Compliance in competition law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46941/2025.se1.3Keywords:
competition law, corporate compliance, ex-ante and ex-post prevention, deterrence, fine reductions.Abstract
This study aims to examine the operation of competition law compliance from two perspectives. First, it examines how competition regulation's compliance mechanism works from the perspective of promoting compliance. Subsequently, it highlights the difficulties associated with corporate competition compliance. Furthermore, it describes how to avoid automatic fine reduction while recognizing compliance efforts.
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