people over the long run." It is understood that the planet's

resilience has been surpassed due to the excessive stress-induced structural alterations. Consequently, these alterations have caused the extinction of numerous species, disrupting the Earth's biosphere and reducing the regeneration capability of soil, water, and other biological resources. Additionally, the biogeochemical cycle has also been affected, resulting in perturbations in the carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus cycles. This change in the structure of the Earth's biosphere also means the extinction of thousands of species. The relation between carrying capacity and sustainability is evident - surpassing the said capacity leads to structural and operational changes, thereby diminishing the system's carrying capacity. If we are to ensure conservation for future generations, our impact must be reduced. This can only be achieved through a reduction in population numbers and/or overall consumption, and/or a significant increase in technical efficiency. That is where innovation, particularly in the realm of social innovation, can be of great importance and act as a game changer.

Social innovation impact on sustainability in the mobility sector

In their study (Butler et al., 2020), the authors identified and categorised six main smart mobility innovations that are most frequently discussed in the literature: (a) intelligent transport systems; (b) alternative fuel systems; (c) driving automation systems; (d) shared mobility services; (e) demand-responsive transport; and (f) integrated mobility systems. In the context of smart urban mobility, these innovations are intended as a comprehensive response to the disadvantages of private car use. They aren't solely technologically advanced, but are holistic in their approach, aiming to improve transport system performance and reduce negative impacts such as congestion and environmental degradation. The importance of a sustainability-focused assessment of these technological advancements cannot be overstated, given their potential impact on transport safety, energy usage and accessibility. Moreover, a comprehensive analysis was conducted regarding their sustainability, specifically with regards to their proposed impacts on transport safety, road congestion, energy consumption, the environment and accessibility, as shown in the figure below.



2. Figure: Policy recommendations relevant to the implementation of smart urban mobility innovations. source: (Butler et al., 2020)

To complement technological innovation, there is a growing recognition of the importance of understanding individual travel behaviour and attitudes. As technical progress and efficiency improvements may not be enough in the face of increasing traffic volumes, behavioural changes towards a more sustainable travel future are gaining in importance. A British study (Prillwitz & Barr, 2011) funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) focuses on the development of 'mobility styles' as a context for the application of targeted social marketing policies. The concept intends to promote sustainable mobility by segmenting populations according to their travel behaviours and attitudes. Employing segmentation approaches, the research identifies gaps between different areas of individual travel behaviour and the varying role of attitudes in travel decisions, highlighting the need for complex and comprehensive frameworks that can drive behaviour change towards sustainable mobility.
The authors introduce the concept of eco-innovation to identify and characterise the evolution of sustainable mobility solutions in their study of business models and the diffusion of eco-innovations in the eco-mobility sector. (Nicolai & Faucheux, 2015) As a result, eco-mobility appears to be a disruptive innovation that requires a significant shift in business models and the global value chain, particularly in the automotive sector. The objective is to not only reduce negative externalities, but also to create new markets and employment opportunities within the mobility ecosystem. The social and institutional dimensions of innovation uptake play a key role in the acceptance and characterisation of eco-mobility. This involves a significant change in the perception of eco-innovation, where the business model for e-mobility needs to be reinvented and the impact on the global value chain of the mobility sector needs to be thoroughly analysed.
According to Whittle and colleagues (Whittle et al., 2019), attention to user needs, preferences, experiences and identities is crucial for an effective transition to innovative mobility solutions such as electric and autonomous vehicles and shared mobility. Their research advocates that although technological advancement can complement the existing transportation system, a more comprehensive effort is needed to address sustainability concerns that account for social and psychological aspects of mobility. Mobility substitution, such as teleworking to reduce travel, presents a significant opportunity for environmental sustainability, despite challenging both established policies and social norms.
Social initiatives also impact the financial dimensions of innovations since all solutions require funding. Vital in aligning global financial interests with local needs are financial innovations such as TimeBanking (*What Is TimeBanking?*, n.d.) and community currencies. Merritt and Stubbs' analysis (Merritt & Stubbs, 2012) suggests that these innovations facilitate community-driven sustainability financing, promoting environmental and social benefits to the local community and fostering partnerships between public administrations, markets and society. Grassroots financing mechanisms enhance social dimensions of resource mobilisation in a green economy, enabling local governments and civil society to participate in the decision-making process related to sustainability financing.

Social innovation in practice by introducing Community Creates Mobility

One possible solution for promoting sustainability of mobility is the Austrian initiative "Community creates Mobility". The various current health and climate crises - which pose new challenges to society - are cited as the root cause of realising this initiative. It aims to meet the ever-increasing demand for smart mobility services and solutions by building consensus on the issue, inspiring joint projects and creating a shared vision of future mobility - illustrated by its own vision: "Mobility as a public good - A holistic vision of the desirable future of mobility common understanding." (communitycreatesmobility, 2019, p.5) Since 2019, Austria's pioneers in the field of mobility have come together in this common movement with the aim of repositioning the impulses of the mobility concept. The central element is the so-called Mobility Manifesto (communitycreatesmobility, 2019), which was developed and continuously adapted

by the community in a collaborative approach. The objectives defined in the Manifesto are as follows:

"We want to develop the mobility of our future in a holistic and socially responsible way. (...) We want to create a common understanding of the future of mobility in Austria (and beyond). We want to create the basis for organisations, start-ups, existing companies as well as civil society groups and citizens to work together to make mobility as a public good as accessible as possible for everyone. This means that mobility is understood holistically and includes different forms of mobility, such as walking or data mobility. Our aim is to create a social movement with enough momentum to stimulate public debate and shed light on open issues. From a climate protection perspective, it is particularly important to us that the costs are borne by the emitter (in terms of mobility) - so that they cannot be passed on to the population (the polluter pays principle). Another key issue for us is to rethink mobility as a purely competitive scenario in the direction of a mobility ideology, in the sense of a "mobility community". We see this as a mobility ecosystem (community creates mobility) moderated by public organisations." (communitycreatesmobility, 2019. p.4)

Starting from the basic principle that mobility is a public good, the organisation defined the following 5 main areas to work on:

1. Physical space and infrastructure: with the aim of starting a constructive discussion about "where" mobility should take place, what kind of (public) space should be provided for different forms of mobility. In addition, it will be necessary to investigate what infrastructure is available, to evaluate it and to define the needs (hardware, software), e.g. optical networks, charging stations, roads, railways. The availability of resources and the reliability of functionality must be treated with the utmost importance.
2. Focus on needs: The needs of the population must be at the centre of the further development of mobility concepts. Any innovation should primarily focus on social/human needs, as mobility is part of life (interacting with infrastructure and public transport). Therefore, mobility should be pleasant, safe, fast, affordable, environmentally friendly, etc. and not primarily focused on efficiency and (short-term) cost savings.
3. Cost and necessity of mobility: Taking into account local and economic (not just business) costs is essential to ensure greater cost credibility in line with the polluter pays principle. Mobility investments must be based on social values (e.g. fairness and environmental sustainability). Mobility systems also cause indirect costs, especially in the health system, but also through emissions, changing property values, staining facades, etc.
4. Sustainability and protecting the future: They see sustainability as more than just protecting the environment, and they want new mobility concepts to have a positive impact on their future and that of future generations. That's why sustainability is seen as essential. It is important not only to think in terms of technical solutions, but also to think holistically, i.e. to support natural forms of mobility as often as possible (walking) and to support the attractive factors of active mobility (infrastructure). Transparency and the associated "polluter pays" principle are also key elements.
5. Mobility ecosystem:
    a. A vibrant mobility ecosystem as the foundation - This requires large (government) organisations that enable and support, but act in a less dominant way and challenge dominant assumptions. Such public organisations can put social needs before economic interests and promote mobility for all. Public transport is at the heart of a sustainable mobility system. It is a public good, like libraries or museums, that should contribute to the well-being of society as a whole and counteract overuse.

b. Shared mobility platform(s) - it needs to be clarified what these look like (virtual?), who has what role and how international platform economies should be managed. Emphasis should be placed on full accessibility and participation, democratisation of data, public spaces and equity, and social inclusion (diversity, gender neutrality, etc.).

The organisation develops the topics and goals defined above together with the participants on a completely voluntary basis at various events, online and in person. I also had the opportunity to attend an event where companies such as Austrian Post presented their current project to develop sustainable reusable packaging. For this project, they are working on a solution through international collaboration, not only with higher education institutions, but also with foreign manufacturing companies, studying foreign experiences that are already working well. By sharing their ideas, methods and dilemmas at the platform's event, they make their ideas, methods and dilemmas accessible and, in addition to networking, they give themselves the chance to involve actors - in a traditionally internal company project - who can make a positive contribution to the success of their project.

Conclusion

As a result this comprehensive study of social innovation in the field of sustainable mobility presents several key findings. Primary among these is the acknowledgement of the equal importance and interdependence between social, economic, and scientific innovations. It dispels the notion of hierarchical dominance, instead illuminating a synergistic interplay where economic and scientific advancements may unintentionally create social challenges. Social innovation serves as a responsive force to rectify these challenges. Central to this discourse is the understanding that societal existence is based on economic and social rejuvenation, both fuelled by innovative endeavours. This involves developing new products and services, improving skills, and creating both tangible and intangible assets. Social innovation goes beyond its conventional boundaries in this context, emerging as a critical means of addressing the complex social dilemmas arising from economic and scientific progress.

