The concept of property in natural law within classical legal theory: innate or acquired rights

Abstract

This study examines the natural law interpretation of property rights in classical legal theory. Thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Fichte offered divergent answers to whether property is an innate right or a socially constructed, acquired right. For Hobbes, property is secured only by the state; Locke derived it from labour; Rousseau saw it as the root of inequality; Kant grounded it in pure reason; and Fichte viewed it as a condition of human freedom. In Hungarian legal thought, Mihály Szibenliszt articulated an intermediate position: property is not innate, nor solely a creation of the state, but an acquired right rooted in the right of personality. The study highlights how Szibenliszt's conception fits into the broader natural law debates and how it contributed to shaping the idea of the modern rule of law.