The study emphasises the need for an inclusive approach to social innovation that seamlessly integrates it with broader societal progress. This approach facilitates a more comprehensive and sustainable trajectory for innovation, ensuring that as we progress economically and scientifically, the social fabric that underpins our collective existence is not only preserved, but strengthened. Additionally, the research emphasises the need to make social innovation available to everyone. It calls for a transition in public value systems towards a greater appreciation and support of social innovation and related social enterprises. The state and institutional systems play a crucial role in creating a favourable climate for social innovation, particularly through adequate economic and educational policies and the reallocation of resources to encourage community-driven funding.

The example of 'Community Creates Mobility' in Austria highlights the capability of individual and communal actions to promote sustainable futures. It shows the role of social movements and community-driven initiatives in advocating and realising sustainable living, thus ensuring the well-being of future generations.

In conclusion, the overarching challenge and imperative lie in cultivating a universal understanding and appreciation of sustainability as a shared interest and necessity. This necessitates a synergistic effort involving private individuals, economic entities, and political actors.

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***Adrienn Takácsné Papp*[15]**

The role of the municipalities in achieving the EU's sustainable energy transition

Greenhouse gas emissions are clearly responsible for the intensification of climate change, the largest share of which can be attributed to energy production and use. The European Union aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. This energy transition by 2050 is called the energy transition. One of the European Union's best-known energy and climate organisations is the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (CoM). This publication evaluates the role of municipalities in the energy transition with the help of the analysis of the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAP) document prepared by the Hungarian municipalities joining the alliance, especially from 16 submitted cities point of view. When planning the area-by-area reductions formulated in their mitigation action plans, they realistically perceive the extent of their direct intervention opportunities, they expect a greater proportion of the planned measures from local actors, so they can help achieve the goals by their exemplary operation, organizing awareness-raising events and finding sources of funding. Through their indirect role in local energy management, municipalities are important actors in achieving the EU's energy transition.

Keywords: sustainability, SECAP, Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy
JEL-Code: P18, O39, Q29, Q40

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Introduction

The European Union and its Member States are world leaders in promoting sustainable development and energy transition. In curbing global climate change and making social and economic development sustainable, special attention should be paid to the scale of energy consumption, energy mix and related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The European Union is making significant efforts to reduce energy use and carbon dioxide emissions compared to the rest of the world [16]. Adaptation of the Sustainable Development Goal 7 (ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all) and the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement (the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels) is crucial to reach a liveable, cleaner, and affordable future. (Bertoldi ed. 2018a, IRENA 2017).
Without local participants, without knowing local characteristics and needs this tremendous task cannot be a success (Fuhr et al. 2018, Mészáros 2007). That is why among the five dimensions of the Energy Union, finalised in 2019, there is already a priority attributed to local actors: energy efficiency measures to reduce demand. (COM/2015/80) The 2021 review of the European Green Deal made more significant commitments than ever to achieve energy efficiency, use of renewable energies and a sustainable welfare society (COM/2019/640). The European Union highlights that access to clean, affordable, and secure energy must be fair and inclusive, funded by the European Union's Just Transition Fund (EU/2021/1056). The Member

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[16] The share of world final energy consumption in 2020: Asia without China (25.8%), China (23.1%), USA (15.3%), EU (10.1%) – (European Commission 2023, 14)
The share of world carbon dioxide emission in 2020: China (33%), Asia without China (27%), USA (14%), EU (8%) – (European Commission 2023, 18)

States of the European Union are legally obliged under the Fit for 55% package to reduce the EU's net greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and to reach climate neutrality by 2050. (European Council 2023).
EU policies, including sustainability efforts, are supported by several organisations and initiatives, such as the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (CoM), which, for the first time, helps municipalities by showcasing and disseminating good practices, providing free advice and methodologies by reaching out to cities. (Bertoldi et al. 2018c., Martire et al. 2018, Reckien et al. 2019, Salvia et al. 2021). A list of members joining the Covenant of Mayors is maintained on the association's website.[17]. Following the 2014 application cycle, the desire to join Hungary grew at an increasing pace. As of 1 January 2023, 34.21% of Hungarian settlements have joined the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (CoM), representing 34.25% of the country's territory, 50.19% of its residential population and 51.71% of the housing stock, meaning that in the future the benefits of accession will be felt in a significant part of Hungary. In terms of the legal status of settlements, 96% of cities with county rights, 56.52% of metropolitan districts, 34.78% of cities, 33.51% of villages, 32.28% of large villages, i.e. 34.2% of Hungarian settlements are signatories of the CoM (Takácsné Papp 2023).
The Literature review summarises the current literature sources examining the relationship between local levels and sustainability and, therefore, how municipalities can take part in the fight against climate change and its negative effects. Results present the most considerable difficulties caused by climate change through the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAP) of the 16 selected cities joining independently and the official data release of the CoM (Baldi et al. 2023), as well as the planned steps in the fight against climate change and their typical sources of funding. The 16 cities are Ajka, Balatonfüred, Budaörs, Kisvárda, Mátészalka, Pápa, Sajószentpéter, Sárvár, Szarvas, Szentes, Szigetszentmiklós, Tapolca, Tiszalök, Tiszaújváros, Várpalota and Vásárosnamény. In the Discussion, Hungarian examples are put in the context of international experiences. The Summary chapter summarises the main results and future research directions.

Literature review

For the first time, implementing climate and energy policy objectives supporting sustainable development goals was defined as a responsibility of the state-level institutions. (WEC, UNFCC) In the European Union, from 2018, the new renewable directive (2018/2001/EU) highlighted the increasing role of the stakeholders at subnational levels. Cities are responsible for the largest energy consumption and three-quarters of global carbon dioxide emissions, which is why they were the first participants of the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (Kona et al. 2018, Salvia et al. 2021, Hritonenko and Yatsenko 2022). The objectives of Sustainability Development Goal 7 and the Paris Climate Agreement will not be achievable without effective intervention by cities, as is typical. *"Cities, accounting for more than 3/4 of global final energy consumption, are equipping themselves with governance tools to improve energy efficiency."* (Nastasi and Di Matteo 2016, 1064) Therefore*, "the most effective level of intervention and action is clearly the local level"* (Ács et al. 2019, 278), the main organizing principle of which is self-government. More and more municipalities respond to the slogan think globally, act locally, i.e. glocalization, and thanks to this, several sustainable measures are implemented, which are the basic conditions not only for local, sustainable prosperity but also for the achievement of European Union's 2030 and 2050 objectives, thus addressing global problems. The main advantage of local value creation is that *"municipalities are well aware of their environment, settlement, what climatic challenges they face, how frequent and what type of climate events they experience, and what is the extent of the damage caused by extreme weather"* (Ács et al. 2019, 278, Cinocca et al. 2018) In addition, local authorities have the capacity to address their

[17] Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy: https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/home

stakeholders at local level in addition to successfully identifying problems. (Ács et al., 2019) The two tools used to combat climate change are mitigation and adaptation. In urban terms, mitigation targets mean the reduction of GHG emissions related to buildings, industrial activity, infrastructure use and transport, and adaptation increases the resilience of cities to climate change. (Hritonenko and Yatsenko 2022, Bertoldi ed. 2018b) In this process, the role of municipalities not only as a coordinator but also as an integrator, i.e*.," Municipalities can significantly contribute to increasing resilience to climate change, not only by coordinating but also by integrating."*. (Ács et al. 2019, 278.)
Niemets et al. (2021), more developed world cities can become sustainable more efficiently than their less developed counterparts thanks to increased financial resources. Networks formed by cities acting in favour of climate protection not only provide methodological assistance to municipalities but also enable the formalization, monitoring, and evaluation of these commitments, forming a common platform, such as the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (Croci et al. 2017). In their article, Dolge and Blumberga (2021) emphasize the role of the transport, industrial, service, agricultural and household sectors in achieving climate goals. According to the results of Croci et al. (2017), the largest emitting sectors are buildings and transport, including public transport, municipal fleet, municipal buildings, and street lighting. Therefore, municipalities expect the greatest results from those areas whose operation they have a direct influence. Geels (2011), referring to the publication of Smith et al. in 2005, draws attention to the fact that *"the sustainability transition, of which energy issues are a key pillar, is goal-oriented, sustainability transitions are goal-oriented or 'purposive' in the sense of addressing persistent environmental problems, whereas many historical transitions were 'emergent' (e.g., entrepreneurs exploring commercial opportunities related to new technologies)"*. (Geels 2011, 25.)

Methods

Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy is one of the well-known climate organisations that help settlements fight against climate change and join the European Union's climate goals. The leaders of these processes are the municipalities. (CoM). The CoM had 343 signatories on its official website, but the real number of its members was only 134 in 1. January 2023. The 343 signatories include 19 joined and 324 individual signatories. Joined signatory means that a settlement joins CoM; for example, as a member of LEADER[18] Action Group, individual signatory means that a settlement joins CoM alone. However, the 324 individual members include 212 settlements registered as individuals even though they are members of a joint group, so the real number of individual members is only 89. Five of the 19 joint members were so-called collector groups. A specific feature of a collector group is that it includes several otherwise independent (e.g., Budapest and its districts) or joint signatories (e.g., the counties of Bács-Kiskun, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Veszprém and their LEADER Action Groups). The five collector groups included 19 joint members. In total, 19-5+19, 33 real joint members can be counted on the official list of the CoM. In addition, a further 12 signatories (3 individuals, 9 joint members) became known due to a free-word search on the internet. Although they are not officially or not yet members of CoM at the time of data collection, these municipalities or groups have a SECAP document prepared according to the CoM methodology. Based on these data, 98 (89+9) individuals and 36 (33+3) joint members can be found in Hungary (Takácsné Papp 2023).

The climate and energy commitments of these settlements led by municipalities are incorporated in the so-called Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAP), which, in

[18] *„LEADER is a European programme, with the aim to involve local actors in rural areas in the development of their own regions by forming Local Actions Groups (LAGs) and designing and implementing strategies." (http://elard.eu/leader-clld/)*

addition to the geographical, demographic and economic characteristics of the given jurisdictions, cover the energy consumption and GHG emissions of key Covenant sectors (municipal buildings, residential buildings, service buildings and transport), as well as the risks caused by climate change and the mitigation and adaptation strategic responses to them. Mitigation action measures (e.g., energy efficiency and clean energy production) can help reduce carbon dioxide or greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, adaptation measures (e.g., flood protection) increase resilience to the adverse effects of climate change (Bertoldi ed. 2018a).
The strategic plans created in the SECAP documents are complemented by an Excel annexe containing detailed data on the settlements and their plans. In many cases, these annexes are not available. The CoM updates its database annually, summarising each municipality's commitments (Baldi et al. 2023). The latter database is not always complete or contains redundancies. However, together with the textual SECAP documents, it fills in the information gaps nicely, thus enabling the analysis of the steps taken by municipalities towards sustainability and their specificities.
The publication is based on secondary research. It focuses on the 16 Hungarian cities that joined the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy and has made commitments for 2030 on its official website. The other aspect was that the data from the research point of view was available. Cities were defined according to the Nomenclature of localities in Hungary on 1 January 2022 (KSH 2023). The chosen method is document analysis. It examines the climate risk, the greenhouse gas emissions, the typical measures to reduce them and the typical financial background of the 16 cities. The 16 cities are Ajka, Balatonfüred, Budaörs, Kisvárda, Mátészalka, Pápa, Sajószentpéter, Sárvár, Szarvas, Szentes, Szigetszentmiklós, Tapolca, Tiszalök, Tiszaújváros, Várpalota and Vásárosnamény.
The research's limitation is that the examined cities measured their emission situation in different years and formulated their planned measures accordingly. Thus, there could be a minimum of two years and a maximum of 10 years between the base year and the target year of 2030, which could significantly impact the municipalities' room for manoeuvre. The results must be interpreted taking these into account.

Results

The impact of climate change is no longer only a noticeable problem for warm climate regions but also a phenomenon negatively affecting the favourable climate of the Carpathian Basin. In contrast to the previous Sustainable Energy Action Plans (SEAP) developed by municipalities between 2008 and 2015, the new methodology applied after 2018 was adapted to the changing EU goals because the Paris Climate Agreement includes a second significant pillar: adaptation. Adaptation is a strategic response to the adverse effects of climate change. Nowadays, former SEAPs have been converted into SECAPs. In the new framework, municipalities assess the factors that pose the greatest threat to local stakeholders (municipalities themselves, citizens, and companies).
Based on the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAP) of the 16 municipalities examined, I seek to investigate which consequences of climate change these settlements considered critical for themselves (Figure 1.). We can identify 151 areas at risk from climate change. The analyses classified the identified risks into eight umbrella groups. Figure 1. shows their share. Extreme storms, floods and resulting landslides (44.37%), extreme heat and fires (30.46%), extreme cold (9.27%), and other unnamed events with a weight of 6.62% are the biggest identified threats. The spread of diseases, biological hazards and groundwater floods have a much lower weight among the risk factors than the previous ones. The cities' stakeholders (municipalities, residents, representatives of industry, service sector, and agriculture) cannot combat these risks without financial investments. However, these adaptation investments do not address the cause of climate change.



Figure 1. Frequency of climate risk identified by 16 cities examined
Source: Own calculation based on Baldi et. al. 2023

Mitigation measures formulate actions (requiring and not requiring investment) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere, which is the root cause of climate change. The SECAP methodology identifies key Covenant sectors such as residential, service, municipal buildings, and transport, which are mandatory parts of a SECAP survey. The reason is that the municipalities, which are the leaders of these commitments, could mainly impact the energy consumption and emission of these sectors, in contrast to other sectors, for example, activities of industry and agriculture. Some signatories do not collect data from service buildings, so this sector's information is missing. Hence, Figures 2 illustrates the share of greenhouse gas emissions among three key areas (residential, municipal buildings, and transport) in their baseline year.



Figure 2. Share of greenhouse gas emissions of the three key areas
Source: Own elaboration based on the cities' SECAP documents and Baldi et. al. 2023

Among the 16 observed cities, municipal buildings have the lowest greenhouse gas emissions (average 6.6%); transportation takes an average of 29.78%; residential buildings (average 64.15%), except Budaörs, have the highest emissions. These and individual ratios depend on the size of the city, the number of residential and municipality buildings, their characteristics, whether they have public transport services, and many other specific factors. This publication does not detail these; it just gives a global picture.

Greenhouse gas emission depends on the amount of a given energy type and its emission factor. Energy consumption (MWh) of a given energy type multiplied by its emission factor (tCO_2eq/MWh) equals the greenhouse gas emission (tCO2eq). (Bertoldi ed 2018b.). Residential buildings had a significant share of the energy consumption, averaging 64.45%, while transport was the second most significant energy consumption sector (average 29.09%), except Budaörs. Municipal buildings had less share, average 5.45%. Fossil fuels dominate the energy mix of the 16 cities examined; the second most abundant was electricity and, where relevant, district heating. Nevertheless, 81.25% of the observed cities used renewable energy. In municipal buildings this ratio was jut 6.25%, but in the residential buildings it is favourable because solar and geothermal energy have zero emission factors. In transport, the use of gasoline and diesel is still clearly predominant, but 6 out of the 16 cities (37.5%) use renewable energy. (SECAP document of 16 cities)

To reduce the GHG emissions of the cities' successfully, targeted interventions are necessary. Together, the examined cities have planned 320 measures to reduce GHG emissions in their jurisdictions by at least 40% by 2030. One of the cities measures its emission in tonnes of carbon dioxide (tCO2) and 15 in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2eq), the unit of measure of greenhouse gas emission. This fact does not limit the analysis because 1 tonne of carbon dioxide (tCO2) equals 1 tonne of GHG emission (tCO2eq) (Bertoldi ed 2018b.). Emission reductions can be achieved through tasks requiring investment (e.g. building insulation) and tasks requiring no investment (e.g. behavioural changes). (Bertoldi ed. 2018b.) 45% of the total actions belong to municipal buildings, 29% to residential buildings, and 26% to the transport sector. 84% of the total measures need smaller greater financial investments, and only 16% do not. (Baldi et. al. 2023, SECAP document of 16 cities). Table 1 presents the types of measures and their share breakdown by the three key Covenant sectors.

Table 1. Mitigation measures of the 16 cities

Key-covenant sectors	**Share of a given measure within the total number sector's measures (%)**
Municipal buildings	**100**
Integrated action	47.23
Energy efficient lighting systems	17.36
Building insulation	14.58
Renewable energy for space heating and hot water	6.94
Behavioural changes	4.86
Energy efficiency in space heating and hot water	4.86
Information and communication technologies	4.17
Residential buildings	**100**
Integrated action	60.46
Renewable energy for space heating and hot water	15.96
Energy efficient electrical appliances	7.45
Behavioural changes	6.38
Building insulation	3.19
Energy efficiency in space heating and hot water	3.19
Information and communication technologies	2.13
Energy efficient lighting systems	1.06
Transport	**100**

Key-covenant sectors	Share of a given measure within the total number sector's measures (%)
Cleaner efficient vehicles and eco driving	41.46
Modal shift to walking and cycling	25.61
Integrated action	17.07
Car sharing pooling	6.10
Modal shift to public transport	6.10
Improvement of logistics and urban freight transport	3.66

Source: Own elaboration based on Baldi et. al. 2023

The energy consumption and GHG emissions of municipal buildings can be considered negligible in contrast to the other two key Covenant sectors examined (SECAP document of 16 cities). However, they are responsible for most planned measures (144 actions, 45% of total actions). Integrated actions have the biggest share (47.23%) among interventions. It contains the different combinations of different measures (e.g., complex energetic renovations), which are listed below. Actions connected to municipal buildings are typically building insulation (14.58%), renewable energy for space heating and hot water (6.94%), behavioural changes (4.86%), energy efficiency in space heating and hot water (4.86%), information, and communication technologies (4.17%). The proportion of measures related to the modernization of public lighting is the second highest (17.36%). The SECAP database classifies the provision of local public lighting as a part of the municipal buildings (Bertoldi ed 2018b.). The provision of local public lighting services is a mandatory task for municipalities (Mötv.). Direct (renewable energy, energy-efficient luminaires) and indirect (transactive energy, energy storage systems, demand response) investments in modernizing public lighting have a cost-saving function. LED luminaires and smart lighting controllers not only achieve significant cost savings but also emission reductions of up to 85%[19] (Sadeghian et al. 2021). However, the share of this reduction in the cities' total emissions (including residential buildings and transport) is not significant.

The second most interventions are related to residential buildings (94 actions, 29% of total actions). 60,46% of planned measures are classified in integrated actions. It contains the different combinations of different measures (e.g., complex energetic renovations), which are listed below. Renewable energy for space heating and hot water takes 15.96%. Energy efficient electrical appliances (7.45%), behavioural changes (6.38%), building insulation (3.19%), energy efficiency in space heating and hot water (3.19%), information and communication technologies (2.13%), energy efficient lighting systems (1.06%) are less mentioned areas. Despite the predominance of integrated measures, the municipality only develops the SECAP strategy; its implementation and financing are mainly the public sector's responsibility. Local authorities can only play a coordinating role. That is why it would be fruitful if municipalities paid more attention to awareness-raising actions because, thanks to these actions, residents could get information about their technical and financial opportunities. The population's lack of knowledge and financial resources could jeopardise the 2030 targets.

We can find local energy production possibilities among the municipal and residential measures, like renewable energy for space heating and hot water. It means the using of solar and solar thermal energy or geothermal energy production. The advantage of green energy production in this way is that the emission factor that determines the GHG emissions drastically decreases because the emission factors of these kinds of energy types are zero.

There are 82 actions (26% of total actions) relating to the transport sector. According to the SECAP methodology this sector includes municipal fleet, public, private, and commercial transport (Bertoldi ed. 2018b.) and is almost 100% based on fossil fuels (gasoline and diesel).

[19] "*Artificial light services account for 30% of the world's energy production. Nearly 55% of the costs associated with public lighting in a settlement are related to energy and 45% to operation.*" (Sadeghian et al. 2021, 3.)

However, Sátoraljaújhely, Szentes, Szarvas, Mátészalka, Vásárosnamény and Tiszalök used biofuels in their baseline years. (SECAP document of 16 cities) The use of electric vechicles is another key factor to cleaner transportation. With eco-driving customs and the modal shift to walking and cycling thus serve physical health, sustainability, and environmental protection. Eco-driving is a driving technology solution that means more consciously operating the car at lower revs and using the climate control system. These take the 41.46% of the interventions. (SECAPs of Sajószentpéter, Tiszalök, Vásárosnamény, Mátészalka, Szentes, Szarvas). In the plans of municipalities, electrification measures mean electric buses and the replacement of the fleet of vehicles of the municipality and its institutions. In the National Energy and Climate Plans, the greening of transport pays considerable attention. From 1 January 2022, only electric buses will be available for purchase with the support of the Green Bus Programme. (ITM 2020) Modal shift to walking and cycling, car share pooling, modal shift to public transport are the actions which do not exactly need financial investment. These take together 37.81% of the total transport measures. Integrated actions have less share, than it was in municipal and residential buildings. Improvement of logistics and urban freight transport (3.66%) has the less important role to reduce the emission caused by transport sector.

As seen from the above, GHG reduction measures are, to a large extent, investment-intensive. For municipal and residential buildings, integrated improvements play the leading role, while measures not requiring investment tend to predominate in the transport sector. However, through awareness-raising actions, municipalities can share knowledge with residents and increase their energy consciousness so they can easily reach the financial support offered.

Finally, besides estimating plans and expected impacts, the financing background of plans is also an essential factor that can determine success or failure. Planning practice should see the financing background of the planned measures. Figure 3 shows the planned funding sources for the measures planned by the 16 cities.



Figure 3. Financing source types among key-Covenant sectors
Source: Own calculation based on Baldi et. al. 2023

One of the shortcomings of the SECAP documents is that the financial sources of the planned actions in the three key areas are not defined (85%). Municipalities can be confident in planning their own resources, but even in the case of municipal buildings, local authority's own resources appear only in the case of planned measures 2.08%, in the case of transport development 1.22%, and in the case of residential buildings it does not appear at all. However, the financial resources of municipalities, complemented by national, EU or private partnership resources, can also reduce GHG in the three key areas. For municipal buildings, this proportion is 6.25%; for residential buildings, it is 5.32%; and for transport, it is 8.54%.

Overall, municipalities have a crucial role in situation assessment and planning on the path towards a sustainable, equitable and inclusive energy transition. However, their capacity to provide the financial means to achieve this is severely limited.

Discussion

The Paris Climate Agreement, concluded in 2015, was the first international agreement that brought together 196 countries worldwide to take effective action against global warming. (EU 2016 L 282) Greenhouse gas emissions are responsible for the intensification of climate change, the largest share of which can be attributed to energy production and use. The European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. This energy transition by 2050 is called the energy transition. Cities are responsible for over 30% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Melica et al. 2018). 75% of the European Union's population lives in cities, a proportion expected to rise further by 2050 (Eurostat 2022). More and more mayors recognise the responsibility of municipalities in the fight for climate protection and commit their municipalities to the reduction targets of greenhouse gas emissions. Experience shows, however, that municipalities mostly do not have the financial and human resource capacity and information to support the development and implementation of strategic goals adequately (Bertoldi et al. 2018a, Martire et al. 2018, Reckien et al. 2019, Salvia et al. 2021).
Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAPs) allow cities to assess the greenhouse gas emissions associated with their energy use and thus formulate measures to reduce them by 2030. (Bertoldi ed. 2018a.) In the future, cities and local organisations will have to make an increasing effort towards sustainable energy management. (Rivas et al. 2021, European Commission 2019) Numerous surveys and publications explore the sustainability and resilience of Hungarian municipalities (Ács et al. 2019, Nagy et al. 2018 a.-b., Nagy et al. 2021, Benedek 2021). However, evaluation of the SECAP documents is a research niche in Hungary. Based on the literature they reviewed, Eisenack and Roggero (2022) express uncertainty as to whether implementing mitigation plans impacts emission reductions and whether other factors may be behind the mitigation. Fuhr et al. published in 2018 Gouldson et al. (2016) and Bansard et al. al. (2016) state that the results achieved in GHG reduction cannot be attributed entirely to the involvement between local authorities and international organisations but instead to independent programmes already underway. The energy used and mix determines an area's greenhouse gas emissions. Buildings had the highest emissions of the areas studied, consistent with the literature. Cipriano et al. (2017) in their view, more accurate information could be obtained based on the floor area of buildings or net usable floor area, while it would also be easier to identify properties with poor energy characteristics. Cinocca et al. (2018) highlight that the methodology is constantly evolving thanks to monitoring reports, so municipalities can get an increasingly accurate picture of emissions related to their territory and the effectiveness of measures to reduce them. Fuhr et al. draw attention to an essential dilemma regarding the possibilities of municipalities (2018, 3). *"critics stress that cities largely operate in the shadow of hierarchy and have only limited capacities to tackle the problem of climate change independent of other levels of government. This implies that local decision-makers are dependent on regional, national, and international regulatory umbrellas that provide incentives and resources for cities to undertake large-scale climate action (...) Thus, the question arises whether, under which conditions, and how local governments can build enduring capacities to play their part in the global endeavour to achieve deep decarbonization."* Municipalities cannot act alone but can be influential actors in achieving climate protection goals embedded in regional, national and international cooperations. In the 2000s, it was observed that cities could take much more flexible steps to curb climate change than at the level of nation-states, and thanks to their international network, they can continue their work more effectively. (Fuhr et al. 2018) Several literary sources (Economidou et al. 2022, Melica et al. 2018, Salvia et al. 2021) deal with the role of municipalities, international networks, and international climate

organizations in achieving climate goals. Their research results prove that international climate organizations can effectively help settlements. The authors emphasize that the primary task of international climate organizations is to supplement the gaps in knowledge and practice at local levels, including municipalities, and to pass on the experience gained from good practices to help implement local measures towards climate goals as early and effectively as possible.

Conclusion

This publication first collected the consequences of climate change that the 16 cities examined with SECAP considered critical for themselves. The results show that these cities' most significant environmental threats are extreme storms, floods and resulting landslides, and extreme heat and fires. In addition, local authorities can also tackle the root cause of climate change by reducing GHG emissions in their jurisdictions. Among three key Covenant sectors (municipal and residential buildings as well as transport), municipal buildings have the lowest greenhouse gas emissions (average 6.6%); transportation takes an average of 29.78%; residential buildings (average 64.15%) have the highest emissions, except Budaörs. In contrast, the most significant share of mitigation actions belongs to municipal buildings, and the lowest share belongs to transportation. When municipalities plan the area-by-area reductions formulated in their mitigation action plans, they realistically perceive the extent of their direct intervention opportunities; they expect a more significant proportion of the planned measures from local actors.
The cumulative impact of the plans presented in the study will not be fully realized until 2030 the earliest. However, their benefits are increasingly felt as the pace of implementation increases. While climate change is a global problem, these small-scale actions at the local level are increasingly important in addressing the problem and achieving a just and sustainable energy transition.
As seen from the above, GHG reduction measures are, to a large extent, investment-intensive. For municipal and residential buildings, integrated improvements play the leading role, while measures not requiring investment tend to predominate in the transport sector. However, through awareness-raising actions, municipalities can share knowledge with residents and increase their energy consciousness to reach the financial support offered easily.
Municipalities are crucial in assessing the initial situation of their settlement and planning for a sustainable, equitable, and inclusive energy transition. However, their capacity to provide the financial means to achieve this must be improved. A future research direction could be to assess the municipal motivations behind planning through interviews.

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RÖVID TANULMÁNY/ SHORT STUDIES

Tünde Mónika Szőke [20]

Hungarian destinations affected by slow tourism - present and future

Abstract: This study examines the scientific publications on slow tourism published in Hungary, focusing on literature covering destinations that have proposed slow tourism as a development direction. The present study includes two thematic maps. The first contains the municipalities and regions where a grassroots initiative related to slow tourism exists. The second map has been extended to include the planned development sites. Based on this, the study recommends how the national tourism managment can integrate slow tourism into the domestic tourism mainstream.

Keywords: slow tourism, development, systematic literature analysis
JEL-Code: Z32, Z33, Z39

https://doi.org/10.32976/stratfuz.2023.40

Introduction

In domestic tourism, slow tourism is increasingly emerging as an alternative sustainable urban and rural development model. Researchers in the country have published several scientific papers on the subject and are making proposals for municipalities and regions to introduce this tourism product. After a short literature analysis, I will present the municipalities and regions related to slow tourism in our country. Through a systematic literature analysis, I will investigate which destinations have been mentioned in scientific publications or strategic documents as having a slow tourism approach in their future development.
By utilising the literature and destination strategies, the present study aims to determine the number of slow tourism destinations currently in Hungary and the expansion potential of destinations where slow tourism has become a development focus.
Research questions of this study:
a) What Hungarian-language studies and strategies on slow tourism involving Hungarian settlements and regions have been published?
b) Which settlements are considering slow tourism as a development option? Where is it already operating, and where is the process at the proposal stage?

Literature review

Slow tourism is today a prominent feature in both national and international literature, due to the fact that sustainability and local values are at the forefront of the life of municipalities and their urban and tourism development agendas.
Sustainability is vital to the slow tourism movement, as it strives to preserve traditions and local values. Slow food focuses on producing and processing local products (mainly agriculture and livestock). And the slow city movement is a partnership of towns and cities rich in craft traditions, well-maintained green spaces, theatres, shops, cafés, restaurants, and unspoiled landscapes (Citta Slow, 2021).
Several researchers have been working on the topic in recent years, but there is still no uniform conceptual framework in this area.

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(Zago, 2011) identifies six dimensions of slow tourism from both the demand and supply side: time, slowness, difference, authenticity, sustainability and emotional 'immersion' in the experience. The four-pillar model of slow tourism, created by Pécsek (2014), reflects localism, experientialism, sustainability and social well-being (Pécsek, Gyorsuló idő, lassuló turizmus: a lassú tuirzmus modellezése, 2014). Of these, sustainability links primarily to economic and environmental domains, while social well-being connects to social sustainability and contributes to improving quality of life (Szőke T. , 2022).

(Lackova & Rogovska, 2015) also review the results and concepts of the previous 30 years on slow tourism. The main question is whether slow food and slow tourism can be an alternative to unsustainable development. Studies identify the slow travel and slow tourism concepts and define slow travel as part of slow tourism (Szőke T. , 2022).

So slow tourism is based on slow movements, respecting local culture, history, and environment, and connecting people (Heitmann, Robinson, & Povey, 2011), which can occur in rural and urban areas. Regions should strive for excellent services, with a sense of well-being, immersion in local culture and nature, and the possibility of a leisurely meal (Meng & Choi, 2016).

However, authenticity must remain to operate in a sustainable way (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2018). A potentially positive way forward is to combine it with gastronomy tourism, which may increase guest stays (Chen & Huang, 2019) and tourist spending. These can deepen the overall impact on both tourism and the local economy (Wondirad, Kebete, & Li, 2021), as it is linked to local agriculture, animal husbandry (Brandth & Haugen, 2011), nature, and culture (Szőke T. , 2022).

Some researchers, such as (Oh, Assaf, & Baloglu, 2014) identify the goals of slow tourism participants. Traveller motivations are self-reflection, novelty-seeking, exploration, and self-enrichment, but according to (Losada & Mota, 2019) the experience is not limited to the destination but also includes the journey itself and the means of travel (Szőke T. , 2022).

Other researchers, including Serdane, Maccarrone-Eaglen, and Sharifi (2020), also address the question of slow tourism as *an umbrella, niche product or approach* (Med Pearls, 2020). Their research shows that slow tourism is neither an umbrella brand (Dickinson & Lumdson, 2010) nor a niche product (Moore, 2012) but more of an approach (Lumsdon & McGrath, 2010) on both the demand and supply side. It is compatible with any tourism element, an exercise that helps discover and experience the world. The study demonstrates that slow thinking – valuing quality over quantity – is the basis of slow tourism (Serdana, Maccarone-Eaglen, & Sharifi, 2020).

In their literature review on slow tourism, Balaban and Keller (2023) examined 63 studies in international journals over the past decade and found no uniformly accepted definition of slow tourism. Instead, the authors identify several directions:

1. (Meng & Choi, 2016): Slow tourism is a type of tourism that encourages tourists to take time to travel and pay attention to people and places.
2. (Losada & Mota, 2019): Slow tourism is the opposite of mass tourism.
3. (Serdana, Maccarone-Eaglen, & Sharifi, 2020): Slow tourism is an alternative approach to sustainable tourism.
4. (Shang, Qiao, & Chen, 2020): Slow tourism is an alternative to mass tourism focusing on sustainability and the tourist experience.
5. (Lin, Huang, & Ho, 2020): Slow tourism is an experience that encourages tourists to prefer slower modes of transport.
6. (Wondirad, Kebete, & Li, 2021), Soler et al. (2018): Slow tourism is an approach that supports the extension of the length of stay in a destination. (Balaban & Keller, A lassú turizmus szakirodalmi áttekintése, 2023)

Hungary boasted slow tourism organisations before the COVID-19 pandemic, including Slow Budapest, Slow Living Hungary and Alföld Slow Association, and there are Slow Food groups and a slow city.

Hódmezővásárhely is the only city in Hungary that has joined the CittaSlow movement. Local products include traditional Hódmezővásárhely pottery and embroidery (fur embroidery on a hemp and linen base) (Cittaslow, 2021). However, several municipalities have expressed their intention to join the Cittáslow movement in their tourism and urban development strategies.
Nelli Krajcsó founded Slow Budapest in 2012. Slow Budapest aims to raise awareness about overwork and promote a slower, more balanced life. It strives to instil a slow-paced approach that includes conscious de-stressing, self-awareness work, practicing being present, and the development of good routines. Every year, he produces an anti-deadline diary to help slow down the pace of everyday life. They have also created a Slow Map of Budapest and have organised Slow Walks, trainings and lectures on the topics noted above (Slow Budapest, 2023).
Founded in 2017 by Diána Szekeres, Slow Living Hungary is a nationwide community based on three life experiences: slow food and wine, slow travel, and slow art and culture.
Its members include wineries in Northern Hungary, restaurants, a castle hotel and a painter in Budapest (Slow Living Hungary, 2021)."
A Slow Food CE Interreg project involving five cities in five countries developed independent research and exploration programmes. The Municipality of Kecskemét was a project participant from 2017 to 2020, and its programme included mapping gastronomic traditions (Slow Food Kecskemét, 2020). The project has also produced a range of technical materials, including a Slow Food Strategy.
Founded in 2018 in Békés County, the Alföld Slow Association currently includes 25 Békés County settlements. In 2023, the association held the III Alföld Slow Conference in Békéscsaba, which exhibited local products and goods. The association has also prepared a strategy until 2030 (Szőke & Alföld Slow Egyesület, Alföld Slow Stratégia, 2023).
Nevertheless, recent crises have forced the association and tourism operators to bolster their online presence while striving to maintain a sense of personalisation (Gretzel, és mtsai., 2020), which the study destinations are implementing on their online platforms. Research on this topic supports the idea that the future lies in smart destinations (Ivars-Baidal, Celdrán-Bernabeu, Femenia-Serra, Perles-Ribes, & Giner-Sanchez, 2021), and plans are underway to continue development in this area.
The research Pécsek conducted in Mezőkövesd proved that the synergy of health tourism and cultural tourism can lead to the development of slow destinations. The author proposes the development of programme packages based on these values and creating accommodations (workcation retreat) where it is possible to live and work (Pécsek, 2019).
Budapest XII district., Szakadát (Tolna County), Heves-Mátra – Budapest (Slow Living Hungary), Kerekegyháza (Bács-Kiskun County), Abaújszántó (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County) have all joined Slow Food International by opening centres (Slow Food International, 2023).
Hungary has expanded the diversity of its slow offerings, and sustainability-based cooperation is becoming increasingly significant in domestic tourism offerings.

Methodology

A review of domestic research on designating slow tourism as a development direction has been conducted since 2000. The systematic literature review is based on the methodology of Xiao and Watson (2019). The method is very good because it helps to locate and precisely identify the focus of the research, which in this case was on existing and planned slow destinations in the country. The systematic overview of the method is as follows (*Figure 1.):*



Figure 1: The systematic literature review process
Source: (Xiao & Watson, 2017)

Step 1: Formulate the problem

Slow tourism is increasingly being discussed as a possible development direction in Hungary, but the domestic tourism development strategies (National Tourism Development Strategy 2030 {NTS 2030}, NTS Tourism 2.0) only partially address the topic concerning gastronomy. Slow movements and slow-life trends have been present for years and were reinforced by the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic (Raffay, 2021)

Today, Slow Budapest (2012), Slow Living Hungary (2018) and the Alföld Slow Association (2018) are all in operation.

Step 2: Develop and validate the review protocol

By utilising the literature and destination strategies, the present study aims to determine the number of slow tourism destinations currently in Hungary and the expansion potential of destinations where slow tourism has become a development focus.

Research questions for the literature analysis:

a) What Hungarian-language studies and strategies on slow tourism involving Hungarian settlements and regions have been published?

b) Which settlements and regions are considering slow tourism as a development option? Where is it already operating, and where is the process at the proposal stage?

The present study concentrated on Hungarian literature and consulted the Hungarian Scientific Works of Technology database (MTMT) and MERSZ.HU. Searched material includes articles, conference proceedings, doctoral dissertations and textbooks on slow tourism published in Hungarian since 2008.

The final filtering was for articles with destinations. The first step retained articles with a destination in the title or abstract. The second step involved reading the remaining articles and selecting those mentioning a municipality or region, especially in the conclusion sections.

This study does not cover publications on local products and slow food.

The research also includes domestic associations, they have their own website. So I did not examine these in the scientific articles, although they are mostly mentioned in them as well.

In addition, I searched for tourism and integrated urban development strategies on Google, which includes the term *slow* in Hungarian and English.

Step 3: Search the literature

Keywords used in the search for scientific publications included *slow tourism* in Hungarian, *slow tourism* in English, and *slow movements* in Hungarian.

Search terms used for strategies include *tourism strategy*, *slow* in Hungarian and *slow* in English and *integrated urban development strategy*, *slow* in Hungarian and *slow* in English.

MTMT had 13 hits for slow tourism in Hungarian and 9 hits for slow tourism in English, with one overlap. In addition, there was an article of the same title in 3 lines, with two different appearances, and an abstract.

In addition, the term *slow food* yielded another 15 publications, of which only eight were related to the topic and not duplicates of previous ones. There were no hits for *slow movements*. The term *slow movement* returned another nine hits, but only two were related to the topic and not repetitive.

Thus, the present study examined 30 articles based on the MTMT.

A document review left 21 publications concerning municipalities or regions where slow tourism is a possible development direction.

Subsequently, the present study concentrated on online-available articles covering national strategies and slow movement/tourism. This search was conducted on Google.

I searched for reference books on slow tourism and searched the term in the mersz.hu database. The search returned 11 books on the subject. In addition, I found one online book on trends in geo-parks, with a separate chapter on the topic. The MTMT database also lists this book.

Step 4: Screen for inclusion

Studies dealing with slow tourism or slow movements that did not include a destination in the abstract or title were filtered out, as were studies on slow movements with a primarily slow food movement focus. Two researchers should work on the screening in this method; however, given that the aim was to have a specific representation of the destinations, I waived this recommendation. The name of a destination appears in a publication, or it does not. There is no transition here; the situation is clear.

Step 5: Assess quality

Further screening occurred after reading through the studies and book chapters.

Areas where *slow tourism* was identified as a development option, but where no concrete proposals or progress have been made, have been included in the research.

The research includes areas where slow tourism was identified as a development option, but concrete proposals or progress are absent.

Therefore, the result split into two maps. One map depicts areas where slow tourism has been implemented and practised. The other map shows municipalities where slow tourism has been proposed or added to existing strategies but remains unimplemented.

Step 6: Extract data

The final data of interest to the present study concentrates on where slow tourism is already present in some form and where it is planned or written about but remains unimplemented.

Step 7: Analyse and synthesize data

Number of scientific publications and strategies on slow tourism and candidate destinations

The MTMT has published 30 publications on slow tourism in Hungarian and English. The table below shows the distribution by year. As can be seen, there have been publications on slow tourism continuously since 2012. Although this keyword has not yielded any results for 2020,

there are articles and book chapters (also available in MTMT with a different keyword) with a chapter on slow tourism *(Tables 1-2)*.

Table 2: Type and number of publications 2008–2015 (number)

Type of publication (pieces)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Hungarian Scientific Works Repository publication (keyword: slow)	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	2
destination study and book excerpt in Hungarian Scientific Works Repository (keyword: slow)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
MERSZ.HU Book excerpt (electronic edition)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strategic reference (tourism development, available online)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Integrated Urban Development Strategy	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3

Source: own editing based on a systematic literature review, 2023

Table 3: Type and number of publications 2016–2023 (number)

Type of publication (pieces)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Összesen
Hungarian Scientific Works Repository publication (keyword: slow)	1	2	2	2	0	5	3	7	**29**
destination study and book excerpt in Hungarian Scientific Works Repository (keyword: slow)	0	1	1	2	1	4	5	5	**21**
MERSZ.HU Book excerpt (electronic edition)	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	**8**
Strategic reference (tourism development, available online)	2	1	0	1	1	5	0	1	**12**
Integrated Urban Development Strategy	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	**9**

Source: author's own work based on a systematic literature review, 2023

The present research discovered that 21 publications mentioned a destination since 2012. *Table 3* lists the destination, the publication authors, the year of publication and the type of publication concerned.

Table 4: Publications proposing the development of slow tourism in destinations

Serial number	Destination (authors and year)	Type
1	Alsó-Ipoly mente (Faragóné , és mtsai., 2012)	Conference proceedings
2	Balaton (Wettstein , 2013)	Conference proceedings
3	Kőszeg (Ernszt & Lőrincz, 2017)	Scientific journal
4	Mezőkövesd (Pécsek, A lassú turizmus mint a városi turisztikai desztinációk fejlesztésének fenntartható alternatívája, 2018)	Dissertation
5	Dél-Zala, Murafölde (Cseke , Marton, Keller , & Birkner , 2019)	Journal
6	Kőszeg, Mezőkövesd, Budapest, Szeged, Hódmezővásárhely and javaslat: Makó, Kiskunhalas (Pécsek, A turisztikai termékek innovatív fejlesztése, 2019)	Book
7	Salgótarján, Karancs-Medves vidék (Molnár & Egedy, 2020)	Journal
8	Tokaj-Zemplén Térség (Dankó & Tóth , Népszerű utazási motivációk és lehetséges válaszok a Tokaj-Zemplén desztináció, 2021)	Electronic periodical
9	Alföld Slow Destination (Szőke T. , Az új turisztikai térségek. Hogyan tovább?, 2021)	Conference proceedings
10	Cserehát, Bükkalja, Bükk fennsík. (Donka, 2021)	Conference proceedings
11	Nyíregyháza - Bokortanyák (B. Pristyák & Zakor-Broda, 2021)	Conference proceedings
12	Alföld Slow Destination (Szőke T. , Az „Alföld Slow térség" versenyképességének vizsgálata, 2022)	Conference proceedings

Serial number	Destination (authors and year)	Type
13	Budapest, Wekerle telep (Pécsek, Lokális hálózatok szerepe a külvárosi turizmusban – A Wekerletelep mikro klaszter modellje, 2022)	Abstracts
14	Budapest, Hódmezővásárhely, Kőszeg, Budapest-Eger, Mezőkövesd, Alföld Slow Térség (Szőke T. , Lassú turizmus, 2022)	Book
15	Sárospatak, Zemplén (Dankó, Új turisztikai megközelítések Sárospatak és Zemplén desztináció turizmusában, 2022)	Textbook
16	Szikszó (Nagy , Marien , Papp , & Piskóti , 2021)	Textbook
17	Abaúj (Piskóti , Nagy , Marien , & Papp , 2022)	Journal
18	Slow Living Hungary, Alföld Slow Association, Budapest, Bük, Szeged, Kiskunhalas, Szikszó, Abaúj térség (Piskóti, Marien, Papp , & Nagy, 2023)	Journal
19	Tokaj-Zemplén (Dankó, Helyi termékekre fókuszáló turizmus a körforgásos és fenntartható gazdaságban., 2023)	Textbook
20	Bakony - Borzavár (Lőrincz, Szabó, & Agárdi , 2023)	Journals
21	Poroszló (Balaban & Csapody , A „lassú mozgalom” főbb irányvonalai – Turizmus, étkezés és városirányítás, 2023)	Book

Source: author’s own work based on a systematic literature review, 2023

Among the strategies available online, I searched for tourism strategies and urban development strategies. As *Tables 4 and 5* show, 13 tourism strategies and nine integrated urban development strategies have been available online since 2009.

Table 5: Strategies that mention the development of slow tourism

Serial number	Type (Author and year)	Destination
1	Cultural Tourism Development Strategy (Budai és Bartha Tanácsadó Iroda, 2009)	National
2	Spa development strategy (Budai és Társa Tanácsadó Kft., 2016)	Tapolca
3	Tourism strategy (Szőke T. , Újkígyós Város Turizmusfejlesztési Stratégiája 2016-2025, 2016)	Újkígyós
4	NTS 2030 (gastronomy) (Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség, 2017)	National
5	Marketing plan (City branding) (MEDIUS Első Győri Közvélemény- és Piackutató Bt. és EFFIX-Marketing Kft. konzorcium, 2019)	Őriszentpéter
6	Concept (MEDIUS Első Győri Közvélemény- és Piackutató Bt. és EFFIX-Marketing Kft. konzorcium, 2019)	Körmend
7	Slow Food Strategy (Corrá & Marangoni, 2020)	Kecskemét, Kiskunság
8	NTS 2030 Tourism 2.0 (gastronomy) (Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség, 2021)	National
9	Cycling Development Strategy (Keller, 2021)	Rákos-patak
10	Marketing strategy (Armadillo Reklámügynökség, 2021)	Hévíz

Serial number	Type (Author and year)	Destination
11	Tourism Concept Plan (Városkutatás Kft, Tosics Iván Ekler Építész Kft, Ekler Dezső, Csizmady Adrienne Jassó Építészműhely Kft, Jassó Sándor, Kiss Borbála Xellum Kft, Puczkó László Soóki-Tóth Gábor egyéni vállalkozó Mobilissimus Kft, Gertheis Antal, Szabó Noémi, 2021)	Szentendre
12	Destination Development Strategy (HONifo Üzletviteli Tanácsadó Kft., 2021)	Gyula
13	Tourism development strategy (Szőke & Alföld Slow Egyesület, Alföld Slow Stratégia, 2023)	Alföld Slow Destination

Source: author's own work based on a systematic literature review, 2023

The 2009 Cultural Tourism Strategy included a national strategic reference. The National Tourism Development Strategy 2030 (NTS 2030) and its complementary version, NTS 2030 Tourism 2.0, mention the slow food movement only in relation to gastronomy.

The first two municipal tourism development strategies citing slow tourism as a direction appeared in 2016 and are available online. One is Tapolca's spa development strategy that refers to Hungarian Tourism Zrt. and it states that ". . . in recent years, slow tourism has become a trend, and cycling tourism fits perfectly into its profile. Slow tourism ensures that visitors to the region do not just come for one-day excursions but discover the cultural and natural values and traditions over several days, leading to more overnight stays (Magyar Turizmus Zrt.)" (Budai és Társa Tanácsadó Kft., 2016).

The other is the tourism development strategy of Újkígyós in Békés County, where the primary focus is on the presentation and development of existing local values. One of the outcomes of this strategy has been the creation of the Alföld Slow Association in 2018, which includes 10 Békés County municipalities adhering to the understanding that developing the region in this direction required joint efforts. Since then, the number of settlements involved in the cooperation has increased to 25 (Alföld Slow Egyesület, 2023).

Slow tourism is also included in the strategy of Őriszentpéter, Körmend, Kecskemét and the Kiskunság, Hévíz, Szentendre and Gyula, and is part of the cycling strategy along the Rákos stream.

Based on a Google search, Table 5 lists the municipalities whose Integrated Urban Development Strategy includes some form of slow tourism or slow city. The present study included nine documents in its research. Slow tourism or slow city strategies appear in two Budapest districts, Lipótváros and Terézváros. Moreover, Keszthely, Szigetvár, Fertőd, Sárbogárd, Hódmezővásárhely, Kapuvár and Szikszó consider slow tourism vital to their municipalities.

Table 6: Integrated Urban Development Strategies mentioning the development of slow tourism

Serial number	Type (Author and year)	Destination
1	Integrated Urban Development Strategy	Budapest - Lipótváros
2	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (Ecorys Magyarország Kft. , Budapest Főváros Városépítési Tervező Kft. , 2015)	Budapest - Terézváros
3	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (Pro Via'91 Kft., 2015)	Keszthely

Serial number	Type (Author and year)	Destination
4	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (MSB Fejlesztési Tanácsadó Zrt., Hübner Tervező Kft., Fact Intézet, 2015)	Szigetvár
5	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (Jankó , Oszvald , & Nagy , 2017)	Fertőd
6	Integrated Urban Development Strategy	Sárbogárd
7	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (EX ANTE Tanácsadó Iroda Kft., 2022)	Hódmezővásárhely
8	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (Pro Via'91 Kft. – 2014, : TRENECON Tanácsadó és Tervező Kft., 2022)	Kapuvár
9	Integrated Urban Development Strategy (Piskóti István, alpolgármester Döbrönte Katalin, Ex-Act Projekt Tanácsadó Iroda, Paksi Szilvia,, 2022)	Szikszó

Source: author's own work based on a systematic literature review, 2023

Step 8: Report findings

In the past two decades, the term *slow tourism* has appeared in academic publications, studies, strategies, and several grassroots initiatives related to slow and sustainable tourism based on local values.

Existing and planned destinations in the country that also develop slow tourism

Two maps have been produced using Google My Maps. The first shows the municipalities belonging to the current organisations and stand-alone municipalities where progress has already been made in relation to slow tourism *(Figure 2)*. The other map includes both existing and proposed destinations *(Figure 3)*.



Figure 2: Existing slow destinations

Source: author's own work based on a systematic literature review, 2023

The map above *(Figure 2)* shows 43 municipalities, grouped by organisation as follows:
Slow Budapest: Budapest.
Slow Living Hungary: Budapest, Eger, Gyöngyös, Gyöngyöstarján, Poroszló.

Alföld Slow Association: Almáskamarás, Békés, Békéssámson, Biharugra, Csabaszabadi, Csanádapáca, Csorvás, Doboz, Ecsegfalva, Elek, Gádoros, Gyomaendrőd, Gyula, Kamut, Kardoskút, Kevermes, Kétegyháza, Kondoros, Kunágota, Lőkösháza, Magyardombegyház, Nagykamarás, Sarkad, Újkígyós, Vésztő.
Slow Food International: Budapest, Budapest, Szakadát, Kerekegyháza, Abaújszántó.
Slow map: Budapest, Bük, Szeged.
Slow Food project: Kecskemét.
Cittaslow Interntional: Hódmezővásárhely.
Additional slow settlements: Hévíz, Kiskunhalas, Kőszeg, Mezőkövesd, Nyíregyháza, Szikszó.



Figure 3: Existing and proposed slow destinations
Source: author's own work based on a systematic literature review, 2023

As *Figure 3* illustrates, the proposals for slow tourism for each region mainly cover areas that are not strictly tourism areas (with one or two exceptions, such as the proposal for Lake Balaton and Budapest). In total, there are 151 municipalities on the map, 108 more than the number of municipalities affected by slow tourism today. There are several proposals in Northern Hungary: the Alsó-Ipolymente, Sárospatak, Tokaj-Zemplén, Abaúj or Bükk regions, and several settlements in the Bakony and Southern Zala.
If these municipalities develop this tourism product, the country could become a key location for slow tourism. These planned and existing areas are where regional development policy should receive priority.

Summary

Since 43 municipalities in Hungary are already involved in some form of slow-movement or slow tourism, and another 100 municipalities could be involved in the future, it would be worthwhile to prepare a separate national strategy for this trend. The literature refers to slow tourism as a niche product too, and the present study recommends that national tourism management prepare strategies for existing and potential niche products, including garden tourism, film tourism, handicraft programmes, bleisure tourism or even fashion tourism, give priority to this area, too. Thus, taken as a whole, tourism management would treat these tourism products as exciting and relevant complementary products to today's needs.

Research limitations

The present research focused only on destinations currently involved with slow tourism and with destinations where managers are considering slow tourism in their municipalities or regions via some tourism product.

A critical assessment of individual destinations from this perspective is not presented and will be part of a further research process.

A further limitation was the search on the World Wide Web, especially in relation to strategies.

Research delimitations

The present study did not address slow food, local producers or local goods in detail. Though these are valuable and crucial components of the slow movement and slow tourism, they are components rather than full representations of the niche product.

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KÖNYVSZEMLE / BOOK REVIEW

József Benedek[21]

Henry Wai-Chung Yeung:
Interconnected Worlds. Global electronics and production networks in East Asia.
Stanford University Press, Innovation and Technology in the World Economy Series,
Stanford, 2022.

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The Global Production Network (GPN) approach has become a central conceptual piece in the explanation of transnational organizational forms of the economic activity since the early 2000s. The original heuristic framework labeled as GPN 1.0 was later developed into a more explanatory theory labeled as GPN 2.0 (Coe and Yeung, 2015), by proposing an intellectually challenging explanation on the interconnectedness of regions, economic sectors and organizations.

The author of this outstanding monograph, Henry Yeung, is a distinguished professor of economic geography at the National University of Singapore, and one of the proponents and main exponents of the GPN approach. He proposes in his book a comprehensive, theory-driven and empirically sound analysis of electronics global production networks. Written in an accessible language, the book represents a significant geographical contribution to the understanding of complex relationships and networks shaping the electronics industry.

Using the motif of "worlds" - as did Michael Storper in his famous work on the "regional worlds" – Yeung argues that the interconnected worlds as a predominant model of organizing electronics production started in the 1990s when the production of the sector moved from the multinational worlds of lead firm located in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan towards globalized and macroregional worlds centered in East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam). The author considers the 2010s as a crucial period when East Asian economies and lead firms became dominant in electronics manufacturing.

Based on a rich empirical material (proprietary data at the firm and component levels) and an extensive fieldwork in East Asia during 2017 and 2018 (64 interviews across 44 lead firms from East Asia) the book reveals the interrelationships between geographical space and companies in four sectors of the electronics industry: semiconductors, personal computers, mobile handsets and consumer electronics/televisions. These interrelationships are perceived as asymmetrical: lead firms have the active role of integrating macroregions and national economies into so-called "interconnected worlds" of global electronics. The outsourcing of production and the organization of intricate GPNs connecting diverse regional economies are the main sources for the emergence of these "interconnected worlds".

The book came out in the right moment, when during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 the shortage in semiconductor supply has captured the attention of governments, companies and academia. The perceived fragility of global supply chains was additionally exacerbated by the increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the United States, and recently by the war

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between Russia and Ukraine. As a consequence, a range of economic policy regulations in Europe and the United States are intending to support the direct state investment in the semiconductor industries in order to reduce the dependency (decoupling from) on supply chains based in East Asia.

The book is not only anchored in the GPN theoretical perspective developed by the Manchester School (Peter Dicken, Henry Yeung, Neil Coe, Jeffrey Henderson, Martin Hess), but moreover: one of its main novel contribution to the existing literature is related to the alignment of an in-depth empirical analysis to the recent GPN 2.0 theory. Acknowledging the outstanding role played by semiconductors as critical intermediate goods for ICT end products, the empirical discussion of each chapter follows the same logical order: it starts with semiconductors before analysing the end products.

Chapter 1 describes the interconnected worlds of electronics understood as an outcome of a co-evolutionary process which has emerged from the innovative production systems of Silicon Valley. Yeung illustrates convincingly the coevolutionary global shift in electronics from the nationally based production systems in the US, Japan and Western Europe prior to 1990 toward highly interconnected worlds underpinned by complex and spatially dispersed production networks comprising US, Western European and East Asian lead firms in the 2010s. This major shift is explained by the changing national and institutional contexts in East Asia and by the strategic coupling of East Asian firms and economies with GPNs.

Chapter 2 offers a brief overview of the historical evolution of three segments of global electronics, from the 1970s/1980s onward, focusing on leading national firms. The author documents comprehensively how indispensable semiconductors are to the development of complex production networks in ICT devices. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the book based on Coe and Yeung's (2015) conceptual work. It is an essential part of the book which needs additional effort from the readers less familiar with the GPN literature. The effort is worth it, because it frames the empirical parts of the following three chapters, which are explicitly related to the GPN 2.0 theory. Chapter 4 brings empirical facts for outlining the geography of electronics industry ("where"), following two dimensions: industrial-organizational (worldwide production locations) and intrafirm configurations (worldwide locations of key corporate functions). Chapter 5 focuses on the firm level identifying the business strategies and organizational innovations of the sector ("how").

The key chapter of the book is chapter 6, where he considers that the success of East Asia can be explained by organizational innovations that enabled East Asian companies to gain important competitive advantages ("why"). He identifies four drivers of GPNs success in East Asia: optimizing cost-capability ratios, capitalizing on the market imperative, managing financial discipline and mitigating risks by ensuring good governance.

The concluding Chapter 7 addresses some challenges for corporate and public policy; knowledge gaps to be addressed in future research such as how technological innovations occur. Yeung's public policy recommendations are balanced, arguing for global strategic partnerships, nurturing competitive advantage within key locations and an open pro-ecosystem approach rather protectionism and return to "national worlds".

Beside impressive recent book reviews (Huggins and Johnston, 2022), it is certainly very interesting to read this book from an Eastern European perspective. What can learn the regional science and regional policy community of this region of the world from Henry Yeung's impressive case study analysis on East Asia? Especially the actual geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe makes this question to be very difficult to answer for. The macroregional differences between East Asian countries and Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) are evident, and economic history is not repetitive: that means, I am convinced that the phantastic development path of the four Eastern Asian "tigers" (South Korean, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) can not be imitated and repeated in different cultural, economic, geopolitical and territorial contexts. However, there are some clear takeaways from the Eastern Asian experiences: first, the central role of national policies enhancing the endogenous capacities for

research and development, and for higher education. Second, the strategic coupling of national firms to the international market dynamics, or, in other words, the strengthening of the international competitiveness of national champion firms. The crucial question remains, are there enough learning and adapting capacities in the firms, organizations or central governments of CEE countries to learn this lesson?

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Szerzőink figyelmébe

A szerkesztőség kéri a szerzőket, vegyék figyelembe a formai megjelenésre vonatkozó alábbi szempontokat:

Terjedelem, kiegészítések:

A „Tanulmány" rovatban maximálisan 35.000, a többi rovatokban maximálisan 18.000 karakter terjedelmű tanulmány közölhető.
A tanulmány elejére öt soros összefoglalót, valamint 3-5 kulcsszó megnevezését és JEL-kód meghatározást kérünk.
A szöveget fájlban kérjük leadni, lemezen vagy e-mailen. (MS WORD bármelyik változatában lementve.)
Kb. 10-15 sorban rövid összefoglalót kérünk a tanulmányról angolul, valamint a cikkben szereplő ábrák és táblázatok címét is kérjük angolul.
Kérjük a szerző adatainak megadását az alábbiak szerint: név, tudományos fokozat, beosztás, munkahely

Szöveg formázása

Oldalméret: JIS B5 – 18,2 x 25,7 cm.
Margók: fent: 2,22, alul: 2,5, balról: 2,5, jobbról: 2 cm; fejléc és lábléc: 1,25 cm.
Betűtípus és betűméret: Times New Roman 10-es, a jegyzetek 9-es betűmérettel.
Bekezdések: cím után nincs behúzás, egyébként 0,7 cm, a bekezdések között sorkihagyás nincs.
Címek: stílusbeállítás nélkül, fő cím és a fejezetek címek vastag, az alfejezetek címei vastag és dőlt betűtípussal.
Szövegközi kiemelések: szimpla dőlt betűtípussal.

Ábrák, táblázatok:

Terjedelmi okok miatt kérjük, hogy egy tanulmányban legfeljebb 4-5 ábra szerepeljen.
Az ábrákat (pl.: térképek, diagramok, rajzok, fényképek) és táblázatokat megfelelően formázva a szövegbe építve kérjük elküldeni. A fénymásolással, szkenneléssel készült ábrákat nem tudjuk elfogadni, mert a nyomda számára nem megfelelő a minőségük. Színes ábrák közlésére sincs módunk. Mindenképpen szükséges az ábrák és táblázatok külön számozása (pl.: 1. ábra; 2. ábra; 1. táblázat; 2. táblázat), s hivatkozásuk pontos feltüntetése a szövegközben, zárójelben, döntve: (1. ábra) vagy (1. táblázat).
Az ábra címét az ábra alatt, középen elhelyezve, a táblázatok címét a táblázat fölött balra igazítva kérjük elhelyezni. Az ábrák és táblázatok alatt fel kell tüntetni a forrást is. Ha saját készítésű az ábra, akkor a „Forrás: Saját szerkesztés, ill. Saját számítás." megnevezést kell használni.

Irodalmi hivatkozások, jegyzetek:

Az irodalmi hivatkozásokat minden esetben kérjük feltüntetni, a szerző vezetéknevét és a kiadását évét zárójelbe téve. Pl.: (Conti 1993). Pontos idézetnél az oldalszám is szükséges. Pl.: (Conti 1993, 76) vagy (Conti 1993, 76-86). A hivatkozások ne lábjegyzetként, hanem csak a fent leírt formában kerüljenek a szövegbe.
Az irodalomjegyzékben csak olyan tételek szerepeljenek, amelyekre a szövegközben hivatkozás található, s minden meghivatkozott irodalmat feltétlenül fel kell tüntetni az irodalomjegyzékben.

A jegyzeteket kérjük a szöveg végén, számozott formában elhelyezni. A jegyzetek a főszöveg kiegészítéseit tartalmazzák, ne legyen bennük pl. ábramagyarázat, hivatkozás.
A szöveg után kérjük beírni az irodalomjegyzéket, a következő alapformákban:
Könyv: szerző (megjelenés éve): *A mű címe*. A kiadás helye: a kiadó neve.

Folyóirat: szerző(k) (a megjelenés éve): A cikk címe. *A folyóirat neve*. (Az évfolyam sorszáma), a szám sorszáma, a cikk kezdő és befejező oldalszáma.
Gyűjteményes kötetben szereplő cikk: szerző(k) (a megjelenés éve): A cikk címe. In: *A gyűjteményes kötet címe. (*szerk. vagy ed(s): Szerkesztő(k) neve), a kiadás helye: a kiadó neve, a hivatkozott írásmű kezdő és befejező oldalszáma.

Példák:
CRONAUGE, U. (1992): Kommunale Unternehmen. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag
ALCHIAN, A.-DEMSETZ, II. (1972): Production, information costs and economic organisation. *America Economic Review*, 2. 775-795.
PÉTERI G. (1991): Az önkormányzatok és oktatási intézményeinek viszonya, finanszírozási kérdések. In: Önkormányzat és iskola. (szerk.: Kozma T.) Budapest: Oktatáskutató Intézet, 122-154.

Köszönjük!

Szerkesztőség

Notes for Contributors

The editorial board of the journal welcomes studies on economic, regional and social issues in Hungarian and in English language. Our journal was launched in 2004. It is published four times a year from 2021 (of which once in English and three times in Hungarian). We are waiting for studies, essays and book reviews submitted for the first publication only. The studies are rated by two double-blind reviewers in each case.

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Please provide the author's details as follows: name, academic degree, position, job.
The text is to be submitted in file by e-mail. (Any version of MS WORD can be used for saving it.)
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A maximum of 4-5 figures can be included in a paper for reasons of length.
Figures (e.g. maps, diagrams, drawings, photos) and the tables are to be appropriately formatted and incorporated in the text. Figures produced by photocopying and/or scanning cannot be accepted, for their quality is not suitable for the press. It is not possible to publish colour figures.
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References to literature are to be given in every case: the author's name and the year of publication in brackets. E.g.: (Conti 1993). For quotations the page is also to be given. E.g.: (Conti 1993, p.76) or (Conti 1993, pp.76-86). References are not to be given as footnotes, but only in the above format in the body of the text.
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Paragraphs: no indentation after the title, otherwise 0.7 cm, no line spacing between paragraphs.
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Books: author (year of publication) Title of the work, name of publisher, place of publication.

Periodicals: author(s) (year of publication) Title of the paper. Name of the periodical. (Number of volume), number of issue, numbers of the first and last pages of the paper.

Books with several authors: author(s) (year of publication) Title of the paper. In: Title of the book. (szerk. or ed(s), or Hrsg.: Name(s) of editor(s)), name of publisher, place of publication, numbers of the first and last pages of the paper referred to.

Examples:

Cronauge, U. (1992): Kommunale Unternehmen. Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin.

Alchian, A.-Demsetz, II. (1972): Production, information costs and economic organisation. American Economic Review (XII.) 2. pp. 775-795.

Péteri G. (1991): Az önkormányzatok és oktatási intézményeinek viszonya, finanszírozási kérdések. In: Önkormányzat és iskola. (szerk.: Kozma T.) Oktatáskutató Intézet, Budapest, pp. 122-154.

Please make sure that if the literature used has a DOI number, it must be listed in the bibliography!

Thank you!

The Editorial Board